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This thesis examines working-class aspirants’ experiences of class mobility 
and attempts at class transition in ‘becoming’ middle-class. Focusing on 
the interiority of aspirant endeavour it examines the psychical, emotional, 
ontological and existential features of this striving for a ‘better classed life’ 
and the class-related anxieties that can ensue. The discussion draws on 
the work of key contributors to discourses on class, self and upward 
mobility. Central to this is the work of Bourdieu and his use of the 
embodied habitus. I contextualise this framing concept and other 
conceptual tools such as misrecognition and symbolic violence in relation 
to the ‘aspirant self’. Critiques by Bourdieu’s adherents and critics are used 
to build an argument for the significance of the emotional and psychical 
challenges in the reflexivity of aspirational endeavour. The study 
undertaken by Sennett and Cobb of the ‘hidden injuries of class’ is used 
with related research on the loss of a ‘familiar’ or authentic selfhood. The 
discussion also examines the ontological insecurity that can arise as a 
result of shifting class identities during and beyond mobility and class 
transition. I also draw on relevant personal experience, presented in the 
form of vignettes, in order to further explore and convey the nature of 
working-class aspiration on an embodied self. 
 
The thesis makes a novel contribution to existing debates on the interiority 
and psychical issues of social mobility and class. By critiquing selected 
examples, I suggest that there is a basis for an existential sociology 
approach to class transition which places ontological insecurity and 
existential anxiety alongside the structural-determinist barriers of class as 
key components and inhibitors affecting class transition. The thesis 
therefore argues that working-class aspirants often experience psychical 
barriers in making this transition into middle-class life; that they carry 
injurious residues of their classed origins within their mobility trajectories, 
and that these often impose social and cultural constraints on a successful 
transition into the middle-class. In these ways the thesis makes a further 
contribution to the existing literature on the nuanced nature of aspiration 
and working-class mobility by extending the theme of hysteresis and 





          Page 
 
Abstract         4 
 
Introduction        6 
 
Chapter 1 Structural determinants of class and their  34 
impact on aspiration, mobility and class  
transition. 
 
Chapter 2 Critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus: determinist   75 
tendencies; reflexive potential and processes 
of ‘internalisation’. 
 
Chapter 3 Working-class aspirants’ perceptions of   111 
self-worth, self-regard and self-esteem  
during class transition. 
 
Chapter 4 Aspirants’ experiences of inauthenticity,   153 
changing identity and ‘becoming’ middle  
class.  
 
Chapter 5 Aspirants’ experiences of  ontological insecurity  189 
and the anxieties of selfhood during class  
transition. 
 
Conclusion         238 
 
Appendix         249 
 





I see myself as being from the working-class while now living a middle-
class lifestyle.1 However, to say this, in this way, is immediately 
problematic and forms the rationale and motive for undertaking this work. 
The experience of entering and being in this ‘other world’ of the middle-
class still seems foreign, incomplete and uncomfortable to me, since I 
carry the residues and legacy of my working-class self and the psychical 
scars and injuries of this class transition. Recollections of experiencing the 
transition into this other class and how, as a result, a different sense of 
being can evolve, form the basis of this thesis. 
 
In my case, and seemingly quite by accident, in my late teens, I and some 
of my Liverpool working-class friends unwittingly experienced a kind of 
‘class revelation’. We met and became friends with a group from the 
middle-class from the affluent area across the River Mersey, with whom 
we bonded and spent most of our leisure time. Despite growing up in a 
city where class divisions seemed to be acutely transparent; where 
working-class culture was (and still is) brazenly pride-inducing, our class 
differences did not seem an issue at first. It was the leisure pursuit we all 
embraced that was the catalyst for our friendship and this pushed any 
sense of ‘class difference’ out of view. This is perhaps an indicator of how 
imprecise, nuanced and mutable social class can be in terms of 
experiencing its divisions and differences, particularly when considering it 
in the context of social aspiration and mobility.2 
 
Yet gradually, as our friendships developed, this sense of connectedness 
with another class evoked deep feelings of inadequacy and ineptitude in 
me. In specific encounters with my ‘posh’ friends I became conscious of 
 
1 I provide a definition of social class and the use of the terms ‘working-class’ and 
‘middle-class’ later in this Introduction. 
 
2 I consider ‘social aspiration’ to be an instrument of individual self-enrichment 
(see Jones 2011, p. 10) and a desire for the realisation of ambitions, ideals or 
accomplishments. I use the term in conjunction with ‘social mobility’, which I 
define as bringing improvements to the social status and wellbeing of individuals 
or groups. I develop these definitions further in this Introduction and in Chapter 
1. 
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nuanced differences between us. Differences of lifestyle, demeanour and 
character. These friends weren’t overtly snobbish, and they did not behave 
in an arrogant way. Indeed, they were kind, friendly people, but they were 
undoubtedly different from us in particularly subtle ways.3 We all got along 
really well in this mutually stimulating environment until gradually some 
of them went off to university, or pursued careers in other places. 
However, I recall that I was often irritated and envious of their self-
assurance and ‘ways of being’. For they had all received a good education 
and this clearly gave them key advantages which, at the time, I was 
unable to fully understand or appreciate. They seemed to be better armed 
for a more fulfilling life and they seemed to take this for granted. 
 
But there was one significant outcome that emerged from these social 
encounters. These middle-class friends had shown me how I might 
prepare myself for a different kind of life. It was the mid 1960s and I was 
in my late teens. I had left school and was working in the motor trade as 
an apprentice mechanic. I recall that it was through these new social 
encounters I began to compare myself with these new friends. Also, and 
without actually realising how or why it might be the case, I began to feel 
that my job was somehow less attractive than I had previously thought 
and that it lacked future prospects. Moreover, this increasing 
disenchantment became tempered with a growing awareness of other 
possibilities and a more positive desire for a change of life course. It 
became clear that my new middle-class friends had motivated me to 
reflect on my situation and to consider pursuing educational qualifications 
that I had previously convinced myself were beyond my capabilities. 
 
But was I being drawn into an illusion here? One that suggested that ‘the 
grass was greener’ in other types of occupation and lifestyle? Indeed, why 
was I feeling ambivalent about my class origins and often unable to feel 
proud and self-assured about being working-class and working in the 
 
3 I explore these nuanced class differences throughout the thesis within the 
context of social aspiration and consider examples of mobility in the trajectories 
of working-class aspirants. 
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motor trade? After all, fully skilled motor engineers were known to earn a 
good living. Perhaps it was to do with feeling insecure and that I was 
perhaps unsuited to the garage workplace culture. Or, perhaps I had 
previously convinced myself that I was not capable of doing anything 
‘brainier’, or ‘refined’, or of higher status, or more ‘worthy’? Or, perhaps I 
had seen the promise of another style of life that my middle-class friends 
seemed to possess? Perhaps I was envious of their life prospects and the 
social and cultural advantages that they seemed to embody? 
 
I later left the garage trade and tried other jobs, before eventually, in the 
early 1970s, when in my mid-20s, applying for a course at a further 
education college. Once this was underway, I gradually learned new 
academic skills and internalised what might be considered a ‘more refined’ 
set of values that enabled me to develop new ways of thinking, being and 
of seeing the world around me.4  
 
I consider this shift in values and ways of being to be pivotal both in this 
autobiographical account and in writing this thesis. However, I do not 
imply from this that being working-class equates with being unrefined, 
unintelligent or less important than being middle-class. Nor do I consider 
this example of emerging class transition and self-transformation to be a 
betrayal of my working-class roots, loyalties or identity. Indeed, my 
working-class friends and I would openly valorise our class origins and 
attributes in the company of our middle-class friends, although this was 
often done in reactive and defensive ways. Rather, my experience of this 
shift in values and ‘ways of being’ is significant because it demonstrates 
the complex, nuanced and sensitive nature of social class and class 
transition. 
 
I didn’t have a good start in terms of my early life and secondary 
education, as I show in my personal vignettes later in the thesis. 
Furthermore, this retrospective personal account raises important 
 
4 I discuss the concept of ‘internalisation’ and its significance to social mobility 
later in this Introduction and further throughout the thesis. 
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questions relating to social aspiration and mobility. It provides a vivid 
example of the perception of the classed self; the emotional and 
ontological challenges that are brought about by class inequalities and the 
range of preconditions and experiences from which working-class people 
might become socially mobile.5 
 
Fortunately, I received inspirational tuition at the F.E. College and with 
increasing determination, encouragement and self-belief I was gradually 
able to make some intellectual leaps. These gave me the confidence to 
apply for and undertake a university course beginning in 1974. However, 
I still found academic study challenging and had repeated feelings of 
inadequacy and low self-worth. My self-esteem fluctuated markedly, 
commensurate with my ability to apply myself to study and in my reaction 
to coursework grades and examination results. 
 
These feelings of uncertainty and self-doubt persist to this day. Now, in 
2020, I still harbour a lingering sense of ‘incompleteness’. So, although it 
might be perceived that I achieved much by eventually completing 
university degrees in the 1970s and 1980s and becoming an F.E. college 
and then university lecturer by 1989, I still find it difficult to feel any 
intrinsic pride in my achievements. Furthermore, depending on the 
context and the company I am in, I can oscillate between feeling uneasy 
about, or proud of my class origins. For example, in middle-class 
environments I can sometimes feel embarrassed, unrefined, unworthy or 
defensive. Although these sentiments are now more managed, I still carry 
and harbour a visceral sense of a ‘lack’ of place and belonging; of feeling 
like a ‘fish-out-of-water’. I can often feel an ambivalence and a sense of 
being de-centred; feelings which are indistinct and thus difficult to 
pinpoint. I consider these ambivalences to be what Sennett and Cobb 
(1973) refer to as the ‘hidden injuries of class’. 
 
 
5  I define and use the term ‘ontological’ throughout the thesis as relating to 
‘being’ and, in particular, to ‘becoming’. I use these terms in the existential 
sociological sense of ontological security and particularly ontological insecurity in 
experiencing security, or otherwise, in the events of one’s life. 
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These uneasy self-reflections have led me to conclude that they are 
manifestations of internalised classed conflicts in which class is, perhaps, 
both the generic cause and the nurtured effect. I therefore consider here, 
in the context of social mobility, how and why social class carries such 
psychological, ontological and existential concerns that are as significant 
as the more commonly understood economic, social and cultural 
distinctions, differences and inequalities. It is these psychical concerns 
that form the core and direction of this thesis. I show how class impacts 
on the sense of self of working-class mobiles 6 and how it tends to 
distinguish, separate, mark, divide and diminish the self, when 
experiencing social mobility, class transition and in seeking to safeguard 
and improve wellbeing and to further self-transformation. 
 
The above personal vignette also shows the contextual and contingent 
nature of aspiration and mobility, however, not necessarily as a series of 
random events and social and cultural connections that may seem prosaic 
and unsurprising. Rather, I submit that it is the personal embodied history 
of these proximal connections and potential discordances that are 
significant. Moreover, it is the often experienced intimidatory nature of 
middle-class cultural settings and the resulting interconnectivities that 
working-class aspirants face when struggling to achieve a ‘better life’. This 
tends to expose both the structural, symbolic and internalised psychical 
inhibitors of class (see Reay 2005, 2015; Skeggs 2004; Lawler 1999, 
2000; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001; Sennett and Cobb 1973). 
 
My contacts with the middle class triggered a new class direction for me 
that was to be life-changing, although not always life-affirming. 
Furthermore, I experienced some awkward and at the time, 
unsophisticated reflections about myself and my situation, which to this 
 
6 I use the term ‘working-class aspirant’ synonymously with ‘aspirant mobile’. This 
is in order to affirm these key framing concepts and to differentiate working-class 
aspirational endeavour from that of the middle-class. I argue that middle-class 
opportunities for social mobility, which I do not discuss in any depth, tend to be 
more advantageous owing to the greater access to social, cultural and other forms 
of ‘capital’ (see Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Savage 2015). 
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day continue to surface and perplex me. For example, why in my teens, 
had I thought myself incapable of realising the goals that I was later able 
to achieve? Why did I take so long to seek and find a different path and 
way forward?  
 
In addressing these questions I can conclude that my sense of class 
disadvantage left me ‘feeling I was not good enough‘; with the anxiety of 
‘forever needing to catch up’ with what I might have done if circumstances 
had been different; of continually trying to validate myself; of needing to 
feel a firmer sense of entitlement and self-worth like those middle-class 
friends seemed to possess; of needing to manage and transcend those 
internalised psychical class inhibitors I experienced in those early days. 
 
Of course, there are many like me, aspirant mobiles who have pursued 
one mobility trajectory or another and have managed to pass through 
what can be termed the ‘class ceiling’. However, also like me, there are 
those who have, to a greater or lesser degree, struggled to embrace and 
internalise the tenets and sensibilities of middle-class life. As I show 
throughout the thesis, there are many who have found it difficult to fully 
accept and to feel they belong as an authentic part of that class and its 
ways of being. Perhaps some have undergone this journey without being 
conscious of it? Perhaps, they have embraced and internalised the social 
norm of meritocracy and the desire to ‘get on’ without critically reflecting 
on the process of self-transformation they have undergone, and the 
potentially nuanced and psychical costs incurred in such a change of 
being? Or, perhaps their working-class ties have been too strong to 
relinquish or abandon since they continue to see the inherent worth and 
power of the working-class? I consider these inner tensions to be 
existentially profound, puzzling and in need of further investigation. 
 
Moreover, I suggest that such personal accounts are helpful in centring 
attention on the feelings and reflections of such working-class mobiles.7 I 
 
7 See footnote 6 above for a definition and use of this term. 
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submit that such accounts provide an interpretative basis upon which to 
examine the psychical aspects of class and self, where class is to be 
regarded as an internalised and embodied phenomenon at both a personal 
and collective level. As such, evidence suggests that while class aspiration 
and mobility may be experienced in uniquely nuanced ways by each 
working-class aspirant, there are potential similarities and overlaps of 
experience across this disparate group from within the working-class (see 
Bourdieu 1977, 1994; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Allen 2013; Friedman 
2016; Savage 2015). I explore these differences and similarities 
throughout the thesis. 
 
A definition of class. 8 
There are numerous theories and perspectives of class involving many 
class categorisations.9 It is therefore important to clarify at the outset how 
I am defining social class and the related terms of ‘working-class’ and 
‘middle-class’. The thesis adheres to Bourdieu’s emphasis on the access, 
or lack of access, to economic and symbolic capital 10 as a benchmark of 
class position. Hence, I specifically focus on those who are, to varying 
degrees struggling 
 
“for the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world, or more 
precisely, for the recognition, accumulated in the form of symbolic capital 
of notoriety and respectability, which gives authority to impose the 
legitimate knowledge of the sense of the social world, its present meaning 
and the direction in which it is going and should go” (Bourdieu 2000, 
p.185). 
 
Bourdieu generally places less emphasis on economic capital and strictly 
speaking does not offer a typology of classes (Crossley 2012). However, 
 
8 Please note that for clarity and structuring purposes the key terms and 
concepts cited in this sub-section are defined below in the following sub-section. 
 
9 For an historical account and analysis of these approaches see for example 
Savage (2000, 2015); Goldthorpe (1980). 
 
10 I define and apply these forms of capital later in this Introduction and in 
Chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis. 
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he notes that in the second part of the 20th Century the then middle-class 
emerged from the partial separation of ownership from control of the 
means of production (Crossley 2012, p. 87). In this, the middle-class 
performed a central role in the control of capital and through the so called 
‘managerial revolution’ secured increasing control and management of the 
working-class (Sweezy 1942). The emergence of high salary occupations 
and a dependence upon scarce forms of cultural knowledge, as well as an 
expansion of education and the increased significance of qualifications, 
also contributed to this change. The coupling of economic capital with the 
emergence of cultural knowledge and symbolic capital became a 
significant lever in differentiating class (see Crossley 2012, p. 87). 
 
For my purposes here, I note that, historically, the composition of social 
classes has been shaped and reshaped within prevailing and dominant 
economic orders and inherently there is deemed to be a struggle between 
classes. I perceive the two socio-economic change dynamics of class 
fluidity and upward mobility to be inter-related and mutually affecting. I 
also consider social class to be structural insofar as class divisions are 
amorphously demarcated through socio-economic barriers and emerging 
and shifting class signifiers (see Bourdieu 1977, 1986, 1990; Lawler 2005; 
Morley 1997; Skeggs 1997). 
 
I therefore take the view that through a socio-economic hierarchical 
system of power, control and domination, these fluid divisions restrict 
upward mobility both economically and in cultural terms. I consider such 
a fluid class structure to be coercively enduring through the effective 
access to, or denial of access, to economic and other forms of capital. 
Social, cultural, emotional, intellectual and knowledge-based capitals are 
important examples of where and how symbolic power and domination is 
derived and secured in these fields of social life (Bourdieu 1986, 1994; 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
 
The struggle to access and control such symbolic capital enables those 
who possess it to perpetuate such advantageous positions in the current 
hierarchical order and thus from this, to derive “degrees of social 
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recognition” (Crossley 2012, p. 86). I consider those with access to such 
capitals and the acumen to secure such socio-cultural capital to be 
relatively advantaged and privileged social groups and thus to be ‘middle-
class’. 
 
In contrast, the working-class are those with limited or no access to such 
capitals, or with limited or no experience and knowledge of their effective 
use. Hence, they more than likely have relatively little power and 
influence. Potentially, they will be variably subjected to forms of 
domination, stigmatisation, coercion and restriction in their life chances 
and choices by those with access to economic, social, cultural and symbolic 
capital who are thus in relative positions of power as a result of this (see 
Savage 2015, p. 335; Skeggs 2004). Furthermore, I consider to be 
‘working-class’ those who are historically disadvantaged by internalised 
forms of structural inequality, domination and power. The extent to which 
members of this class are predisposed to be(come) aspirational and 
upwardly mobile will be influenced by their relative position within the 
social space; by the fields in which they practice and relative to their 
reflexive understanding of their lived experiences and the possibilities for 
change (Crossley 2012, p. 86). It will also depend upon their perceptions, 
expectations, rationale and world view as to how they may gain access to 
available capitals. 
 
Defining class is far from straightforward. Indeed, using terms such as 
‘working-class’ and ‘middle-class’ is bound to be imprecise, particularly in 
the context of aspirational endeavour and social mobility since these are 
phenomena that are multifariously practiced across sections of the 
working-class. In this, further empirical research would help in clarifying 
how aspiration and mobility are currently practiced within the working-
class given the fluidity and mutability of class relations and structures. 
This definition of class would seem to be consistent with the sociological 
thread of the thesis. As I show when discussing processes of 
internalisation (see separate section in this Introduction), these give rise 
to an examination of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and the embodied self. 
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I therefore seek to unpick the puzzle of why classed experiences of 
aspiration and upwardly mobility often present challenges for working-
class aspirants when seeking to secure a ‘better’ life. In this, I focus on 
why and how aspirant mobiles proximate towards middle-class mores and 
norms and assimilate these in their mobility trajectories. I also consider 
the emotional reactions that can arise in making the break with ‘familiar’ 
working-class traditions; in such ways of being and the transformations of 
the self that might arise in ‘becoming’ middle-class. These psychical 
impacts of class mobility can be shown to raise confusions over class 
identity and position for many aspirants were issues of authenticity, 
entitlement and belonging can emerge (Sennett and Cobb 1973; Allen 
2015; Friedman 2016; Knights and Clarke 2013; Lawler 2005; Loveday 
2015; Mallman 2017, Sayer 2005). Specifically, anxieties can arise 
resulting from a sense of a ‘lack of fit’ and of ‘feeling like an imposter’; of 
being in the wrong social and cultural space at the wrong time. Here, 
working-class aspirant mobiles are shown to adopt defensive or protective 
strategies during their mobility trajectories (Chapman 2015; Knights and 
Clarke 2013; Reay 1998b). ‘Masking’ and other psycho-social approaches 
are in evidence; adopted to disguise the discomfort and shame aspirant 
mobiles can experience when interacting with more ‘culturally-dominant’ 
middle-class ‘others’. 
 
My intention here, therefore, is to show that such psychical states need to 
be understood historically and managed reflexively in order to confront 
the unwanted influences of socialisation and class structure. Such 
psychical states can materialise into apprehensions that can bring 
psychical instabilities both ontologically that is, in states of being, and 
existentially, in terms of concrete human experience. This can threaten a 
sense of self, place and life direction. Aspirant mobiles can become 
disoriented, rootless and without a firm sense of class identity and 
belonging (see Friedman 2016; Mallman 2017; Sennett and Cobb 1973). 
 
In addressing these issues, I engage in a theoretical discussion based on 
published sources from key contributors to discourses on class, self, social 
aspiration and mobility. Principal among these is Pierre Bourdieu and his 
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Theory of Practice (Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1994, 2000, 2005, 
2009; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007). Of central significance in this is Bourdieu’s 
conceptual interlocking triad of habitus, field and capital, which I briefly 
define here along with his other key concepts which I apply in the context 
of aspirational endeavour and social mobility throughout the thesis. 
However, alongside Bourdieu’s considerable contribution I use a particular 
text that originally inspired me to write the thesis. This is the seminal text 
by Sennett and Cobb (1973), entitled The Hidden Injuries of Class. I use 
this throughout the thesis to offer a contrasting, but complementary 
platform on which to examine the central topic (see Section 1.6). 
 
Bourdieu’s concepts in his Theory of Practice. 
Habitus can be defined as “an internal organising mechanism. It is the 
accumulated embodiment and ensemble of durable and transposable 
dispositions that internalise the necessities of the extant social 
environment” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 13). These dispositions 
are formed early in life and comprise our ways of acting, feeling, thinking 
and being. Habitus captures how we carry within us, or internalise, our 
history (Maton 2012, p. 51). Alongside the habitus and inextricably linked 
to it, is Bourdieu’s concept of field. Wacquant defines a field as “a set of 
objectives, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms 
of power or capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2007, p. 16). Examples of 
fields include the fields of social class (and the social mobility between 
classes), the artistic field, or the economic field. In Bourdieu’s schema, 
fields are deemed to follow specific logics and the competition within a 
given field can be perceived as being like a game, with players vying for 
power, influence, domination and respect. However, unlike a game, while 
a field follows rules, or regularities, these are not explicit or codified (see 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p.98).11 
 
 
11 Bourdieu also uses the broader concept of ‘social space’. I use this term in the 
thesis to differentiate it from field. ‘Social space’ is the set of all possible 
positions that are available for occupation at any given time or place (see Hardy 
2012, p. 229). 
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The third critical concept in Bourdieu’s conceptual triad is capital. In the 
context of class relationships this can be defined as a resource, or asset 
and thus a means of power and influence in a given field. Capital permits 
some groups the ongoing capacity to enhance themselves, while those 
without, or with limited access to such resources or knowledge (savvy) of 
how to use them effectively, will struggle to enhance themselves (Savage 
2015, p. 46). Examples of kinds of capital include social, cultural, 
emotional, linguistic, intellectual, scientific and literary capital. In 
Bourdieu’s schema they are to be considered as similar to economic capital 
in that they are transferable or transposable and are able to be 
accumulated or converted for use within and across different fields or 
social and cultural spaces (see Moore 2012, p.100). 
 
However, for Bourdieu it is in what he terms symbolic capital that power 
is derived from these other kinds of capital. For instance, the instrumental, 
self-interested and transparent nature of economic capital is only a means 
to an end, for example, in returning a profit or accruing interest. Its 
undisguised and arbitrary character in the distribution of power and wealth 
is apparent (see Postone, LiPuma and Calhoun 1995, p. 5). However, 
symbolic capital has the capacity to deny and suppress its instrumental 
nature and to demonstrate its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘naturalised’ qualities (see 
Moore 2012, p. 100). Furthermore, Bourdieu uses the concept of 
misrecognition to show how these qualities work in favour of some social 
groups but not others (see Savage 2015, p. 46). 
 
Thus, the power of cultural capital is demonstrated symbolically through 
cultural tastes and preferences which are seen as indicators or signifiers 
of class. They are deemed to be either legitimate or illegitimate depending 
on the class perspective, but within or against a dominant cultural frame 
of reference, which can push the idea of some signifiers being superior 
while others are made to ‘appear’ to be inferior. For example, cultural 
disparity and nuanced domination can be shown to materialise through 
the modern practice of inheritance. Apart from the passing over of 
economic capital to one’s kin in the form of property or heirlooms, this can 
be supplemented by cultural capital. Without necessarily realising it well-
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educated parents have the tendency (habitus) to pass on the capacity 
(capital), in the form of their own prior educational experience and know-
how, to their children to enable them in turn, to succeed in the cultural 
field of school and university and hence to acquire indirectly the means 
for securing the best jobs and the economic benefits that this brings 
(Savage 2015, p. 49). However, the fact that this form of inheritance is 
not direct shows its nuanced power and means that its significance can be 
misrecognised (Savage 2015, p. 49). As Moore (2012, p.101) indicates 
 
“This systematic denial of the fact that symbolic capitals are 
transubstantiated types of economic capital involves the process that 
Bourdieu calls misrecognition”. 
 
However, the minute that this practice is actually seen as a form of 
privilege, then it can be contested, and its power can be challenged. The 
classed parameters of domination are exposed and, under pressure, the 
‘powers that be’ may be forced to make structural adjustments (see 
Savage 2015, pp. 50-51).This also indicates how cultural capital cannot 
be construed as a fixed set of tastes, but as a much more fluid or mutable 
phenomenon.  
 
Furthermore, in the Bourdieusian schema misrecognition can be construed 
as a form of symbolic domination or even symbolic violence. However, this 
‘violence’ is not evident in the form of physical coercion, but rather through 
a tacit, unconscious acceptance of power and domination both by those 
who see themselves as ‘entitled’ and by those who see themselves as 
unsuitable, ill-equipped, undeserving and dispossessed of such power and 
domination. Thus, it is a form of structural violence and the above example 
shows how the power of such forms of capital can be symbolically 
‘naturalised’ and disguised when utilised in this way. In class terms it also 
shows how class domination historically legitimises existing power 
relations and practice (Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1986, 1990). 
 
Bourdieu shows how class domination is manifest and reinforced through 
access to symbolic capital and class signifiers in areas such as language, 
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dress, cultural practice, individual taste and education achievement 
(Bourdieu 1984; Skeggs 2004). Thus, if aspirants in the field of social class 
cannot effectively acquire and utilise such forms of symbolic capital their 
aspirational endeavours may be thwarted. For example, in the realm of 
language usage, the experience of being corrected, chastised or 
patronised for ‘misusing’ language, or even speaking with a regional 
dialect, can be seen as a form of symbolic violence and domination (see 
Thompson 1984, below in Section 1.4). It becomes more than a mere 
linguistic issue since it can have deeply felt and shaming consequences for 
aspirant mobiles, thereby negatively impacting on their aspirational 
endeavours and sense of self. However, many aspirants have been shown 
to resist and challenge such aloof behaviour, class arrogance and elitism. 
They choose to express pride and to defend themselves against such 
accusations of inferiority and to valorise their working-class cultural, 
educational and occupational predispositions (Sennett and Cobb 1973, 
p.19; Stahl 2013; Skeggs 2004). 
 
However, I emphasise that mobile aspirants are more likely to struggle in 
what Bourdieu refers to as an ‘uneven playing field’, when compared with 
aspirants from the middle-class, since they have to make greater step 
changes.12 To improve their chances of a better life they need to take 
greater risks and make more significant adjustments to the embodied self 
(habitus) in overcoming their class disadvantage which may often be 
viscerally felt (Friedman 2016; Reay 2013, Calarco 2011). It is also likely 
that the aspirant’s reflexive powers will need to be more honed in trying 
to overcome the symbolic violence and misrecognition that is meted out 
to the working-class. These are shown to be powerful social and cultural 
control mechanisms of class domination that coercively fix, restrict, 
subjugate and demonise the working-class (Bourdieu 1977; Jones 2011). 
 
Encountering such painful forms of condescension and belittlement can 
leave aspirant mobiles with indelible psychical scars. For example, levels 
 
12 I do not discuss middle-class aspiration or mobility directly. I mention it only 
comparatively in discussing working-class mobility. See for example Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001). 
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of inner resolve, resilience and self-belief can be severely tested when 
these forms of class domination occur (Rosenberg 1981; Harter 1993). 
Yet it is these very aspects of character and temperament that aspirant 
mobiles may need to reflect upon and confront and perhaps to strengthen, 
if the sense of ‘lack’, ambivalence and belittlement are to be transcended. 
For example, in situations where forms of disapproval such as disgust and 
contempt are meted out on grounds of class; where ignorance of the 
correct ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ is perceived and received negatively, 
then the aspirant’s sense of progression can be shown to falter (Lawler 
2014, p. 702; Kuhn 2002, p.117; Reay 1997b; Emler 2001). 
 
Throughout the thesis I utilise other relevant concepts from Bourdieu’s 
conceptual toolkit. Specifically, these include the concepts of doxa, 
hysteresis and particularly reflexivity. Doxa refers to “what is taken for 
granted” and to the social reality that goes unanimously unquestioned 
because it lies beyond any notion of enquiry. It is that which is assumed 
to be ‘given’ in relation to the social and cultural world since it is the 
absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of 
arbitrariness (Deer 2012, p. 117; Bourdieu 1977). 
 
For example, later in this Introduction and in later sections of the thesis I 
make reference to the ‘myth’ of meritocracy and to the rhetoric 
surrounding this concept. We can perceive this construct of meritocracy 
as doxa owing to its ubiquitous presence and persuasive acceptance 
across the class structure; its prominence as an ‘individualistic’ social 
value in relation to personal advancement, social climbing and striving and 
the normative assumptions underpinning it. As such, it is shown to subtly 
disguise deeply entrenched class inequalities and the unequal access to 
the aforementioned kinds of capital through false notions of a ‘’level 
playing field’; through the justification for disparities of wealth and the 
false claim of ‘equal opportunities’ across classed society (Savage 2015, 
p. 398), Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991). 
 
In specific sections of the thesis I also make reference to the concept of 
hysteresis. This can be defined as the disruption in the relationship 
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between habitus and the structures of the field to which they no longer 
correspond. It is the temporary breakdown in self-regulation (habitus) 
which was established to fit an individual to society (see Hardy 2012, p. 
129) and, importantly, to a particular class. In the context of aspirant 
mobility, the changing self can be considered in terms of a process which 
embraces both a feeling of being at once the ‘same as always’ person, 
while socially and culturally ‘becoming’ a ‘different self’. Thus, it is in the 
experiencing and familiarising of oneself with other social class 
environments that holds our gaze here and from which hysteresis can, 
potentially at least, emerge. This potential shifting of class agency is 
essentially bound up with the structural drivers embedded in the cultural 
machinations of another class which the aspirant wittingly, or unwittingly, 
internalises in the process of class transition (Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1990). 
Thus, the focus here is to consider how working-class aspirants experience 
this psychical disturbance in their mobility trajectories. 
 
The last of Bourdieu’s concepts I refer to is that of reflexivity and in 
particular the adjoining concept of a reflexive habitus. Reflexivity can be 
defined as an act of self-reference where examination or action bends back 
on, or refers to and affects the entity instigating the action or examination. 
It refers to the capacity of the agent (mobile aspirant) to recognise the 
forces of socialisation and to alter, when necessary, their place in the social 
structure. 
 
My intention is to speculatively identify the characteristics of the reflexive 
aspirant self that emerge from particular class-related struggles of upward 
mobility. In terms of individual temperament, the aspirant mobile can be 
shown to face many tests of self-worth and self-esteem, where 
engagement in a self-reflexive analyse of the habitus might be beneficial 
in strengthening character (Baumeister 1993; Rosenberg 1981). As an 
ongoing historical summation of routinised dispositions and structures, it 
will require close consideration. At such times the sense of self and of 
identity is a reminder of the challenging path that awaits the aspirant in 
‘becoming’ one of a different class. Crucially, there are also ontological 
and existential issues to consider in this line of thinking which I explore in 
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Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis (Allen 2015; Ashman and Gibson 2010; 
Sennett and Cobb 1973; Sayer 2005). 
 
Processes of ‘internalisation’. 
However, in conceptualising an individual’s embodied disposition, formed 
as it is from early socialisation and involving social and other structures, 
it is notable that Bourdieu’s habitus is designed to avoid an inside/outside 
distinction which dualities such as individual/society, agency/structure and 
mind/body struggle to make clear or to convincingly resolve (Bourdieu 
1990; Wetherell 2005). This raises questions in terms of the functioning 
of the unconscious and the processes of internalisation that Bourdieu 
refers to as “history forgotten as history’ (Bourdieu 1990, p. 56). This is 
critical in understanding how aspirant mobiles perceive their practice of 
upward mobility and what it might mean to them in terms of becoming 
middle-class and ‘successful’. It concerns how they might account for, 
reflect upon and rationalise this drive for mobility in order to achieve this 
success and the avenues they might choose to take in order to achieve 
this. Moreover, it concerns how they may reshape such practice in 
transcending class boundaries, while others of the working-class are, 
seemingly, unwilling or unable to do this (Bourdieu, 1990; Friedman 2016; 
Swartz 2002; Elder-Vass 2007; Akram 2012; Maton 2012). 
 
For example, according to Bourdieu and Passeron (1997) people 
internalise through a protracted process of conditioning the objective 
chances they face. They come to ‘read’ the future and to choose the fate 
that is most likely for them. Thus, expectations of future outcomes are 
based, through the habitus, on experiences of past (historical) outcomes 
(see Maton 2012, p. 57). Bourdieu in his Logic of Practice (1990) notes 
that it is our material conditions of existence that, through our past 
experiences, shape our unconscious sense of the possible, probable and 
desirable. We learn where we will do best and where we will struggle and 
thus, normally, we will seek to avoid those fields which might involve a 
field-habitus clash (see Maton 2012, p. 57). However, this may not always 
be the case and the process of change may not always be located in the 
internalised unconscious (Noble and Watkins 2003). For example, in the 
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specific case of aspirant mobiles they may have reached a point in their 
lived experience were they also consciously recognise those fields where 
they would normally struggle but choose to enter them anyway. They may 
be prepared to be ‘out of their comfort zones’ and risk facing ‘sink or swim’ 
scenarios in order to action radical changes in their circumstances. These 
perspectives also suggest sociological inferences of an existential kind, 
which I consider later in the thesis. 
 
This would seem to be one possible explanation for how aspirant mobiles 
might be able to transcend their past patterns of socialisation and class 
reproduction to enable a changed habitus to emerge. I use a range of 
citations and personal vignettes in the forthcoming chapters to illustrate 
these processes of internalisation.13 This can also provide a theoretical 
underpinning for future empirical research on the kinds of self-reflexive, 
internal narratives that surface among working-class aspirants and reveal 
the perspectives and motives therein. I consider the degrees of reflexivity 
in Bourdieu’s habitus in Chapter 2. 
 
As noted above, another way of understanding processes of internalisation 
as ‘natural’ is to consider the rhetoric and discourses relating to 
meritocracy. As noted in the previous sub-section Meritocracy propagates 
the argument that the motivation to aspire and succeed is a ‘natural’ 
human predisposition rather than one that can be shown to be culturally 
loaded; that represents specific social values and norms and that, in turn, 
reinforces dominant class interests and forms of control. This meritocratic 
myth is based on the idea that the most able in society will ‘naturally’ 
accede to the most influential positions in a given field through a 
combination of natural ability, savvy and, or hard work. However, this 
construct can also be seen as a form of society-wide taken-for-granted 
doxa, or conditioning, internalised by large numbers of people in advanced 
economies in the 20th and 21st centuries (Reay 2013). It poses a social 
reality founded on a ‘collective unconscious’, harbouring the belief that 
 
13 As I discuss in Chapters 1 and 2, this perspective on the ‘unconscious’ has 
obvious comparisons with the psychoanalytical approach of Freud. However, to 
consider Freud’s work directly would be beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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equal access to resources, or capital, exists for all, while contradictorily 
ensuring the retention of class hierarchy, status, difference, separation 
and division (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
 
This also aligns with and accommodates a voluntarist view of personal 
growth, change and development. That is, one which sees individual 
agents as largely free, uncoerced and unconstrained in their choice of 
personal goals and ways to achieve them. As examples of internalisation 
both meritocracy and voluntarism place individual agency (autonomy of 
action and choice) above social structural class determinants. However, 
as I discuss in Chapters 1 and 2, this meritocratic position is powerfully 
‘individualistic’ in tenor since it draws upon the idea of ascendant 
autonomy and agency. The individual’s will and character are evoked in 
order to ignore, sidestep and ultimately transcend structural determinants 
and the social inequalities that are shown to persist in a class society 
(Bourdieu 1994; Savage 2015; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991). 
 
This line of enquiry also approximates to the long-standing discourse in 
social theory of the ‘structure/agency’ duality where the tensions and 
interplay between the wider social forces and the individual agent are 
shown to be complex, individuated, circumstantial, contextual and 
contingent (Giddens 1984; Archer 2003, 2010; King, 2010). Thus, 
because of these interconnections and overlaps I briefly consider the 
major tenets of this debate, recognising that it has tendencies of 
‘circularity’ and is considered by some to be a sterile exploration (see 
Wetherell 2005). As I discussed above, I focus instead on Bourdieu’s use 
of the habitus as an ‘unconscious’ forgetting of history and practice, which 
has been criticised for the very fact that it appears to underplay 
consciousness in the way agency is formulated. I follow this in Chapter 2, 
by considering key critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus and its determinism 
which, some critics argue, offers too limited a space for agency and 
reflexivity. Thus, in the context of working-class aspiration and mobility, 
voluntarism and determinism can be considered as important tendencies 
that the habitus might be shown to contain. They are also another way of 
understanding how aspirant mobiles internalise and negotiate their 
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personal limitations and the social constraints in seeking a ‘better 
existence’ within the constraints of the embodied self (habitus) and 
classed society. 
 
The alternative to this meritocratic approach might be to adopt a socially 
immobile and non-aspirational stance, or, to adopt strategies that obviate 
or negate the rhetoric of ‘striving’. However, this may be a challenging 
prospect given the prevailing structural forces that are dominant in a class 
structure. Moreover, I note throughout the thesis that sections of the 
working-class are known to consider social mobility as untenable and even 
distasteful. Indeed, according to Skeggs, a long-standing tradition shows 
a defence of working-class life; a pride in its identity; a distancing from 
middle-class mores and its values (see Savage 2015, p. 365; also, Reay 
2013). This is historically endorsed in the forms of industrial action, trade 
unionism, working-class protest movements and forms of working-class 
cultural expression and class autonomy. 
 
The above discussion and my reading of secondary sources indicates that 
working-class mobiles conceive of, prepare for and undertake, their 
aspirational journeys in complex ways and from different positions within 
and across the working-class (Allen 2013; Mallman 2017; Friedman 2016; 
Reay 1997b; Loveday 2014; Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine 2003). Aligned 
to this, I also consider research on the loss of, or threats to, a ‘familiar’ or 
authentic self as a result of, for example, long range mobility trajectories 
(see Chapter 4 and Friedman 2016, p. 139). Furthermore, although 
similarities in the patterns of mobility trajectory may be apparent, as a 
sub-group of the working-class it can also be shown that aspirant mobiles 
make up a complex and heterogeneous grouping with disparate motives 
and drivers; with various perspectives on what constitutes ‘success’ and 
as such carry a range of visions of what they might mean by an improved 
future and increased wellbeing. In this regard, I seek to emphasise that 
while there are similarities and parallels, each aspirant’s experiences of 
mobility are psychically, ontologically and existentially nuanced in being 
unique to them. Moreover, each aspirant’s temporal life pathway and 
mobility trajectory is also unique. However, it is important to show how 
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these experiences are replicated and shared across a range of mobility 
scenarios (Friedman 2016; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Lawler 1999; Savage 
2015; Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2009 and 2010). 
 
An existential sociology approach.14 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I develop this emphasis on ontological concerns by 
adopting an existential sociology perspective. This can be defined as one 
which focuses on ‘everyday life’ and as such emphasises the centrality of 
embodiment and feelings within human agency. It can be defined 
descriptively as the study of human experience-in-the-(contemporary)-
world in all its forms (Kotarba and Fontana 1984). This will assist in my 
focus on the particular emotional, ontological and existential implications 
of mobility and transition that make up each aspirant mobile’s embodied 
self. Existential sociology expects change to be a constant feature of 
people’s lives in terms of their character, temperament and classed 
experiences; in their life course in terms of finitude and in their ontology 
and anxieties about their ultimate demise. This form of sociology 
embraces one’s experience of the social world, the other people that 
populate it and the culture that provides meaning to that life. The agent 
(mobile aspirant) is simultaneously the writer, producer and actor on a 
stage not necessarily of their choosing, but one that cannot be exited 
without confrontation (Kotarba and Fontana 1984). 
 
Furthermore, I want to suggest that aspiration and mobility are contingent 
upon and tend to highlight, the dynamic in which aspirants are grasping 
life existentially, from within a uniquely personal set of changing social 
circumstances. However, as a group within the working-class, aspirant 
mobiles can be shown to adopt similar, or shared, behavioural patterns 
and rationales. By employing varying degrees of endeavour, the aspirant 
is shown to be striving in such a way that the structural barriers to mobility 
are challenging, although in many cases such challenges are overcome. 
 




The discussion on the internalisation of social and cultural attributes shows 
how, in some cases, class transition can also take place. 
 
However, I also emphasise that in temporal and existential terms aspirants 
have one finite life in which to maximise the opportunities that arise and 
to make life-changing decisions and choices about how they exist in the 
face of this finitude. Thus, the existential imperative is emphasised, and 
aspirant mobiles’ psychical struggles are contextualised through the lens 
of this existential sociology. The thesis thus revisits and critiques the 
debates surrounding ontological insecurity (a term borrowed from Laing 
1990a). In so doing I use Sennett and Cobb’s (1973) discussion of the 
findings from interviews with aspirant mobiles who are experiencing the 
effects of social mobility. This American study of predominantly white 
working-class men undertaken in the early 1970s shows the 
disillusionment and existential anxieties that they identify as the ‘hidden 
injuries of class’. The authors examine the relevance of these of being. 
They examine the respondents’ self-deprecating behaviour that emerged 
when making sense of their lives, career pathways and workplace 
pressures (see also Knights and Clarke 2013). As indicated above, this is 
useful in showing how shifting class identities can, in turn, often create 
habitus clive’ during and following the particular mobility trajectory of the 
aspirant (Friedman 2016; Hardy 2012; Bourdieu 1977, 2000, 2009). 
 
Research methodology. 
The methodological approach adopted is to intersperse theoretical 
critiques of secondary research with reflexive accounts of relevant past 
events in the form of personal vignettes, similar to those often found in 
autoethnographic and autobiographical research. Autoethnography is the 
study of the self and Reed-Danahay defines this as a form of self-narrative 
that can be done by an autobiographer who places the story of his or her 
life within a story of the social context in which it occurs (Humphries 2005, 
p. 841). The discerning difference between autoethnographic and 
autobiographical research would seem to be in the degree of reflexivity in 
the research process and the extent to which the self can be detached 
from the subject to engage in an objective account that illuminates a wider 
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social context. However, this can be problematic since in connecting the 
personal with the cultural in this way concerns regarding self-indulgence, 
narcissism and difficulties with generalisability are prone to arise (see Le 
Roux 2017; Finch, 1987). 
 
However, my research approach is neither strictly autoethnographical nor 
autobiographical. The personal vignettes are designed to complement and 
embellish the theoretical discussion in the absence of any empirical 
research data or findings. According to Denzin (see Humphreys 2005, p. 
840) vignettes “ask readers to relive the experience through the writer’s 
or performer’s eyes”, or as Ellis suggests, to “bring life to the research and 
the research to life” (Humphreys 2005, p. 842). 
 
Personal vignettes are known to have specific strengths and weaknesses. 
Their strengths are that they act as a vehicle for reflexive examination and 
to express the writer’s involvement and intimacy in the topic. They can 
enhance contextual richness and provide a window through which the 
reader can view some of the pleasure and pain associated with past social 
phenomena (Humphreys 2005, p. 842; Felski 2000, p. 33). The 
weaknesses of this approach are that they can be seen as self-indulgent 
writing and thus narcissistic in style, be seen as mere naval-gazing or self-
confessional in tone, in which case there is a danger that the reader’s trust 
will be lost. Furthermore, it may distort the responsibility of the researcher 
and the authenticity of the work (Humphreys 2005, p. 851) 
 
The vignettes are situated in a time period from 1950 up to the present. 
However, they mainly focus on my life from 1963 in Liverpool, when I left 
secondary education. From that time, they reference my years working in 
the motor trade in Liverpool and later doing a variety of other kinds of 
work. From then they briefly mention my time at a further education 
college, again in Liverpool, where I studied ‘O’ Levels and then ‘A’ levels 
after which I left the city in 1974 to attend two universities until 1979. I 
then took up a full-time teaching post at a technical college in West 
Sussex, before moving to the East midlands in 1989 to begin a post at a 
UK university. I do not cover this last period in the vignettes. Thus, in 
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summary, the vignettes cover times and events in workplace and college 
contexts and home life in my teenage years and beyond, up to the time 
when I left home. 
 
The idea of using vignettes emerged from my original interest in the 
research topic which is based on my own ‘lived experiences’ and has been 
further affirmed through early discursive writing and the review of the 
literature. Moreover, in critiquing the relevant literature on working-class 
upward mobility it affirmed both subjectively and objectively that 
sociologically I was representative of this group. Thus, as the opening 
vignette shows (see pp. 6-9), I am reflectively recording the early part of 
‘my journey’ in the form of a ‘living example’ of an aspirant working mobile 
with a story to tell. As Gray notes, I can be considered as “an actor in my 
own life production” (see Humphreys 2005, p. 840). 
 
The vignettes embrace a range of emotions and states-of-being which I 
address primarily by relating to class insecurities that trigger changes in 
levels of self-esteem and self-worth, regret, shame and guilt. I try to show 
the ways in which these are induced and consolidated or ameliorated 
through interactions with familiar and unfamiliar classed ‘others’. Thus, 
the vignettes convey the poignancy of pain and discomfort, but also of joy, 
excitement and satisfaction that I experienced in moving my life forward 
in my early years. By taking the good advice of respected friends I finally 
followed the educational pathway to escape class disadvantage.  
 
Thus, the vignettes are autobiographical as well as factual; they 
contextualise the theoretical discourse and include reflexive elements. 
According to Macbeth (see Humphreys 2005, p. 840) reflexivity can be 
considered to be “the turning back of an inquiry or theory or text onto its 
own formative possibilities”. I use this reflexive style in revisiting past 
events often as memories that I have harboured as ‘experiential fossils’ 
that were not communicated openly with my working-class peers. I 
recognise that the richness of these memories may have faded with time, 
however, importantly, current situations often bring these memories back 
to mind thereby underlining their significance. These past experiences of 
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upward mobility evoke memories of the psychical and social class 
challenges that I faced and how these have affected me up to the present 
day. I recall some of the factors of social positioning and manoeuvring that 
I undertook prior to, during and then beyond my transition to middle-class 
‘professional’ life.  
 
I have attempted to tailor these accounts so as to emphasise the reflexive 
process involved in the changing of my circumstances, or the inertia that 
prevented this. In addition, I site the interactions with the ‘other’, be they 
with family members, friendship networks, or peer groups or workplace 
fellow employees in various settings and locations. In so doing, I illustrate 
how these relationships are instrumental in a reflexive sense, in the 
development of my psychical interiority and ways in which these 
experiences have transformed me as a person within my own trajectory. 
 
I do not claim that the vignettes are necessarily significant to others or 
generalisable within a wider social context. Rather they are intended to 
illustrate the uniqueness an individual aspirant’s mobility pathway and 
emerging life. While recognising the likely existence of shared experiences 
and patterns of behaviour among aspirants and their mobile trajectories, 
I use the case examples and personal accounts purely as an observational 
mechanism that draws attention to the research question (see below) and 
how it can be addressed and validated. 
 
Research focus. 
The thesis takes the existence of class as a given and a legitimate area of 
theoretical enquiry. Furthermore, in focusing on social aspiration and class 
transition, the thesis does not directly consider other structures of 
inequality, such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, disability or 
age. However, where relevant to the core thesis I do include a number of 
direct and indirect references to gender in some of the discussions (see 
for example, Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001; Lawler 1999, 2000; 
Allen 2013; Morley 1997; O’Donoghue 2013; Reay 1997a, 1997b). In this 
regard, although a large number of my references relate to the working-
class and in some cases appear to centre on working-class men (such as 
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Sennett and Cobb 1973), this has not been deliberate. Furthermore, 
although it may appear so in places, neither have I intentionally focused 
the research exclusively on white working-class men to the exclusion of 
other ethnic groups. 
 
In terms of the research sources I have ‘triangulated’ the academic 
disciplines of sociology, social psychology and, in a more limited way, 
existential sociology. This demonstrates the indicative breadth and depth 
of the research topic. The secondary sources are used therefore, in order 
to form a bridge for this inter-disciplinary approach. I justify this since, in 
addressing the research question, I argue it cannot be effectively 
examined from within one discipline. Historically and geographically, my 
citations relating to social class are taken from research undertaken in the 
20th and 21st Centuries and largely from academic sources emanating from 
the UK, USA, Europe and Australia. 
 
Through this lens of social aspiration and upward mobility the thesis 
engages with existing debates on class in examining the internalisation of 
ideas relating to social mobility as a construct. It does so by critiquing 
selected secondary research sources, particularly the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu and suggests that there is a basis for an existential sociology 
approach to social mobility and class transition. This places ontological 
insecurity and existential anxiety alongside the structural determinist 
barriers of class as key components and inhibitors affecting class 
transition. The thesis argues that working-class aspirants often experience 
significant internal barriers in making the transition into middle-class life. 
It argues that aspirant mobiles can carry injurious residues of their 
working-class origins during their mobility trajectories and that these often 
impose social and cultural constraints on a successful transition into the 
middle-class. In these ways the thesis makes a further contribution to the 
existing literature on the nuanced nature of aspiration and working-class 
mobility by extending the theme of ‘hysteresis’ and ‘conflicted interiority’ 




The thesis research question to be addressed, therefore, is, 
 
In what ways do working-class aspirant mobiles experience 
psychical, social and cultural tensions and challenges to their 
embodied self and class identity, during their mobility trajectories 
and transition to the middle-class?  
 
The following thesis structure is adopted: 
 
Chapter 1 defines and frames the concepts of working-class social 
aspiration and mobility and the importance of determinism and 
voluntarism in relation to these practices. I then link Bourdieu’s key 
concepts of habitus, field, capital, doxa, symbolic violence, misrecognition 
and reflexivity and consider the first of two sections discussing the 
unconscious processes of ‘internalisation’ of class embodiments. I then 
provide the first of a series of personal illustrations of my own embodied 
selfhood and social mobility in relation to Bourdieu’s concepts. 
 
Chapter 2 considers a selection of critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus by key 
contributors in terms of its determinism and reflexive potential. This will 
be followed by an assessment of the limits of reflexivity among working-
class aspirants and the second of two discussions of ‘internalisation’ and 
an interpretation of Bourdieu’s habitus as ‘unconscious as forgotten 
history’ in the formation of the embodied self. Further personal vignettes 
are included in relation to these considerations. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the sentiments, perceptions, emotional states and 
reactions encountered by aspirants. The so called ‘deficit model’ of the 
working-class emphasises the persistent feelings of disadvantage, 
exclusion, lack, shame and insufficiency. It raises questions of self-regard, 
self-esteem and the fragility of self, among aspirants. However, this can 
be balanced against the perceived benefits of mobility such as increased 
self-respect and wellbeing experienced by working-class aspirant mobiles. 
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Chapter 4 discusses aspirants’ experiences of ‘inauthenticity’, 
fraudulence and manifestations of insecurity such as the ‘imposter 
syndrome’ that can be shown to threaten a sense of self. An existential 
sociology perspective will be introduced to consider these ontological 
difficulties. In this regard, the chapter considers how and why a sense of 
‘belonging’ is critical for aspirants in the processes of class identity 
disruption and realignment. The discussion will be fashioned around the 
theoretical value of authenticity as a concept, in the sense of a ‘familiar’ 
self in the context of social aspiration and mobility. 
 
Chapter 5 considers working-class aspirants’ experiences of ontological 
insecurity and the contradictory messages and anxieties that can arise 
during shifts in class loyalty and identity. Sennett and Cobb (1973, pp. 
206-210) use this concept from Laing (1990a) to illustrate a ‘double-bind’ 
in the form of a set of contradictory and irreconcilable commands. They 
show how such ‘schizophrenic’ situations can create psychical tensions for 
the aspirant mobile, somewhat similar to Bourdieu’s concept of hysteresis. 
I apply an existential sociology approach, introduced in Chapter 4, which 
further contributes to an understanding of the psychical tensions 
underpinning class mobility. This raises issues of the transformative 
pressures of change and questions how real and grounded aspirant 
mobiles can, or need to be, when drawn into unfamiliar cultural territory 
and where their ability to retain that sense of self and belonging is tested. 
 
Conclusion. The principal points that have been made throughout the 
thesis will be summarised. This is followed by a discussion of further 
related areas of theoretical, empirical and qualitative research that might 
be pursued following my discussions in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1. Structural determinants of class and their impact on 
aspiration, mobility and class transition. 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
In this first chapter I define and contextualise the framing concepts of 
working-class aspiration and social mobility. I then follow this with a brief 
account of determinism and voluntarism. These aspects and tendencies 
will be shown to have a bearing on aspirational endeavour and social 
mobility and will be considered further in Chapter 2 and at later points 
throughout the thesis. I then link Bourdieu’s key concepts of habitus, field 
and capital and related tools in his Theory of Practice that I briefly defined 
in the thesis Introduction (Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1986, 1990). These are 
applied throughout the thesis in examining what I refer as the psychical 
interiority or internalisation of structural barriers and enablers of class in 
the embodied self of aspirants. I consider these to provide a solid basis 
upon which to examine aspirants’ perceptions of their endeavours and 
changing sense of self, class and identity, as well as the ontological 
insecurity and existential anxiety that can potentially emerge during 
mobility and class transition.15  
 
The concepts and terms used here are pivotal in exploring this psychic 
landscape of class (see Reay 2005; Allen 2013; Sennett and Cobb 1973). 
Such internalised structures tend to have a robustness and durability 
which Bourdieu’s use of the habitus shows (see Bourdieu 1984, 1990; 
Skeggs 2004; Sayer 2005).16 I explore the ways in which structural 
determinants emerges and how and why these may translate into 
psychical barriers or enablers during mobility. Bourdieu’s perspective on 
the processes of ‘internalisation’ of structures is useful here. I consider his 
 
15 References to ‘class transition’ refer to working-class aspirants facing the 
psychical, ontological and existential challenges in morphing into the middle-class 
and attempting to cultivate a sense of acceptance and ‘belonging’ within the 
middle-class. I discuss the key concept of ontological insecurity in relation to class 
transition in Chapter 5. 
 
16 A more developed explanation of habitus is provided in Section 1.4 of this 
chapter. 
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use of the ‘unconscious’ in this and his reference to ‘history, forgotten as 
history’ further in Section 1.5 and in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
 
The secondary sources used characterise the embodied aspirant self as 
struggling in various ways to adhere to dominant social class structures, 
with the fixity and fluidity of these structures and with the signifiers of 
class that tend to preserve and differentiate the prevailing orthodoxy of 
class.17 Furthermore, there is the tendency for these internalised structural 
determinants to reinforce class insecurities among many aspirants. I 
therefore consider how these impact on the feelings, perceptions and 
practice of aspirants. For example, the experience of breaking from 
working-class cultural ties can show upward mobility trajectories to be 
complex and disruptive in form and unique in their impact on each 
aspirant. I also consider how these structural determinants of class might 
inhibit, for example, the self-assuredness, resilience and confidence which 
aspirant mobiles are shown to need in order to preserve wellbeing and to 
be able to interact effectively with their middle-class counterparts.18 These 
structural inhibitors can raise difficult issues for aspirants in terms of their 
sense of self and being. Their sense of place, space and ‘belonging’ is 
explored in later chapters (see Friedman 2016, p. 145; also, Allen 2013, 
2015; Abrahams 2017; Reay 1997b; Lawler 1999, 2000).19  
 
Following this, I include the first in a series of personal vignettes tracking 
and reflecting upon my own early experiences of aspiration and mobility. 
The opening personal account in the thesis Introduction set the scene for 
the autobiographical tone of the thesis (see page 6). These are 
accompanied by further theoretical interpretation. A concluding section 
 
17 See Bourdieu’s definition and uses of doxa as a similar concept to orthodoxy, 
and other concepts discussed in Section 1.4. 
 
18 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on levels of self-worth and self-esteem. 
 
19 I emphasise ‘belonging’ here because I show later in the thesis how this raises 
complex issues about the transformative nature of the self and class identity, and 
of ontological and existential issues pertaining to class transition and self-
transformation which, I argue, are far from clear or straightforward. 
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will then summarise the main points raised and those to follow in Chapter 
2. 
 
1.2 Defining and framing working-class aspiration and mobility. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I define working-class aspirant mobiles as 
those of working-class origin living in capitalist, industrial and commercial 
classed societies in the 20th and 21st Centuries, who, in evaluating their 
class disadvantage and limited capitals, are seeking ways of ‘getting out 
and getting away’ (Lawler 1999). In this, they are striving to overcome 
their perceived class-related predicaments and are thereby, endeavouring 
to transcend the structural constraints of class. An early study by Gould 
(see Empey 1956, p. 704) theorised that the more unsatisfactory the 
present is conceived to be in the mind of working-class aspirants, the more 
urgent is their desire to depart from it in the future. Gould also speculated 
from this that the working-class is imbued with a deep all-pervading need 
to leave the present.20 However, she also suggests that their social reality 
compels aspirants to reduce or contain their aspirations because they are 
unable to accept the risk of becoming ‘less’ poor. Gould speculates further 
that, in reality, their aspirations might be limited by their ‘classed horizon’. 
However, her findings appear to contradict this because of that compelling 
need to leave their present circumstances. Hence, I suggest that a tension 
of ‘being’ is evident, which I explore throughout the thesis and particularly 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Furthermore, research shows that this desire to ‘escape’ is often tempered 
by ambivalence with regard to old class loyalties; family ties, or a need to 
preserve a familiar working-class self. Importantly however, with a formed 
set of internalised dispositions, aspirants often seek to escape from the 
hidden psychical injuries or mental scars of their working-class life (see 
Bourdieu 2009; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Reay 2015). This research shows 
that these classed injuries are indelibly bound into the psyche of the 
aspirant. Also, owing to this classed interiority, aspirants’ attempts at 
 
20 I suggest later that this expression of urgency would seem to have existential 
implications, which I explore in the Chapter 5. 
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detaching from their working-class milieu and in ‘becoming’ middle-class 
is often shown to be an incomplete and complex process (Friedman 2016). 
This incompleteness can be manifest in conflicted ways of being which 
persist as residues of their former classed self, or their ‘lived past’, in their 
changing selves (see Bourdieu 1977, 2000; Friedman 2016). I also show 
that in being aspirational and socially mobile, aspirants are trying, in an 
existential sense, to reconcile, heal and transcend this former classed self. 
I contextualise these aspects of socialisation or internalisation and the 
impacts that these have on the embodied aspirational self in Section 1.5, 
in Chapter 2 and throughout the thesis.21 
 
Another view, however, is that the socially mobile can be ‘omnivorous’ in 
their cultural consumption patterns and world view. In this van Eijk 
suggests that they are shown to nostalgically retain habits and practices 
of the past alongside the newly acquired tastes and subsequent classed 
experiences (see Atkinson 2015, p. 117). This would seem to put a 
different complexion on the somewhat negative idea of ‘getting out and 
getting away’ and the motives behind social mobility and class transition. 
Conversely however, Friedman argues that aspirants appear to be 
‘culturally homeless’ since they never feel as though their shifting tastes 
are truly valid (Friedman 2012). This relates to matters of authenticity 
which I discuss in Chapter 4. According to Friedman the upwardly mobile 
can feel guilty for appearing to be snooty and snobbish about their new 
cultural preferences when in contact with generic family members and old 
friends. However, at the same time, they also feel embarrassed and stupid 
when discussing these seemingly ‘normal’ middle-class attributes of taste 
with friends or colleagues from within the new ‘social space’ that they are 
now part of, or ‘feel’ they are part of (see Atkinson 2015, p. 117; Friedman 
2012; also Savage 2015, p. 217). Again, these areas of class tension are 
explored in later chapters. 
 
21 The reference to ‘existential’ here is clarified in Chapters 4 and 5. It is sufficient 
here to define it as a fundamental awareness and urgency of being that is 
experienced by the aspirant. 
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Given the rhetoric and orthodoxy underpinning meritocracy, the idea of 
social mobility, aspiration and mobility can be viewed as a prevalent social 
value and norm by a dominant class (see the thesis Introduction; Atkinson 
2015, p. 69; Savage 2015).22 There are likely to be uniquely different 
factors involving each aspirant’s quest and trajectory. Hence, the terms 
‘aspirational’ and ‘mobile’ can be shown to convey a mix of moral signifiers 
with positive ones such as striving, hard-working, achieving, self-
developing, self-actualising. However, negative sentiments can also be 
conveyed such as self-centredness; class betrayal; success-fixated; self-
regarding and competitively driven to social climbing and cultivated to be 
in keeping with the prevailing value or ethic of Individualism (see Giddens 
1991; Sayer 2005). These sentiments can be considered to be implicit 
motivations for social mobility and are considered throughout the thesis. 
 
Furthermore, as inferred above, aspiration and the drive to be socially 
mobile can be considered as a socially and culturally constructed ‘valued-
loaded’ hook or device which aspirants have internalised. That is, they 
have been socialised into grasping the idea and desire for a better life. 
Here, aspirants’ sole rationale might be summarised in the expression  
 
“We have no other option but to strive like everyone else, if we want to 
secure a better life and experience personal fulfilment”.23  
 
This presents the idea of aspiration and mobility as, on the one hand a 
proto-typical form of innateness in humans, but on the other, a socio-
cultural and normatively constructed impetus found and actively 
promoted, through the rhetoric of dominant interests in the specific 
environment of classed societies (see Reay 2005, 2013; Reay, Crozier and 
Clayton 2010; Allen 2013, 2015; Felski 2000; Friedman 2016; Knights and 
Clarke 2013). However, the danger here is of falling into the trap of 
 
22 For brevity and maintenance of focus it is assumed here that the dominant 
norms and values of classed societies are considered to be those of the dominant 
middle-class. 
 
23 These are my words, and not quoted from another source. 
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essentialist reductionism were aspiration and the desire to be upwardly 
mobile, is assumed to be ‘natural’, regarding it as an unquestionably 
worthy social, value-driven code of practice that is universally accepted 
and assumed to exist in all forms of society. 
 
However, closer examination of social mobility shows that there are 
various kinds of mobility trajectory, indicating the extent to which the 
aspirant makes adjustments to self and lifestyle. Mobility can also occur 
inter-generationally where, for example, the daughter secures a higher 
income and a more affluent lifestyle and wellbeing than for example, her 
mother had during her working life. However, here, I am more interested 
in the nature and extent of mobility in the lifetime of a given aspirant. In 
this, the mobility trajectory can vary in form. This can be clarified by 
considering the most typical examples. For instance, ‘short-range 
mobility’, or small shifts in occupation, status and lifestyle would be 
evident when moving from, for example, skilled manual/engineer to 
supervisory grade. Whereas, ‘long-range mobility’ would be where the 
aspirant makes big leaps, for example, from skilled manual work to senior 
professional position. Note here that occupation and lifestyle are closely 
linked (see Friedman 2016; Sennett and Cobb 1973).  
 
Variations of these two kinds of trajectory would be long-range mobility in 
a very short time period (a meteoric rise in occupational status and 
lifestyle) and short-range mobility over a very gradual timescale. Thus, 
the type of mobility considered varies according to the context, degree, 
depth, range and composition of the mobility trajectory. Moreover, the 
extent of psychological and ontological disruption experienced will also 
vary in terms of the adaptability and resilience of the aspirant in terms of 
the range of mobility experienced within or across specific class 
boundaries. Thus, as indicated earlier, the individual aspirant’s 
experiences have unique characteristics (see Bourdieu 2009; Morley 




However, given the class structure, orthodoxy and hierarchical nature of 
social and cultural reproduction and with the emphasis on large numbers 
of people ‘striving for something better’, this tends to be bound up and 
reinforced through a ‘universal’ rhetoric. By propagating the idea of a fair 
and open society with equal access to resources the normative mechanism 
of a meritocracy facilitates upward mobility as a realisable goal (see 
Atkinson 2015, p. 104; Mallman 2017, p. 2; Savage 2015, pp. 187-189, 
215-216). 
 
Here, I consider the basis and rationale upon which working-class 
aspirants are able to choose and to take this path of upward mobility, to 
be important, but secondary to my central enquiry into the psychical, 
ontological and existential impacts of mobility. At first glance it would 
seem that aspirants desire a better life for a number of reasons. Perhaps 
they are dissatisfied with their current circumstances. They may have 
become angry and embarrassed by, or disdainful of their working-class 
background and are attracted to the material advantages that a better 
(classed) life can bring. Perhaps they have sufficient self-belief and 
determination to act in specific ways and to deploy specific strategies to 
overcome the structural constraints of their current circumstances (see 
Allen 2013; Goldthorpe et al 1969; Lawler, 1999, 2000; Loveday 2015).  
 
Also, it is possible that each aspirant will have had a catalyst or seminal 
moment which has triggered this desire to ‘shift’ and from which rapid, 
gradual, major or minor change might occur. Or perhaps it is a matter of 
growing class awareness through association with influential others, or a 
proximal connection with a new peer group, or a chance encounter.24 One 
or more of these possibilities would seem to pertain for the individual 
aspirant (see Savage 2015, pp. 187-217; Savage 2005, pp. 940-942). 
There may be patterns and routes to mobility with common factors such 
as educational attainment and academic qualifications as a basis for career 
 
24 This is what happened in my own experience, as my opening vignette 
indicates. 
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progression and wider choice (Loveday 2015; Morley 1997; Reay 1997b, 
1998a, 2001, 2012). 
 
Much of the relevant literature shows aspirants making decisions, life 
choices and adjustments to their life course by reflecting, in various forms 
and degrees of clarity, on their circumstances (see Allen 2013; Ashman 
and Gibson 2010; Bourdieu 2009; Burkitt 2012; Knights and Clarke 2013). 
I suggest that this, in turn, can be considered as an existential imperative 
to ‘fulfil one’s potential’ with the need to seize available opportunities and 
overcome constraints and to acquire the necessary forms of capital to 
enable this to come about (see Bourdieu 1986, 1994). Such resources may 
not have been available or may have been restricted in various ways in a 
working-class upbringing. But when aspiration is defined in normative 
terms it is often accompanied by deep ontological conflicts, anxieties and 
pressures particularly among the youth of the working-class (see Sennett 
and Cobb 1973, p. 27; Allen 2013, p. 768). Thus, as indicated above, the 
rhetoric surrounding aspiration as ‘meritocratic’ and as a ‘virtuous social 
good’ can be shown to obscure the broader inequalities affecting people’s 
capacity to realise their aspirations. This raises psychical and ontological 
concerns (see Friedman 2016).25 
 
Having attempted to frame and contextualise aspirant mobility within 
class, I now consider how class structures can be perceived as either 
determinist or voluntarist in form in the actions of aspirant mobiles. 
 
1.3 Determinism and voluntarism tendencies in social aspiration 
and mobility. 
Here I briefly consider the determinist social pressures to maintain order 
and conformity to social mores. In turn, these can be shown to help in 
 
25 It is also important to note here that many from the working-class choose not 
to be socially mobile. They may even resist offers by management of career 
progression in the workplace. For various reasons, such low levels of ambition, 
issues relating to self-worth and confidence, or simply preferring a stress-free 
‘easy life’, they may choose to refuse, but may still be respected for their skills 
and knowledge, preferring to choose a non-aspirational, or non-mobile working 
life. 
 42 
understanding the predispositions to become aspirational and to elevate 
the self on an upwardly mobile social trajectory. However, alongside these 
internalised forces and inner drives is the tendency towards voluntarism. 
This tendency can be seen as one of over-estimating the aspirant’s 
capacity for autonomy and agency in relation to matters of structural 
compliance and constraint (see Sayer 2005, p. 9). The extreme form of 
this might be where the aspirant considers that: “No matter what 
obstacles are put in my way; I will overcome the problem; I will find the 
willpower and resources to achieve my goals!”.26  
 
As I show, such hyperbole, while demonstrating inner resolve, may also 
bring disillusionment if not tempered by a careful assessment and 
management of realistic possibilities and expectations. Moreover, without 
the necessary social and cultural capital (see Bourdieu 1986, 1994) and 
viable mobility prospects, such voluntarist tendencies may cause 
difficulties for the aspirant. Furthermore, the internalisation of prevailing 
structural norms can become barriers or inhibitors to mobility. This is one 
important explanation for the limited numbers of working-class aspirant 
mobiles breaking through the ‘class’ ceiling in recent times (see Savage 
2015, pp. 216-217). 
 
I have briefly articulated the difficulties relating to determinism in social 
structures and the voluntarism in the agency of aspirants. However, I flesh 
out later in this chapter the complexity in these constructs that underpin 
an exploration of aspirational endeavour and social mobility. As indicated 
so far, the barriers and enablers of mobility can be shown to have psychical 
origins and implications, insofar as aspirant internalise these structures to 
enable, or hinder future improvements to their lives. Here, perhaps the 
aspirants’ perception of future life chances and choices will temper their 
motivations and expectations (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007). Depending 
on the disposition and character of the aspirant such past experiences can 
be shown to influence what is perceived to be realistic and achievable in 
the future and what is not (see Sennett and Cobb 1973; Bourdieu 1994). 
 
26 These words are entirely my invention. 
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However, despite these internal (psychical) structures and external (socio-
cultural) structural constraints, aspirants would still appear to be able to 
reflexively identify, examine, question, reconsider, clarify, resist, adjust 
and then select or disregard specific courses of action. They would in effect 
engage in, or with, their ‘internal conversation’ (Archer 2003) or narrative, 
based on their self-scripted account of their life so far.27 By means of this 
self-referential act of reflexivity, the agent could be said to critically ‘refer 
back’ to the issue instigating the action or examination. 28 For example, 
through various analytical methods they would be able to recognise the 
impact of primary socialisation on their past actions and, potentially, find 
practicable strategies to alter their future place and space in the social 
structure. This ability to reflexively analyse their life circumstances can be 
considered as either a conscious, unconscious or pre-conscious process, 
or a combination of these (see for example, Bourdieu 1994; Archer 2003, 
2010; Noble and Watkins 2003; Stahl 2013). 
 
Thus, it is in the opportunities and conditions under which aspirants are 
able to think, feel and act in a reflexive manner in relation to their classed 
selves that is of most interest here and is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2.29 The very process of internalisation would seem to show that 
the aspirant has the capacity for both independent thought and action, 
while recognising the past structural conditioning they have embodied and 
their capacity to adopt a non-critical compliance with prevailing social 
norms and values. In effect, both can be shown to influence the mind-
sets, outlooks, expectations and future lives of aspirants (Bourdieu 1977, 
1990). 
 
However, to qualify my discussion so far, Skeggs argues that this presents 
a short-sighted picture of agency which grossly underplays the degree of 
 
27 This issue is further explored in Chapter 2. I also contextualise and discuss this 
idea of an aspirant’s scripted narrative within an existential sociology perspective 
in Chapter 5. 
 
28 Also, see the thesis Introduction for a definition of reflexivity.  
 
29 Chapter 2 considers the potentialities and advantages of a ‘reflexive self’ and 
its applicability to the mobility of aspirants. 
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structural fixity in the lives of working-class agents (aspirants) (Skeggs, 
2004, p. 52). For example, Skeggs argues that Beck’s inflated voluntarism 
ignores the situational power of the ‘social’ in assessing what kinds of risks 
agents might encounter and the social resources they can or cannot access 
in order to make sense of these risks and to act upon them (Skeggs 2004, 
citing Savage 2000; also Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1986). 
 
This literature emphasises the struggles involved in acquiring the 
resources or capitals to be able to transcend such structural barriers and 
is indicative of the strength and endurance of such barriers. Aspirants can 
be agents of their own destiny, a point I return to in Chapter 5, and have 
the capacity to reflexively question the implications of choosing to comply 
with the dominant structures. However, the key point here is to show that 
this agentic potential frequently stays untapped and dormant owing to the 
impact of such ingrained and habituated dispositions. For this reason, 
working-class mobility has been shown to be unevenly distributed and to 
remain only marginally representative of the working-class as a whole (see 
Savage 2015, p. 189-217; Bourdieu 1990). 
 
However, as part of my focus I seek to account for the ways in which 
aspirant mobiles articulate their circumstances and experiences, given 
that these structures are held and reinforced in the psyche. This of course, 
needs to take account of the ways in which aspirant mobiles perceive 
themselves. That is, the subjective experience of their classed lives may 
or may not be objectively accurate in structural terms. For class cannot 
simply be reduced to whatever agents think it to be, nor indeed, can class 
be blamed for all the personal, social, cultural or moral difficulties that 
aspirant mobiles might experience (see, for example Sayer 2005, pp. 139-
167). 
 
However, as I show in Chapter 3, the literature relating aspirants’ feelings 
and sense of selves indicates their need to be respected in relation to their 
class experiences. This is critical in understanding social wellbeing and the 
impact of mobility. Aspirants’ sentiments can be seen to be linked with the 
structural inequalities that they experience and how they identify 
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themselves in a narrative of their classed lives (Bourdieu 2009, 2007; 
Emler 2001; Kupfer 2015; Mruk 2006). I now consider further the 
structural impositions on aspirational endeavour by evaluating specific 
concepts used by Bourdieu and then apply these to the challenges 
aspirants face in becoming upwardly mobile. 
 
1.4 Linking Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and key concepts to 
psychical structures, aspiration and mobility. 
In the thesis Introduction I indicate that within Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, the conceptual triad of habitus, field and capital are inextricably 
linked. Moreover, Maton (2012, pp 50-52) suggests that Bourdieu’s use of 
the habitus links past, present and future embodiments of the self. It also 
links the social with the individual, structure with agency and thus aims to 
transcend such troublesome dichotomies (see Wetherell 2005). Bourdieu’s 
habitus is structured by material conditions of existence and generates 
practices, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, thoughts and ways of being, as 
well as habitual states, predispositions, tendencies or inclinations in 
accordance with its own structure (Maton 2012, p. 50). 
 
Thus, Bourdieu links habitus with field and in this specific area of social 
space “each field prescribes its particular values and possesses its own 
regulative principles. These principles delimit a socially structured space 
in which agents struggle, depending on the relative power position they 
occupy in that space” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 17). These might 
be positions that seek to either conserve or transform the structure of 
relations, or forces that are constitutive of that field. Thus, the habitus 
enters a particular field with degrees of capital, as economic, cultural and 
social resources, which determine the levels of power and influence it can 
command and, as a result of interactive challenges, the habitus is 
reshaped. 
 
Examples of field could include social class, education provision, an agent’s 
upbringing, or past life choices. For example, this might be the degree of 
access to networking, as an example of social capital and guidance in 
specific socio-cultural arenas. For example, as a field, aspirant upward 
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mobility could profoundly impact upon the aspirant’s choice of direction in 
life and for this reason it might be argued, there are existential 
implications for the aspirant’s mobility trajectory. 
 
Bourdieu also uses the concept of doxa in a similar way to ‘orthodoxy’ (see 
the thesis Introduction). It is through the maintenance and reinforcement 
of doxa that conformity to prevailing social (structural) norms and values 
are assumed and internalised (Bourdieu 1977). This also has a bearing on 
the earlier discussion on determinism and voluntarism in Section 1.3. 
Doxa, therefore, is a combination of, and struggle between, orthodox and 
heterodox norms, values and beliefs. It consists of the unstated, ‘taken-
for-granted’ assumptions, ‘common sense’ drivers and established 
structures that lie behind the distinctions that agents are making. It 
encompasses what falls within the limits of the thinkable and the sayable 
(“the universe of possible discourses”) and “what goes without saying 
because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu 1977, 1990; Bourdieu and 
Eagleton 1991). In this sense it is what is beyond comment or question. 
Furthermore, doxa “contributes to its reproduction in social institutions, 
structures and links as well as in minds and bodies, expectations and 
behaviour” (Deer 2012, p. 114). Thus, social norms can be seen as 
unquestionable givens and as such can be seen as difficult to change at 
an individual level. Again, this is useful in understanding how and why 
aspiration and mobility become a feature of habitus, field and capital for 
some and not others from the working-class. 
 
Bourdieu has further important concepts relating to the habitus in terms 
of the psychical internalising or inscribing of structures, which 
demonstrate deeply felt forms of class domination within the self. These 
are both symbolic and actual in form and have the potential to undermine 
the self-worth of aspirants (see Chapter 3). First is the concept of 
misrecognition (see the thesis Introduction). Misrecognition embodies a 
set of socio-cultural processes that anchor the doxic ‘taken-for-granted’ 
assumptions into the realm of social life, most notably in the field of class. 
Citing Bourdieu and Wacquant, Skeggs (2004, p. 4) interprets 
misrecognition as a means of power in the form of cultural superiority and 
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dominance by the middle-class. She argues that such privilege is ascribed 
rather than achieved and therefore, is thought of as natural and 
legitimate. This essentialising of cultural value as a form of symbolic 
capital by the dominant middle-class enables this power to be hidden, in 
the sense that it is assumed and hence misrecognised. 
 
Similarly, nuanced forms of ‘violence’ are shown to emerge with regard to 
social and cultural differences and distinctions of taste are established as 
symbols of social class position. Here Bourdieu uses examples such as the 
use of language that operate to commit acts of symbolic violence and 
symbolic domination. These are demonstrated in the peremptory verdicts, 
which, in the name of taste, condemn to ridicule, shame and silence those 
who fall short of the right way of being and doing (Bourdieu 1984, p. 512). 
 
Thus, those who possess the necessary cultural capital are able to judge 
and legitimate what is considered to be good taste (which they can choose 
to change over time) or, conversely, what is considered to be tasteless. In 
this way, Bourdieu argues, the dominated working-class is denied this 
capital in a number of key areas of their lives. Here, language and cultural 
taste or refinement are notable examples in the symbolic terrain of class 
domination (Bourdieu, 1986, 2009). Through the use of language, 
symbolic domination may be evidenced in highbrow settings such as 
education establishments, higher academia and other professional and 
managerial contexts. It can arise anywhere in the professional world were 
the middle-class use language and pronunciation as an elitist tool of power 
and authority. These forms of symbolic domination can be shown to impact 
negatively on the aspirant’s self-confidence and self-worth in daily life.30 
 
Most importantly however, Thompson (1984) reinforces the point that this 
use of language as symbolic violence is also a signifier of class, thereby 
endorsing its legitimacy and status. When aspirants from working-class 
backgrounds are negatively exposed to this form of class signifier they 
 
30 See also, for example, my personal vignette in Section 1.6 of this chapter; in 
Chapter 2 regarding the internalising of class inferiority, and in Chapter 3 
pertaining to the discussion on self-worth and self-esteem. 
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might be perceived as being culturally distanced from this ‘official’ style of 
language and deemed to lack competence in its use. In this way, by 
accepting this ascendant legitimacy without actually possessing the 
symbolic capital, class dominance is reinforced. This cultural linguistic 
difference is similar to Bernstein’s earlier use of the ‘elaborate’ and 
‘restricted’ codes of language that he argued linked everyday language 
and vocabulary to a particular social group or class (see Bernstein 2003). 
In this way therefore, language and its form of usage, is shown to be 
classed. Those who can utilise this official language can apply, in a 
separatist and elitist way, the emotive and dominating practice of 
condescension, which suitably distances and distinguishes them from 
those who are dispossessed and disempowered by it (Thompson 1984). 
Again, being socially mobile can bring such forms of domination to bear 
when there is a mismatch of class familiarities and sensibilities. For these 
reasons it would seem that aspirant mobiles need to be mindful of such 
expressions of domination and the instability and vulnerability of their 
social standing and sense of place during their mobility trajectories. 
 
This is significant since in protracted discussions of the classed self, feeling 
‘out of place’ in social and cultural situations can be shown to trigger highly 
sensitive states. Emotions such as shame and humiliation may result in a 
general malaise of alienation arising from acts of symbolic violence 
administered as expressions of class power and hierarchical domination. 
Thus, the actions and sentiments of aspirants, which can include such 
emotional reactions (displays) and threats to the embodied self, are to be 
seen as forms of structural class differentiation and domination; as the 
collectively held normative commitments which sustain the social orders. 
These symbolic practices are shown to advantage some groups (or 
classes) but disadvantage others. This is noted by Vincent where such 
emotional displays remain taken-for-granted (doxa) and thus 
unrecognised (misrecognition) (see Vincent 2011, p. 1384; also, Skeggs 
2004). 
 
By contextualising aspiration and mobility in terms of doxa it can be 
considered as a pre-reflexive, natural, normalised, rational and logical 
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human enactment in the social field of class (see Bourdieu 1977, p. 115; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 74). Bourdieu also uses the concept of 
field to describe “a set of objectives, historical relations that exist between 
positions anchored in certain forms of power” (or capital) (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2007, p. 16). Furthermore, in the context of a class society, 
aspiration and mobility can be said to take place because it is what people 
do, or might choose to do pre-reflexively, pre-consciously and 
normatively. Importantly, from a class perspective, the reasons for 
becoming aspirational are that unequal power relations are also ‘taken for 
granted’ as is the variability of access to resources to ensure access to the 
‘good life’. This would then leave aspirants with options. One option would 
be for aspirants to strive to improve their circumstances within the finite 
time, space and resources available. I would suggest that this is, in effect, 
an existential challenge in contending with class inequalities. Also, each 
aspirant is starting from a uniquely different base line with varying 
volumes of capitals. This is what Bourdieu refers to as an ‘uneven playing 
field’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 215; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 98). This 
has a bearing on the interiority, motivation and resilience of the aspirant’s 
embodied and dispositional self, or habitus, to persist in striving in order 
to flourish in a class society. 
 
The aspirant’s habitus might suggest an amenability to considerable 
change, since by the very desire to seek and strive for a better life it 
shows, theoretically at least, a mutability and this, in large part, has been 
given thrust by the potentially dislocating or reorienting acts of reflexivity. 
The habitus of the aspirant can be shown to be like that of a creator 
undergoing free and conscious acts of self-creation and assigning to 
his/herself such life designs (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 133). 
Furthermore, Navarro (2006, p. 16) suggests that the habitus can be 
changed under unexpected situations or over a long historical period. 
However, this flexibility to change the habitus is not simply an action of 
‘free will’ nor completely determined by internalised structures, but it 
becomes possible by a kind of (dialectical) interplay between the two.31 As 
 
31 I briefly considered the key implications of this in Section 1.3. 
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I discuss in Section 1.5 and in Chapter 2, this gives an indication of the 
complexity of the reflexive process insofar as an aspirant’s embodied and 
dispositional self is shaped and formed into and by, habitual practices. It 
is shaped by existing structures and experiences of a unique set of 
historical events, as well as offering the volition to be able to shape and 
reshape current practices and psychical structures such that, these 
condition the aspirant’s very perceptions of self (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170). 
This is critical to aspirants in the field of social mobility where reflexive re-
shaping of the classed self is a constant challenge. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind the degrees of fix and/or 
fluidity that take place as inter-class relations change and how this might 
enable social and psychological clues to how a ‘transformative classed self’ 
might emerge and be shaped. For while the system of dispositions enables 
aspirants to embody, sustain, reproduce and be reproduced by and within, 
a social field this, in itself, is not fixed. In this regard it seems that 
Bourdieu is arguing that the habitus is both fixing and transforming the 
embodied self (Bourdieu 1977). Also, more broadly, the field of class itself 
is also changing constantly through the dynamics of class struggle; 
exposing the contradictions and tensions that this throws up and indicating 
the way class signifiers of domination and subordination can also shift. 32 
In the midst of this, the mobile aspirant can be said to face both pitfalls 
and opportunities. Their embodied classed self is at once both held and 
freed to consider the choices and obstacles of mobility (Maton 2012; 
Skeggs 2004). 
 
In this way issues of class, self and otherness can be shown to impact on 
social aspiration and mobility, particularly in the way structures impose 
and cultures contain, evolve and affect the self as practiced in the lived 
experience of everyday life and in a variety of social and cultural settings. 
For example, aspirants may apply for middle-class appointments in 
 
 




organisations and may be selected initially on the basis of ability and 
qualifications. However, they may not be sufficiently sensitised to and 
comfortably familiar with, the nuanced middle-class behaviours and 
cultural practices of the professional organisation. They may misread, or 
fail to see, these assumed modes of behaviour, or codes of practice in the 
organisation’s culture (Bourdieu 1977).33 Furthermore, aspirants may, for 
example, misconceive the appropriate or expected ways of gaining 
recognition and respect necessary for enhancing, not only their career 
prospects, but also their sense of self and wellbeing. They may jeopardise 
these prospects perhaps through ill-advised, disingenuous approaches or 
interactions with their workplace peers and superiors. Already feeling a 
sense of unfamiliarity and ‘lack’ they may adopt inappropriate practices 
such as toady or obsequious posturing to gain favour. This might then be 
detected by their peers or superiors and discreetly noted for future 
reference. Such behaviours may have resulted from aspirants’ historically-
classed embodiments, carried unconsciously and emanating from, for 
example, internalised forms of class deference to superiors; from the 
sentiments of inferiority towards middle-class professionals or experiences 
of belittlement or humiliation from authority figures in the aspirant’s past 
life (Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Walkerdine, Lucey 
and Melody 2001; O’Donoghue 2013). 
 
As I show in Chapter 4, such behaviours and aspects of selfhood raise 
concerns in terms of a grounded sense of identity and the need for feelings 
of security, familiarity and authenticity. Moreover, aspirants caught in 
such predicaments will also need to quickly assess these nuanced and 
coded cultural differences if they are to retain their honour, integrity, 
wellbeing, life prospects and a promising future in, for example, workplace 
environments. Here, the habitus is useful in showing how such 
incongruous class embodiments can leave the aspirant vulnerable in the 
absence of sufficient symbolic capital. 
 
 
33 These are what Bourdieu’s refers to as the nuanced ‘rules of the game’ in a 
given field of practice. 
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Importantly, Bourdieu contests mobility as a universalising condition 
(Skeggs 2004, p. 48).34 Perhaps this might be because of the wide 
discrepancies of access to the various forms of capital in the field of class. 
Thus, in the case of aspirant mobiles, this would determine who is able to 
negotiate for various forms of capital and who is not; who can move 
through the specific social space and who cannot. 
 
Thus, Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice is useful in explaining social and 
cultural practice in the context of class and aspiration for some important 
reasons. Firstly, the concepts of habitus and field usefully account for the 
embodied nature of classed dispositions, including internalised ways of 
being and for habituated development of the aspirant’s character, self-
perceptions and behaviour. Secondly, they provide powerful insights into 
the nature of the aspirant self, particularly the ‘internal conversation’ 
(Archer 2003) and the emotional and ontological struggles aspirant’s 
experience, which I explore in more depth in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Thirdly, 
in terms of both the opportunities and threats to ontological security, 
habitus, field and capital provide a useful basis for such a discourse on 
social aspiration and mobility.35 They can highlight the differences and 
divisions in class relations and forms of structural domination that surface 
in discourses on social mobility. 
 
1.5 Bourdieu’s habitus and the processes of ‘internalisation’. 
Here I examine the psychical internalisation of social and cultural 
structures in relation to social aspiration and mobility. The key question is 
 
34 This might suggest the need for a discussion as to why class mobility is so 
restricted and limited within the working-class; who becomes mobile and who 
does not and why this might be. A further discussion might be warranted 
therefore, to clarify what Bourdieu means by mobility not being a ‘universalising 
condition’. Is he saying that it is negated as a phenomenon by the very existence 
of class and that mobility is not available to all because of the endemic inequalities 
of a class structure? This may or may not be a different issue to that of the 
motivations of those who are aspirational and who, through a reflexive 
examination of the self, or through other approaches, are able to overcome (or 
not) the inhibiting structural barriers that I address here. 
 
35 I discuss further the key concept of ontological insecurity in the context of 
social aspiration and mobility in Chapter 5. 
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to address why and how working-class agents choose to become 
aspirational and socially mobile and what the processes are that underpin 
their inclinations and motivations. I touched on some of these in Section 
I.2 and consider these issues further in Section 2.5. 
 
As I indicated in the previous section Bourdieu uses the habitus to define 
a set of historical relations as bodily dispositions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
2007, p. 18). Thus, the habitus is an internalised organising mechanism 
based on the knowledge and sensibilities that an agent (aspirant) needs 
in order to have what Bourdieu refers to as a feel for, and an ability to 
play, the ‘game’ of living in its multifarious contexts or fields 36 It is this 
ability to cope, or even flourish effectively in the social space that is central 
to my use of this key concept (Bourdieu 1977). To quote him 
 
“The habitus - embodied history, internalised as a second nature and so 
forgotten as history, is the active presence of the whole past of which it is 
the product” (Bourdieu 1990, p. 56). 
 
Bourdieu contends that this acquired knowledge is necessarily inculcated 
appropriately in order for culturally-defined ‘products’ such as language, 
taste, economy, or classed life itself, to succeed in reproducing themselves 
in the form of an open and durable system of dispositions. In this regard 
the habitus is a system of socialised norms, tendencies and habits that 
guide agents’ thinking, actions and, as I discuss later in Chapters 4 and 5, 
in an ontological sense, their very being. For Bourdieu however, the 
habitus is also 
 
“a product of history, it is an open system of dispositions constantly 
subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a 
way that either reinforces or modifies its structures” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2007, p. 133). 
 
 
36 See Section 1.4 and the thesis Introduction for a definition of this 
Bourdieusian concept. 
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Therefore, such experiences provide the basis for either ‘holding’ and 
habitually repeating the dispositions of the embodied self, or they provide 
the basis for reflexively changing them. Thus, citing Bourdieu, Wacquant 
indicates that 
 
“Aside from the effects of certain social trajectories, habitus can also be 
transformed via socio-analysis, i.e., via an awakening of consciousness 
and a form of “self-work” that enables the individual to get a handle on his 
or her dispositions.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 133). 
 
However, Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that this can be attempted only 
after, and on the basis of earlier structuring of the habitus which may, or 
may not, affect changes to later higher-ranking structures. For example, 
Wacquant suggests that 
 
“the habitus acquired in the family is at the basis of the structuring of 
school experiences, and the habitus transformed by the action of the 
school, itself diversified, is in turn at the basis of all subsequent 
experiences…and so on from restructuring to restructuring.” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 2007, p. 134). 
 
In this regard Bourdieu asks, “how can behaviour be regulated without 
being the product of obedience to explicit rules dictating such practices?” 
(see Maton 2012, p. 49). This question would seem to provide an 
important starting point in understanding how class and the habitus might 
be inter-related and how ingrained practices might become unconsciously 
forgotten, buried in the psyche or misrecognised in an historical sense 
over time. This is the fundamental puzzle for Bourdieu and is what the 
habitus is intended to solve. It is ‘structured’ by the individual’s past and 
present circumstances. For example, family upbringing is part of its 
bedrock and ‘structuring’ in helping to shape one’s present and future 
practices (Maton, 2012, p. 50). However, we are not pre-programmed and 
merely acting out the implications of our upbringing. Rather practices are 
the result of an ‘unconscious relationship’ between the habitus, field and 
capital which are interlocked. 
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As I mention above, this captures how we carry forward within us our 
continuous process of making our history and how we make choices to act 
in certain ways and not others. This is also useful in understanding the 
puzzle and appeal of social mobility among some sections of the working-
class and not others and the preconditions for some becoming socially 
mobile and while others struggle to become so, or ‘consciously’ choose not 
to be. Thus, why we are where we are at any moment is the result of 
numerous events of the past that have shaped our path (Maton 2012, p. 
51). I explore this temporal aspect from an existential sociology 
perspective in Chapters 4 and 5. However, what is it about the 
‘unconscious’ that Bourdieu considers in relation to the power of habitus 
and processes of internalisation? 
 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) consider why those from the working-class 
are less likely than the middle-class to attend university (see Maton 
2012).37 They suggest that innumerable stimuli during upbringing shape 
the outlooks, beliefs and practices of the working class. For example, in 
terms of educational (self) confidence Bourdieu shows how class becomes 
internalised as an embodiment and a barrier to many who may then decide 
not to engage in the game, choosing that is, to ‘internalise their 
disadvantage’ and ‘regulate themselves out of the system’, thus remaining 
fixed in their class position. They consider that it is “not for the likes of 
them”. Their habitus does not match that of the social context. They are 
not attuned to the doxa, or the unwritten ‘rules of the game’ (see Maton 
2012, p. 57).38 
 
 
37 This example clearly predates more recent UK government initiatives of wider 
access to higher education. However, the point is nonetheless valid in the current 
discussion. See also the example in the thesis Introduction in the section 
‘Processes of ‘internalisation’. 
 
38 But as I show in Chapters 3 and 4 and in my personal vignettes, the interplay 
between self-confidence and demonstrating one’s abilities is profoundly complex. 
Some from the working-class take the knocks and, as a result, harbour a sense 
of failure and disengage, while others muster the resilience to strive despite the 
knocks and are able, eventually, to achieve. 
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This explanation of Bourdieu’s habitus is, however, complex and requires 
further unpacking. We can see from the first quotation in this section that 
his reference to ‘second nature’ implies a doxic effect. This is so since 
much of what aspirant mobiles might perceive and do in their endeavours 
may be assumed to be normal, taken-for-granted and so commonplace 
that it is not worth discussing because “It goes without saying since it 
comes without saying” (Bourdieu 1977). However, what is the nature of 
the relationship between an historical socialising process and one that is 
perceived as a forgotten history?  
 
Bourdieu seems to answer this by citing Durkheim, who says that 
 
“In each one of us, in different degrees, is contained the person we were 
yesterday, and indeed, in the nature of things it is even true that our past 
personae predominate in us, since the present is necessarily insignificant 
when compared with a long period of the past because of which we have 
emerged in the form we have today. It is just that we don’t directly feel 
the influence of these past selves precisely because they are so deeply 
rooted within us. They constitute the unconscious part of ourselves. 
Consequently, we have a strong tendency not to recognise their existence 
and to ignore their legitimate demands. By contrast, with the most recent 
acquisitions of civilisation we are vividly aware of them just because they 
are recent, and consequently, have not had time to be assimilated into our 
collective unconscious”. (Bourdieu 1990, p. 56). 
 
This clearly shows the historical nature and attributes of the habitus. 
However, Bourdieu’s reference to the ‘unconscious’ in this form has 
generated some controversy about the nature of internalisation processes. 
Such criticism appears to centre on the extent of ‘conscious’ deliberation 
and the ways in which the ‘unconscious’ replaces conscious action. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s insistence on change taking place primarily from 
within the unconscious, as if the conscious self is not part of the 
embodiment of durable dispositions, or that it plays only a limited part in 
change-making and reflexivity is an issue to some (see for example, Noble 
and Watkins 2003). Bourdieu states that the habitus is created and 
produced unconsciously, without any deliberate pursuit of coherence, that 
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is, without conscious concentration (see Bourdieu 1984). This is crucial in 
understanding Bourdieu’s reflexivity, which Wacquant, quoting Bourdieu, 
states 
 
entails, rather, the systematic exploration of the “unthought categories of 
thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought.” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant (2007, p. 40). 
 
However, in the context of social mobility, this raises the serious question 
of how an aspirant’s reflexive capacity and capability actually enables 
them to become consciously aware of their embodied self, in the sense of 
being able to articulate it meaningfully in actioning changes in practice, 
during their aspirational endeavours. Bourdieu (1984) accounts for this 
reflexive process by pointing to the tensions and contradictions that arise 
when people encounter, and are challenged by, different situations that 
may trigger a serious rethink of their circumstances or when emotional 
imbalances or splits occur in the psyche, which he terms hysteresis 
(Friedman 2016, p. 138; Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 206). 
 
Furthermore, according to Bourdieu, (see Swartz 2002, p. 63) the 
dispositions of the habitus represent informal and practical, not discursive 
or conscious forms of knowledge. That is, the practical evaluation and 
informal mastery of opportunities and constraints occur unconsciously. 
From this, Swartz asks what group characteristics the habitus incorporates 
and notes that Bourdieu has stressed mostly the sense of place in the 
social order, that is, an understanding of inclusion and exclusion in the 
various social hierarchies. With aspiration and mobility in mind this would 
seem to resonate in other research (see Friedman 2016; Allen 2015; 
Chapman 2015; Morley 1997; Reay 2004, 2005, 2015). It seems that 
people internalise basic life chances for people of their kind (that is, their 
class) and the chances of success or failure are internalised and 
transformed into aspirations and expectations (see Swartz 2002, p. 64; 
Morley 1997, p. 114; Elder-Vass 2007, p. 334). 
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I develop this discussion on ‘internalisation’ further in Chapter 2, Section 
2.5 since other important aspects of this historical process of class 
embodiment and transformation are worthy of examination. In particular, 
I consider the potential and constraints which Bourdieu places on reflexive 
self-analysis; of the unconscious reproduction of habits of class and how 
these might inhibit or enable social mobility and class transition. 
 
1.6 The hidden injuries of class. 
Much of the thinking for the thesis is drawn from an early and important 
piece of research by Sennett and Cobb (1973). The authors explore what 
they term the hidden injuries of class experienced by American blue-collar 
male workers in the 1970s, many of whom have experienced social 
mobility, but nonetheless feel the discomfort of this in their circumstances. 
By unpicking the narratives told by their respondents, the authors piece 
together the sociological, psychological and existential significance in 
these accounts of life and class position within society at the time.39 The 
inner conflicts that they unearth during the interviews are critical here. 
The respondents are shown to be measuring their own self-worth against 
the lives of those other than themselves who are in occupations upon 
which society appears to place more value.40 
 
The ambivalence the respondents show is an indication of how the 
structures of class have been internalised and that mobility can generate 
long-standing mental strife. It also registers the risks involved in being 
socially mobile and how aspects of character such as fortitude and 
resilience might play a part in maintaining inner strength. 
 
Sennett and Cobb reflect on their respondents’ hopes, fears and 
aspirations for the future. In so doing, they focus on the symbolic labels 
 
39 The work of Sennett (1999) and Sennett, (2004) is also relevant in evaluating 
and developing an ontological and existential conceptualisation of class in relation 
to psychical interiority and working-class aspiration and mobility. 
 
40 I draw the reader attention here to my opening vignette in the thesis 
Introduction and my growing dissatisfaction and low sense of self-worth when 
working as an apprentice motor mechanic. 
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accorded the respondents which they term the ‘badges’ of class and ability 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 62-64). Their respondents have striven in 
various ways and degrees, for a more fulfilled life, often under challenging 
domestic and workplace conditions and notably with limited social and 
cultural capital. Their findings reveal many moving accounts and I consider 
a selection of these here, which are useful in building a picture of the 
internal, psychical structures of class. 
 
Sennett and Cobb (1973, p. 30) note that an erosion of confidence was 
evident even among respondents who had palpably achieved success in 
their occupational settings.41 The authors ask what it is about a culture 
that the more it gives, the more it brings feelings of vulnerability. They 
ask why and how it is possible to consider getting beyond the idea of 
freedom and dignity in the respondents’ individual lives when society is 
arranged in such a way that they have had, as yet, little taste of either 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 30). Their research is significant in 
demonstrating how perceptions and feelings are primarily rooted in those 
received from others, whether complementary or derogatory, which in 
turn emanate from the wider social norms and the values. However, these 
are often disingenuously portrayed on the back of fundamental 
contradictions and misrecognition as discussed so far (Bourdieu 1977; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007). Similarly, as aspirant mobiles their skills 
and abilities are also linked to their sense of self-worth and dignity. Thus, 
there are ontological implications in their struggling to be appreciated and 
recognised. However, this need for recognition and respect is not simply 
sought on the basis of what they can contribute, but for their very 
existence as sentient human beings, irrespective of such attributes.42 I 
explore these concerns in the ensuing chapters. 
 
 
41 See Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion of self-esteem among working-
class aspirants. 
 
42 I revisit this critical issue in Chapter 5. 
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So far, I have considered the structural determinants of class constraints 
and how they are internalised by aspirant mobiles. I have tried to show 
how these can inhibit social mobility from within the self. I now want to 
move on to look at some personal illustrations which can complement the 
examples from the published literature. I show some of the ways in which 
working-class mobility might succeed or flounder in making this significant 
transition to a middle-class life. Implied in these accounts are the ways in 
which the barriers to aspiration and mobility register psychically, and how 
they can be shown to endure. Some further examples from Sennett and 
Cobb (1973) and others will complement these personal accounts. 
 
1.7 Personal vignettes. 
 
Vignette 1.1. 
Class differentiation can be exemplified in forms of deference and a sense 
of inferiority, as well as in class solidarity and disdain for such structural 
inferiority. For example, the class disparity in the use of language and 
intonation discussed in Section 1.4 is illustrated here in a brief 
conversation with my mother. It occurred at a time in the 1960s when I 
was becoming more socially and politically aware of my parents’ sense of 
class distinction and domination and how the impact of class structure can 
reinforce or reduce self-worth. It shows the impact of ‘how it is said’ rather 
than ‘what is said’. It usefully demonstrates the combination of Bourdieu’s 
‘taken-for-granted’ doxa and the symbolic domination that reinforces the 
deference shown by the working-class to the social and cultural elite and 
established middle-class. 
 
I remember watching TV with my mum one night and Reginald Maudling, 
the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, was being interviewed. My 
mum said 
 
 “He sounds so clever when he talks, doesn’t he? What he’s saying 
must be right”. 
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By the very fact that he spoke with a refined or ‘posh’ accent convinced 
my mother that whatever he uttered must have been be based on sound 
principles since he was obviously well educated! I asked her what she 
thought he was actually saying, but she was not really listening to the 
content of his utterances, merely the sound he made when speaking. At 
this stage I was fuming in my chair. I was probably aged eighteen at the 
time and beginning to react strongly to my parents’ views, while proposing 
alternative perspectives on society more and more in their company. 
 
I cite this family encounter to show both the deference and sense of class 
inferiority that can surface in working-class homes and how tensions can 
arise. I was not able to convince my mother that this politician may not 
necessarily have her best interests at heart. However, if I argued with my 
parents, especially my dad, they tended to get upset, take it as a personal 
slight and blame me for disrupting the household. My dad had difficulty 
accepting any opposition, or any reasoned or reasonable alternative to his 
views. My parents used to enjoy watching and laughing at TV programmes 
such as ‘Till Death Us Do Part” which ironically portrayed the tensions 
arising from the conflicting social and political views of members of a 
working-class family. 
 
My social and political perspectives were becoming diametrically opposed 
to those of my parents and this continued to bring conflict within the 
family. Eventually these disagreements became so strong that I chose to 
move out of the family home. I was gradually becoming more aware of 
class inequalities and injustices, but I lacked the confidence and 
knowledge to consolidate this into a purposeful course of action. At this 
time, I considered myself to be ill prepared for life and had not formulated 
any conscious sense of social inequality, aspiration or mobility. 
 
The formulation of the habitus and impact of doxa is apparent in this 
example. Such snapshots of working-class life reveal compliance and 
deference to authority based on the flimsiest of foundations. But the above 
discordant family interchange was eye-opening in experiencing and 
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Here I recall some early memories of school life. These portray the 
dispositional confusion of a lack of clear goal setting which was to set me 
back for many years. 
 
I vividly recall, with deeply held feelings, my early years at my secondary-
modern school in Liverpool in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Thinking 
back, I would say that almost all the pupils at the school were working-
class. Having all failed the 11-plus exam and then the 13-plus, I and my 
fellows adopted a cavalier attitude, though with fatalistic resignation, in 
suppressing the feelings of failure that this significant event had brought. 
I recall rationalising this at the time and thinking I would be ok and how 
strange grammar schools must be and probably ‘not for the likes of me’ 
(see Lawler 1999, p. 15). 
 
Mine was a ‘dump’ school and we all intuitively knew that, without actually 
stating it. The staff knew it too. But they treated us reasonably well 
knowing the ‘assumed’ academic limitations of their charges. Anyone who 
seemed to be ‘clever’ was quietly respected, but usually socially 
marginalised during school hours at least, without them necessarily facing 
antagonism from the rest of us. 
 
Thoughts of great achievements in life seemed limited to dreams and 
fantasies. It wasn’t until the final year (1963) when those of us who had 
not left at age fifteen, (the earliest leaving age at the time) were given 
the opportunity to sit regional examinations. Inexplicably, the air seemed 
to clear for us and after years of muddling through in a kind of academic 
sleepwalking, there was a strange sense of impetus and of starting to 
knuckle down to do some serious work. An anxiety-based existential 
nudge perhaps? But by then it was too late. The damage had been done. 
Our horizons, it seemed, had been irrevocably narrowed, trimmed and set. 
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I recall one pupil in our final year who suddenly stood out as academically 
smart compared to the rest of us. I couldn’t understand what he was 
doing, or how he was doing it, or indeed how he had previously been 
invisible and had now suddenly emerged with this level of ability. It was a 
mystery how, all of a sudden, he was consistently high achieving. I recall 
that his manner was reserved, slightly aloof and quietly detached without 
being overtly superior. Clearly, he had been working hard for some time 
and, we concluded, he was definitely going to ‘go places’. It was an odd 
time. 
 
With weeks to go before the end of our school lives we began to see how 
limited our futures were going to be in terms of finding ‘good’ jobs. Out of 
the whole final year probably only 2 or 3 pupils were considered able 
enough to go on to do GCE ‘O’ levels, or even ‘A’ Levels! The idea of 
university seemed distantly mysterious; like a completely different world 
and well beyond my frame of reference. So, in effect, a process of ‘value-
realignment’ had taken place for one or two in the school. They had 
somehow grasped the nettle and ‘woken up’ to the social reality that 
bettering oneself and becoming upwardly mobile might be a good thing. 
But for the rest of us at that time and in that context, there was no such 
value adjustment of any significance. Although, I believe the seeds had 
been sown somehow in my mind, if only by seeing what was possible in 
the case of those academically able souls. 
 
As I show in Section 1.6, concerns regarding a failure to connect with the 
educational ethos and a resulting low self-regard are amplified by the 
American working-class college students in Sennett and Cobb’s research. 
Respondents recall being “made to feel inadequate” and by a “laying on of 
culture” they showed how difficult it was for them to effectively internalise 
the unfamiliar, more nuanced middle-class values, norms and practices 
that are most prevalent in school regimes (Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 
26-27). Their research concluded that these difficulties profoundly 
threaten the individual’s sense of dignity and belonging. The researchers 
use the term ‘status incongruity’ to show how their respondents were 
subjected to an unfamiliar set of rules in a social class ‘game’ of legitimacy 
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and entitlement where self-respect and the respect of others is a double-
edged prize (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 23; Bourdieu 1984, 1990).43 
 
These students were self-critical, blaming themselves for their 
ambivalence about their prospects in the education system. They 
attributed this to a feeling of not having made better use of their 
opportunities (see Vignette 1.2 for a similar outlook). There was the strong 
likelihood of them working in occupations that would provide little 
engagement or sense of being valued. Significantly however, their 
disaffection also led them to hold themselves to blame for their lack of 
self-confidence and for having failed to progress further in life. Comments 
such as “If only I had what it takes” were significant in their feeling ill-
equipped for what they, wrongly, perceived to be the personal character 
attributes to succeed (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 28). The authors 
suggest that these responses endorse what are, in effect, confused 
metaphors of self-worth which they suggest might be recast as issues of 
freedom and dignity and which the class structure has the effect of 
undermining among those from the working-class.44  
 
Although their research was undertaken in the USA, almost 50 years ago, 
this still seems to resonate with more recent research. For example, in 
research by Savage and his colleagues on class in 21st Century Britain they 
point that despite being successful those from a lower status background 
harboured a ‘lingering sense of deficit’ rooted in their psyche (Savage 
2015, p. 217). 
 
Such concerns over self-regard are likely to emerge when social and 
cultural capital is limited and out of alignment with middle-class norms, 
values and cultural practice (Bourdieu 1986). For example, UK school 
pupils from families with limited cultural capital felt anxiety, 
 
43 See Bourdieu (1990) for his use of the phrase ‘rules of the game’ in the social 
field of class and other social fields. 
 
44 A more extensive discussion of self-worth among working-class aspirants is 
explored in Chapter 3. 
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embarrassment and resentment when they realised that, despite 
demonstrating comparable academic and intellectual abilities to their 
middle-class peers, they nonetheless felt a profound sense of shame when 
reflecting on this disadvantage (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001).45 
This in turn had a lasting impact on their confidence and positive hopes 
for the future with many feeling ostracised and marginalised by their 
allegedly ‘more capable’ middle-class peers.  
 
Similarly, this is painfully demonstrated in Calarco’s research on the ‘help-
seeking’ strategies of middle-class children in mixed ability and mixed 
social class schools (Calarco 2011). Here the more passive, non-assertive 
dispositions of working-class children were demonstrated when comparing 
their modes of classroom interaction to that of their middle-class peers. 
By contrast, middle-class children were shown to be considerably more 
assertive, confident and able to ‘tune in’ to the teacher’s expectations, 
often adopting brazenly manipulative tactics to get the teacher’s attention. 
This cultural attuning of middle-class pupils shows how ‘status congruity’ 
becomes advantageous in securing future advancement. 
 
The working-class pupils in Calarco’s sample clearly needed help. 
However, Stahl (2014) warns about misreading and oversimplifying how 
working-class youth engage with the rhetoric on social mobility and 
aspiration. He argues that the complex negotiations around identity and 
what constitutes self-value and worth are critical at the interface between 
their ‘inner life’ and the social context when they are seen to be resisting 
doxic notions of social mobility. From Stahl’s perspective, the students 
underlying emotional makeup and passive behaviour may have been 
wrongly misinterpreted as ‘disengagement’ rather than a lack of ability. 
 
However, the above examples show that the structural forces of class can 
bring about inner tensions among the upwardly mobile, where aspirants 
are confused about and are struggling to either retain, or to change and 
 
45 See Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion on ‘shame’ and Chapter 5 for a 
longer discussion on the anxieties and ontological insecurities emerging during 
social mobility. 
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adapt to different social values and social mores (Sennett 1999). This is 
further explored in Sennett’s later text in which he considers the 
discordance and dismay among his respondents who reflect on their 
dashed expectations in seeking to achieve more in life than the efforts and 
aspirations of their parents (Sennett 2004). Again, tensions surface when 
aspirants seek to distance themselves from their parents’ lifestyle and 
values while at the same time wanting to respectfully appreciate their 
parents’ sacrifices and hard work (see Vignette 1.3, also Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001; Reay 2013). 
 
More recent literature amplifies and qualifies this assertion albeit in 
conflicting ways. For example, Mallman (2017) notes the challenges to the 
homogeneity of working-class socialisation and what upwardly mobile 
aspirants’ narratives show when their class origins and ambitions are 
seemingly at odds. Citing Sennett and Cobb (1973), Mallman suggests 
that the upwardly mobile enter a moral economy that pits them in 
opposition to their ‘old’ selves. The social and cultural separation or 
splitting from parental, family and community influences poses a potential 
threat to ‘relational cohesion’. Bourdieu calls this a dialectical 
confrontation between a socialised ‘working-class self’ and an emerging 
‘middle-class self’. He argues that attempts at full assimilation to middle-
class life may bring only ‘qualified’ success in moving between totally 
different ways of life associated with different sections of the social space 
(see Mallman 2017, pp. 19-20; Friedman 2012). Again, one of the main 
contentions in the thesis is that psychical tensions such as this, prevent a 
complete class transition from occurring. The ‘in-between-ness’ and sense 
of being in a ‘no-mans’ land’ without a firm identity or sense of belonging 
is something that can persist for many mobiles bringing existential 
consequences in terms of resolving the feelings of a ‘conflicted or lost self’ 
(see Friedman 2016).46 
 
However, the above issues of identity and belonging highlight the limits of 
the determinism in Bourdieu’s habitus about which his critics have 
 
46  Chapter 5 discusses the anxieties of such class fragmentation. 
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variously argued (see Section 2.2). This also shows the extent to which 
the embodied self can adapt to new social and cultural class positions and 
the instances where the habitus is adjusting (Mallman 2017, p. 20, 
Atkinson 2015, p. 116), suggesting that it is able to undergo changes 
through time. This is an important point since in the case of aspirational 
intent the habitus, as Bourdieu seems to have intended, may, depending 
on the unique character and circumstances of the individual, become rigid 
and fixed at certain times and then become released or malleable at other 
times. If this is so, then the question arises as to what structural forces 
can and cannot be freed up to enable the aspirant’s habitus to meld with 
unfamiliar middle-class socio-cultural practices. 
Mallman (2017, p. 23) also notes the apparent impasse and contradiction 
between aspiration and the emotional challenges that can come from 
‘rising above one’s station’ whilst at the same time shaking off the 
constraining notion of ‘knowing one’s place’.47 Again, ambivalence can 
emerge since aspirants can retain parts of their working-class self, such 
as family influences and a past classed life, while simultaneously seeing 
these in a different light by becoming differently classed, estranged or 
detached and by experiencing shifts in their sense of self and identity. 
Similarly, the location of the self ‘in the past’ and then as a changed 
version which has become the ‘present’ self can be said to create a 
hybridised self which lends continuity to narratives of a disrupted habitus 
and of negotiating incongruent patterns of class behaviour in order to 
bolster an independent identity (see Mallman 2017, p. 24, Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001, pp. 25 and 163). Similarly, relational barriers are 
formed in the families of aspirants whereby the habitus is divided against 
itself (Sayer 2005, p. 26).48 
Indeed, an ontological disjuncture of a divided self need not be negatively 
exaggerated. For example, Mallman (2017, p. 24) argues that while 
 
47 This process of unsticking entrenched class-related emotions is examined in 
Chapter 3. 
 
48 A fuller critique of the habitus as used by Bourdieu is undertaken in Chapter 2. 
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aspirants may inherit a ‘family-outsider’ status, this can be seen as 
training them to become comfortable (less anxious) about feeling different 
and so enable them to transfer or channel these class/family challenges 
into personal resources.49 By instigating what Taylor (1989) refers to as a 
reflexive ‘turning inward’ for approval the classed self can be considered 
to show resilience, authentication and validation of the shifting character 
of selfhood (Mallman 2017, p. 24). These innermost dialogical structures 
of thinking and feeling may, or may not be reflexively transformative in 
form, to the extent that was discussed in the earlier sections. However, 
the ontological nature of aspiring will necessarily involve engagement in 
an iterative or cyclical process of self-conscious evaluation of intrinsic and 
extrinsic issues related to the self. Again, this aspect of the transmutation 
of the self in class transition is further examined in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
 
Furthermore, this transformational aspect of the aspiration process may 
create conflicting approaches to previously held social and cultural values. 
Aspirants may develop a propensity to acquire and display individualistic 
class differentiation, or to place growing importance on the culturally 
nuanced mores of the middle-class and to distance themselves from the 
world views and socio-cultural practices of family members who are not 
aspirational or mobile. Perhaps, aspirants might become embarrassed or 
dismissive about the ideas and views which were commonly accepted in 
their earlier life and peer group. However, in an existential sense they may 
equally be unable to comfortably, and completely establish and stabilise a 
new sense of a ‘transformed self’ when in an unfamiliar social and cultural 
space and place. 
 
Vignette 1.3. 
A number of the above points certainly resonate in my early life, in my 
domestic setting, as the brief account below explicates. 
 
 
49 This point usefully previews the discussion on ‘ontological insecurity’ which is 
the central theme and objective of Chapter 5. 
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Coming into my teens, in the early 1960s, my life at home did not feel 
particularly comfortable. I increasingly disagreed with my dad on matters 
of politics and social affairs (see Vignette 1.1). This created an irreversible 
rift between us which I did not consider to be class related. It was only 
later, in the 1980s and beyond, in gravitating to a more ‘educated’ and 
middle-class lifestyle that I began to reflect on this disharmony. It was my 
engagement with such matters in an undeveloped quasi-academic way 
that allowed me to see what I considered to be the limitations and 
weaknesses in his (and my own) previous socio-economic arguments, 
which he had held for many years. For ‘an easy life’, my mother would 
agree with him, or sit on the fence in ignorance of the issues and how they 
were being interpreted.  
 
This example of personal development can be seen as a form of psychical 
‘splitting’. It may be considered typical of how offspring move away from 
their parents; of how they need to ‘leave the nest’. However, aside from 
this, it was also a realisation that much of the parenting I had received, 
specifically in terms of the acquisition and accumulation of knowledge, and 
the perspectives and justifications for our own particular social position, 
were now no longer acceptable to me. So, I didn’t agree with my dad’s 
perspectives on society at that time. However, I also found it hard to 
coalesce with him, mainly because of his erratic behaviour and 
temperament. I felt pity for him in his anxiety about poverty and the 
strangely self-imposing constraints he seemed to harbour. Basically, I 
suspect he was mildly traumatised by his experiences in WW2, but this did 
not become clear until much later in our lives. I felt ‘held back’ by my 
home life. Although, in general terms, my parents were loving, I felt 
’penned in’ by the limitations and narrowness of their social perspectives 
and outlook. I wanted to love and respect them, but I also wanted to 
escape! 
 
Accounts of this form can be said to reveal an interesting psycho-social 
phenomenon in that working-class aspirants are, in effect, continually 
caught in a kind of existential ‘double bind’ (see the discussion in Sections 
5.2 and 5.3). They are striving to seek out and realise new pathways 
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towards greater prosperity and security and towards a more meaningful 
and flourishing life (see Atkinson 2015, p. 116; Sennett and Cobb 1973, 
p. 209).50 This central problem can also be articulated as an anxiety-based 
ontology of class transition that I develop further in the final chapter of 
the thesis. I argue that this presents aspirants with significant psychical 
challenges during class transition and throughout the remainder of their 
lives. 
 
On the balance of the evidence in the literature and the argument 
established here, a further qualification to note is that these ontological 
tensions will mean that many working-class aspirants will lack the desire, 
determination and resilience of character to strive to better themselves 
beyond their ‘familiar’ field of class. The aforementioned structural 
constraints of class can be seen as self-limiting signals in many working-
class families. As demotivating objects, they force many to rationalise 
their situation on fatalistic grounds and to internalise the message that 
they must accept their lot, recognising that there are structural limitations 
to their voluntarism and agency and the extent to which they can strive 
for and achieve a better life. These sentiments have existential parallels 
which I consider in Chapter 5. 
 
In moving towards a different class position the aspirant may in fact 
experience ambivalent feelings and expressions of disloyalty towards and 
from family members, previous friendship groups, or others who are 
perceived to hold a ‘traditional’ working-class outlook. This is a complex 
matter since aspirants are seeking to better themselves while also facing 
dismissal and rebuke from their class of origin. This exposes another 
contradiction (or conflict) which requires some unpicking. The classed 
narrative is confusing since its message seems to be as follows 
 
 
50 Bourdieu uses the term hysteresis to explain instances where adjustments to a 
new set of conditions are not successful (see Chapter 5) and parvenu, the feeling 
of no longer fitting in with family and friends from home, yet not feeling as though 
they really belong to the new world they have entered either. 
 
 71 
“You can, and must, do better with your life than we have done, but don’t think 
you are any better than us by doing so. Remember where you came from, because 
we won’t forget!” 51 
 
This form of class sentiment is problematic insofar as it shows the 
contradiction between the pride that may be felt by families for someone 
‘getting on’ in life, but also the envy or even jealousy which the emerging 
differences in lifestyle and attitudes can engender. Of course, the aspirant 
may or may not be sensitive to these kinds of class pressure. This would 
depend on the aspirant’s circumstances and relationship with, or attitudes 
towards, family and peers. It would also depend upon the aspirant’s sense 
of self in relation to their upward mobility. Whether this makes them feel 
they are experiencing a greater sense of self-worth as a result of this social 
and cultural progression, or whether this might be tempered by other 
kinds of inner conflict or ambivalence. The development of socio-cultural 
difference and division can, as shown, produce powerful discomforts that 
are difficult to reconcile in the self (Mallman 2017; Friedman 2016; Lawler 




In this chapter I have examined the structural determinants of class and 
how these impact on the psychical interiority of aspirant mobiles. I have 
defined and interpreted the framing concepts of aspiration and mobility as 
normative and socially coercive constructs. I show them to be both 
psychically internalised and externally practiced by self and others in 
response to established socio-cultural norms. These framing concepts are 
a key feature of the fluidity of classed life, revealing the struggles involved 
in striving to overcome the barriers to class transition (see Allen 2015; 
Mallman 2017; Loveday 2014; Lawler 1999, 2000, Reay 1998b, 2005; 
Stahl 2013, 2015). 
 
 
51  This quotation is roughly based on expressions and sentiments in my earlier 
life. See also Lawler (1999) with regard to ways of checking ‘pretension’ in family 
and class contexts. 
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I have shown that social aspiration and mobility are presented as a self-
motivating and social imperative, as evidenced by their widespread take 
up and practice. However, I show that working-class aspirants tend to buy 
into the rhetoric of meritocracy, which tends to understate, or ignore 
entirely, the importance of class as a barrier to their mobility and is 
propagated structurally through the myth of a fair and equal society. I 
have argued that the structural inequalities largely prevent such mobility 
and class transition from materialising without a monumental existential 
struggle and resolve on the part of the aspirant. I have tried to show that 
by conforming to these prevailing structural norms, aspirants often fail to 
recognise that their striving is actioned on an ‘uneven playing field’ (see 
Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1990; Savage 2000, 2015). 
 
Accordingly, I have outlined some of the complexities in the struggles of 
aspirant mobiles. These have been considered by briefly introducing 
Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, symbolic capital, doxa, 
misrecognition and symbolic violence/domination. In so doing the central 
argument is that the structural determinants of class tend to be 
underestimated in discussions of working-class social mobility. Inversely, 
there is the danger of over-emphasising the autonomy and independence 
of aspirants and thus a tendency towards voluntarism can be shown. By 
aspirant mobiles underestimating the extent to which forces of structural 
determinism and doxa are internalised during socialisation, such 
aspirational endeavours can bring unexpected psychical challenges 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1994, 2007; Friedman 2016; Atkinson 2015; Reay 
2004, 2005, 2015). 
 
Thus, uncovering the assumed, invisible and hidden practices of class 
helps to show the power of class domination and its effects. However, in 
the case of social mobility, the assumption is that it is just something that 
sections of the working-class do. For how else could they overcome the 
classed restrictions and limitations of their classed lives? I use Bourdieu’s 
concept of doxa to show how such a meritocratic guise is misrecognised 
by many working-class aspirants since ‘it goes without saying’ that social 
and cultural advancement is desirable and realisable. Also, Bourdieu’s 
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concept of symbolic violence shows how middle-class superiority and 
domination is practiced. This is manifest in the form of class signifiers and 
is reinforced through areas of taste such as the use of language (Bourdieu 
1984; Thompson 1984). 
 
I also introduced Sennett and Cobb’s (1973) work on the hidden injuries 
of class and their research observations. In particular, I underscore the 
deeply felt concerns regarding dignity and self-respect, self-denigration 
and the contradictions that emerge from their respondents’ accounts of 
their lives. Given the socio-cultural changes experienced in class transition 
their research shows how mobility can existentially affect aspirants’ sense 
of being, belonging, place, and identity. The discussion also shows how 
and why class can be at the root of ontological insecurities that develop 
and militate against the establishing of a robustness of character (Sennett 
1999, 2004). This is deemed to be an important factor in increasing 
wellbeing among the socially mobile in classed societies. 
 
Sennett and Cobb’s respondents expressed deeply held feelings and 
beliefs about their predicaments and how their aspirations to live a better 
life were being thwarted by feelings of inadequacy, ambivalence, 
uncertainty, disappointment and frustration. They showed how and why 
respondents often experience a limited control of events, choices and 
direction in the psychic terrain of class. Respondents expressed confusion 
over where respect and dignity are held and maintained. They adopted 
self-condemnatory attitudes about their sense of personal achievement, 
often failing to appreciate the full impact of the structural class barriers 
that prevailed but showing how these profoundly affected their sense of 
self-worth and options for their future life. Further references to this 
important work are made throughout the thesis. 
 
The aspirational quest for a better life necessitates, to a greater or lesser 
degree, an awareness of the value and merits of reflexivity. By engaging 
in the process of self-examination and an adjustment of their sense of 
class and self, aspirant mobiles can be said to more effectively manage 
their specific inner obstacles to mobility and to greater wellbeing. The 
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following chapter therefore explores the concept of reflexivity by 
examining Bourdieu’s use and interpretation of the concept. This also 
requires a more extensive account of how his related concepts of habitus 
and field can be operationalised and how, in relation to these, the 
embodied self is a primary focus when addressing the aforementioned 
determinant structures of class. 
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Chapter 2. Critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus: determinist 
tendencies; reflexive potential and processes of ‘internalisation’. 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter I study the extent of determinism and reflexivity in 
Bourdieu’s habitus (see Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1990, 1994, 2005).52 It is 
important to consider the different approaches to Bourdieu’s habitus 
through a selection of critiques by his adherents and critics. These 
contributions are useful in addressing the contradictions, inconsistencies 
and tensions between individual agency and societal structures. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 1 Bourdieu’s habitus is designed to avoid such an 
internal/external or self/other distinction that such dichotomous 
paradoxes struggle to fully reconcile (see Maton 2012, pp 59-60; 
Wetherell 2005). 
 
Some further discussion of this problem is useful in understanding how 
the internalised structural class inhibitors, discussed in Chapter 1, can be 
further addressed. As I noted, such processes of socialisation become 
unconscious through what Bourdieu refers to as ‘history forgotten as 
history’ (see Bourdieu 1990, p. 56; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 136, 
footnote 90). In the case of aspirant mobiles, their internalised 
predispositions towards social-climbing; of striving for a better life and 
greater wellbeing, need to be unpicked in the light of this literature.53 Thus 
a critique of Bourdieu’s habitus is also helpful in considering how aspirants 
carry their embodied history of class with them throughout their mobility 
trajectories and whether this explains their predisposition to be socially 
mobile, to engage in class transition and potentially to ‘become’ middle-




52 As indicated in the thesis Introduction, I take ‘reflexivity’ to mean an act of 
self-reference, where action or examination ‘bends back on’, that is, refers back 
to and affects the entity instigating the action or examination. 
 
53 The reader is reminded that I am using the term ‘aspirant mobile’ as 
synonymous with the phrase ‘working-class aspirant’. 
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Moreover, it is central to the thesis to establish an understanding of how 
aspirant mobiles reflect upon and internalise middle-class ideas of 
‘success’. I therefore critique and summarise these perceptions in order to 
establish the limitations of such aspirations and expectations. 
 
I consider aspirants’ capacity to reflexively examine their embodied 
habitus and whether they are able to harness the capacity to rethink, 
rebuild and reproduce their selfhood, identity and socio-cultural position, 
despite their historically habituated practice (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 
2007). As I have shown in the previous chapter, the capacity to enact 
radical change in the self is always offset by degrees of access to various 
forms of capital. Here it is interesting to note how the aspirant mobile’s 
plight can be a confused, conflicted and solitary one in a number of ways 
(see Friedman 2016, p. 145). In trying to decipher and compete with the 
different signifiers and symbolic capital of the middle-class, aspirant 
mobiles can be deeply affected in terms of their sense of self and a 
potentially shifting and disrupted identity. Their social outlook, mind-set, 
disposition, character and ongoing life narrative can also be affected (see 
Sennett and Cobb 1973; Skeggs 2004; Sayer 2005; Friedman 2012, 
2016; Lawler 1999). Thus, Bourdieu’s habitus shows how class is internally 
reproduced and how the efforts of the aspirant mobile can be 
misrecognised when competing in an ‘uneven playing field’ (Bourdieu 
1977, 1984, 1990, 2009). 
 
The impact of structural norms and values on the psychical interiority of 
the aspirant have also been considered in Chapter 1, Section 1.7. 
However, here I examine the formation of the embodied self by tracing 
the links with class and its impacts on the temperament and character of 
aspirant mobiles. For instance, why did the working-class students appear 
to be less assertive than their middle-class peers in getting the attention 
and respect of their schoolteacher? (Calarco 2011; see Section 1.7). This 
seemed to show that the development of class dispositions is the result of 
internalisation processes where access to forms of ‘psychological’ or 
emotional capitals might be critical. I am thinking here of such qualities 
as resilience, inner resolve, firmness, boldness, preparedness and 
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obviously, from the Calarco’s example, assertiveness and confidence (see 
also Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 88). Would these kinds of qualities 
enhance confidence and self-esteem in the aspirant if developed in their 
early years? Would they, as a consequence, build a more robust and non-
deferential habitus? That is, one able to challenge the social class 
domination they experience; unwilling to bow to the class advantage and 
domination of middle-class others; unwilling to be devalued or made to 
feel inferior or to be treated as such? 54 
 
Thus, the chapter provides a number of critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus to 
consider the extent of determinism and rigidity in the way he intends it to 
be understood. Or, whether it should be perceived as a flexible, durable 
and a mutable mechanism because of the inherent element of reflexivity. 
I follow these critiques with three brief accounts contrasting the 
interpretations of reflexivity by Giddens, Archer and Taylor, before moving 
on to assess the limits of reflexivity in the trajectories of working-class 
upwardly mobile aspirants. A further critique of internalisation to that 
provided in Chapter 1 follows, focusing on Bourdieu’s use of the 
‘unconscious’ in enabling or inhibiting change. I then consider how middle-
class ideas of ‘success’ are internalised before providing further accounts 
of personal experiences relating to the classed embodiment that help 
contextualise the key points. 
 
2.2 Critical interpretations of Bourdieu’s habitus in relation to its 
determinism and reflexivity. 
 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and his development of a reflexive sociology 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007) have been challenged on a number of 
fronts. Some have considered the extent to which the reflexive form is 
manifest within it and from within various specialist areas. For example, 
the habitus has been considered in the context of class with regard to 
 
54 See Chapter 3 for an expanded discussion of such temperaments in the context 
of self and value. 
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transformative learning (Nairn et al. 2012) and in linking emotionality with 
reflexivity (Holmes 2010; Brownlie 2011; Vincent 2011; Burkitt 2012). 
 
However, this section draws out the main areas of contention with 
Bourdieu’s use of the habitus by citing specific theoretical approaches. 
These seek to clarify its complexity in the context of class and with 
relevance to working-class aspirational endeavour. Specifically, the key 
concern is with regard to the determinism and therefore an emphasis on 
structural constraint in Bourdieu’s use of the habitus. To contextualise this 
within the ongoing discussion implies that an excess of determinism in the 
embodied self would stifle the aspirant’s capacity to be upward mobile. 
This is so since such determinist elements would, in specific ways, limit 
the aspirant’s capacity to think and act reflexively in overcoming the 
constraints or barriers of class. Here, three distinct positions seem to 
emerge in the critiques of Bourdieu’s habitus and embodied selfhood which 
I briefly consider. 
 
The first position is held by theorists such as Lash (1993) who argue that 
the elements of determinism shown to be inherent in Bourdieu’s habitus 
do accurately reflect how social structures influence the actions and 
patterns of practice of the individual agent (aspirant). In this perspective 
the internalising of such structures is seen as having more influence on 
the embodied self than that of an agent’s capacity for autonomous action. 
In turn, the agent’s capacity to be reflexive is also restricted by this 
internalisation of structures. It is seen as carrying greater weight in the 
reflexive process than that of agency and similarly, it affects (limits) their 
life chances and possibilities for upward class mobility (Lash 1993). 
 
The second position is held by those such as Archer (2003, 2010). They 
argue that although the agent’s embodied disposition is brought about by 
a process of socialisation and their social reproduction is formed through 
degrees of normative structuration, the elements of structural 
determinism in Bourdieu’s use of the habitus are far too excessive. Indeed, 
they argue it is this very human attribute of reflexive deliberation that 
enables an agent to transcend the structural determinants and constraints 
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of disposition, exemplified in Bourdieu’s habitus, and exemplified in the 
field of class and class transition. 
 
Thirdly, there are those such as Crossley (2001, p. 117) who argue that 
Bourdieu’s habitus can be shown to embrace the potential for reflexive 
deliberation, but that this is either largely misunderstood and understated, 
or that there is a lack of clarity and transparency in Bourdieu’s own 
account of it. Furthermore, they argue that as a conceptual construct the 
habitus has the scope for further development and theoretical expansion 
within a ‘reflexive sociology’. 
 
This is evidenced in Chandler (2013, p. 5) who argues that Bourdieu’s 
habitus is limited by its monolithic tendency to see the self as a unified 
subject and a system of durable dispositions that are socially given 
(Chandler 2013, p. 18). Thus, Chandler argues that Bourdieu’s habitus 
lacks development in terms of the social-psychological potential and 
dimension of the self in that it gives less attention to individual dynamism, 
inner-conflict and the complexities that comprise the formation of agency. 
Instead, Chandler postulates the idea of a socially saturated self with an 
interiority based entirely of an economy of self-negotiated and inter-
temporal bargaining of short and long-term interests. These interests are 
deliberated through the agent’s (aspirant’s) investment in current cultural 
capital which is, by default, part of the social structure. 
 
While seeking to be consistent with the aim of Bourdieu’s habitus as 
culturally motivated, Chandler seeks to lay greater importance on 
deliberation and individuality in practice. Desaturation and resaturation 
are thus part of Chandler’s theoretical development here, whereby 
reflexivity is composed of the agent’s competing interests in relation to 
the cultural capital at his/her disposal. The agent’s ‘internal conversation’ 
occurs in the form of a negative desaturation process of questioning 
motivations and competing interests and constituting a circling back of 
these upon themselves due to crises in the doxic attitude of the agent. 
These are reframed by a readdressing of cultural capital through a process 
of resaturation (Chandler 2013, p. 18). It is this desaturation and 
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resaturation together that comprise the reflexivity of the saturated agent 
and underlines the ‘subjectivity’ of agency by allowing a dynamic interplay 
between conscious and non-conscious contributions to practice. 
 
Furthermore, this reinforces the way in which culture produces more or 
less conflict in the shaping of agents’ (aspirants’) lives within different 
socio-economic contexts or fields (Chandler 2013, p. 20). Chandler cites 
examples such as the ways in which agents struggle with various forms of 
disorder, dependency and addiction and how these demonstrate the 
complex interplay between the socio-cultural circumstances of agents and 
the socio-psychological impacts of these (Chandler 2013, p. 13). 
Chandler’s approach is of critical importance in drawing out the ontological 
class-based tensions within a classed self which I discuss further in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Sweetman (2003) however, gravitates towards a post-structuralist 
position by considering the shifting forms and norms of identity in ‘late-
modernism’. Like Giddens (1991, see Section 2.3) he questions whether 
agents’ identities are becoming more reflexive. Furthermore, the all-
encompassing nature of the habitus, with its predisposed ways of thinking, 
acting and moving, such as posture, demeanour, outlook, expectations 
and tastes, shows the ontological totality of the concept. Indeed, Bourdieu 
asserts that this ontology encompasses what he calls the bodily hexis at a 
micro and macro level of human existence as the product of our upbringing 
(Bourdieu 1984, p. 466).55 On this point Sweetman argues that  
 
“the habitus, at least partially, reproduces social structure, and as the 
embodiment of social arrangements and material circumstance it broadly 
ensures that we fulfil our destiny as members of a particular class” 
(Sweetman 2003, p. 532). 
 
 
55 This concept of bodily hexis equates to the physical formation of bodily 
disposition, the shapes of the body, postures, manners, ways of speaking, the 
habits of the body and how this determines identity in a ‘bodily’ sense. 
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I evaluate further this idea of aspirants fulfilling their destiny in Chapter 
5. 
 
This line of thinking also points to the complex nature of the agent’s 
(aspirant’s) inner constraints and proclivities and the extent to which these 
are either consciously self-induced, or arise as a result of internalisation 
and are thus conditioned by prevailing social structures in the form of 
unconscious adherence to prevailing social norms and values.56 As the 
earlier discussion on meritocracy noted, this is shown in Western classed 
societies were dominant norms such as social mobility and aspiration are 
valorised (see Friedman 2016; Skeggs 2004; Allen 2013; Savage 2015). 
This is evidenced in spite of the impeding structural barriers and 
ontological difficulties faced by the working-class as a whole. However, in 
particular, it is demonstrated by those aspiring to transcend their prior 
class dispositions and are morphing into another class identity and way of 
life. 
 
Considering the subjectivity of selfhood within Bourdieu’s habitus Crossley 
(2001) takes a phenomenological position with regard to both pre-
reflexive and reflexive modes of action which he contends are equally 
rooted in habit (see also Swartz 2002). Similar to Archer (2003) Crossley 
argues that Bourdieu tends to understate the extent to which rational and 
conscious calculation enters into everyday life as a matter of course. That 
Bourdieu’s ‘feel for the game’ metaphor is weak insofar as choices and 
therefore, the ability to make decisions are usually not exceptional, but 
more commonplace in daily life, interacting with more spontaneous tactical 
manoeuvring (Crossley 2001, p. 97). 
 
However, in taking the central aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological analysis of habit, Crossley argues that this actually 
deepens Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus. This is because it provides 
a sense of the way in which habits fit into an ongoing dialogue between 
 
56 See Chapter 1 and Section 2.5 of this chapter for further discussion on this 
point. 
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agents (aspirants) and their interpretations of their changing world. Thus, 
while habits generate repeatable actions, so actions variously modify and 
create newly formed habits through conscious and unconscious reflection. 
Thus practices, actions or behaviours are not to be seen as fully 
repeatable, fixed or over-determined. Rather, they are to be seen as 
mutable, with new habits or patterns of behaviour emerging over time and 
becoming a part of the changing self, often through internal struggles 
(reflexive internal conversations and hysteresis) with the changed 
circumstances, for which the agent bears responsibility (Crossley 2001, p. 
117). Thus agents (aspirants) can be said to be determined by structure 
forces, but also to have the autonomous capability to reflexively determine 
their practice in relation to those structures. This line of thinking seems to 
counter the structural-determinist position and offer a more flexible 
theoretical stance since ‘active’ agents (aspirant mobiles) can consciously 
shape their lives in accordance with available opportunities and constraints 
of social and cultural capital. This is particularly the case when such capital 
becomes symbolic (Bourdieu 1977, 1986, 1990, 1994). 
 
However, questions then arise as to whether this ‘reflexive fluidity’ is 
universally accessible across the class structure. For example, in the case 
of mobile aspirants, it is open to question whether such reflexivity 
materialises, or is triggered, as a result of uniquely clustered social and 
psychological circumstances. In this regard Crossley argues, as indicated 
above that the potential for ‘reflective agency’ is something of a mystery 
in Bourdieu’s work and that it warrants more transparency. Thus, in using 
Merleau-Ponty’s approach of rooting reflexive states in habit, Crossley 
argues that both pre-reflective actions , those ingrained and spontaneous, 
and reflective modes of actions, those that we think about and those 
steered by the ‘feel for the game’, are equally rooted in habit (Crossley 
2001, p. 117). 
 
Calhoun, LiPuma and Postone (1995, p. 6) come more strongly to 
Bourdieu’s defence in describing the power of reflexivity as the ability to 
evoke rational and ‘conscious’ calculation in the everyday life of the agent. 
From this they argue that Bourdieu does, in fact, consider the habitus to 
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be self-reflexive in that, each time it is animated in practice, it encounters 
itself both as embodied and as objectified history (see Section 2.5 below). 
 
Furthermore, Elder-Vass recognises why Bourdieu is thought to be using 
habitus as nothing more than a conveyor belt for the determination of 
human behaviour by social forces (Elder-Vass 2007, p. 328). With this in 
mind Elder-Vass summarises two aspects of the habitus where he argues 
agency and structure appear to conflate in terms of acquired knowledge, 
namely, a) agents are constitutive of structures and b) structures are 
constitutive of agents (Elder-Vass 2007, p. 333). In the first case Elder-
Vass argues that structures are manifest in the actions of agents, through 
internalised knowledge and emotions and in relation to those structures 
and the responses to them. In the second case Elder-Vass argues that 
there is both a metaphorical and literal reading of this. Thus, for example, 
when treated metaphorically the working-class aspirant may internalise 
feelings of inferiority. Such an emotional response may result from 
experiencing middle-class condescending behaviours. But when taken 
literally what this might mean is that the agent has actually acquired the 
belief that s/he actually is inferior (Elder-Vass 2007, p. 334). Thus, these 
external forces, conveyed by and derived through, the actions of others, 
do not ‘disappear’ into our bodies as such. Rather, their effectiveness 
derives, in part, from a process that depends upon their effects on the 
body and mind. I expand further on these processes of internalisation and 
the ‘unconscious’ in Section 2.5. 
 
Thus, the actions of others may trigger mental states which the resilient 
aspirant may receive and reflect upon, but then shrug off. However, the 
vulnerable aspirant might feel them, perhaps viscerally and have them 
become firmer, more established, and potentially recurring, painful 
fixtures in their psyche. Thus Bourdieu, in considering the habitus as a 
‘structuring structure’ can be said to be suggesting that when we 
internalise something, such as a feeling of inferiority, it can become 
literally an embodied part of us (Elder-Vass 2007, p. 334). 
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This would seem to be crux of the discussion here. In some cases, the 
aspirants’ embodied habitus can be so fixed that in seeking better 
circumstances; in becoming middle-class through a structurally induced 
expectation; in aping the middle-class, lemming-like, and in feeling their 
way unquestioningly, they are doing so with little or no self-examination. 
They may be adopting a non-reflexive disposition during class transition 
and internalising middle-class mores in a non-critical manner. 
Furthermore, in terms of wider social and political awareness, the impact 
and extent of a reflexive process may be minimal or missed/avoided 
altogether. Thus, in cases of such psychical myopia the idea of 
‘aspirational endeavour’ might be considered to be devoid of critical social 
and cultural meaning or value. 
 
This difficult problem of dispositional mutability and reinforcement is 
explored below (Section 2.5) in terms of the interactive and internal 
processes of reflexivity. Suffice it to say that it is not always clear how 
processes of learning, adaptation and change occur, nor of how habitual 
patterns of thinking and feeling persist. However, some forms of 
psychoanalytical and psychotherapeutic practice are known to be 
successful in accounting for psychical resistances to change or uncovering 
and facilitating changes in the habitus. Such practice may be necessary in 
order to reflect on life experiences in ways that enable the jettisoning of 
unwanted or unhelpful ways of thinking (and feeling) and in enabling 
greater self-affirmation, wellbeing and class awareness. However, as I 
show in Section 2.5, it appears that Bourdieu struggled to build a 
sociological theory which could accommodate these concerns and 
approaches (see Steinmetz 2006; Fourny 2000). 
 
The above critiques provide only a snapshot of an extensive body of 
material discussing Bourdieu’s habitus. However, they do show the key 
approaches in assessing the extent of determinism and the possibilities for 
a non-determinist reflexivity in the concept. They also go some way 
towards developing a theoretical explanation of the forms of constraint 
faced by aspirant mobiles and the ontological mechanisms that can 
emerge in order to transcend the conditioned constraints embedded in 
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their class origins. Furthermore, they help in understanding the extent of 
reflexivity and the forms that take place among aspirant mobiles in terms 
of the self-limiting mechanisms at play.57 What I consider to be embodied 
residues from their working-class roots may linger as internal barriers to 
a more effective and complete reflexive process during social and cultural 
transition to middle-class life. 
 
The following sections consider some key contributions to reflexivity within 
social and class theory. Firstly, I outline the work of Giddens (1984, 1991) 
and his position on structuration, individualism and self-identity. I then 
follow this by summarising the work of Archer (2003) and her 
morphogenetic approach and lastly that of Taylor (1989) and his position 
on the inward turn of selfhood. These are not intended to be expansive, 
however, I include them in order to contextualise the significance and 
range of interpretations of reflexivity as a concept within a critique of 
Bourdieu’s habitus and a discourse on social mobility and class transition. 
 




Giddens’s work on reflexivity has brought considerable critical comment 
(see for example, Craib 1992; Archer 2003, 2010; Elder-Vass 2007; King 
2010). However, here I focus specifically on his alleged failure to consider 
sufficiently the class impacts of cultural differentiation and the unequal 
access to resources in what he terms institutionalised reflexivity (Giddens 
1991, p. 98). His approach requires a self that is able to reflect upon itself 
in a ‘fractured world’ while simultaneously externalising the self from 
social relations. This position has been considered problematic since it 
presents the idea of a reflexive self, but in a normative and idealistic form. 
It suggests that the self is able to plan its future actions and then reinsert 
itself back into society through the internalisation of revised 
 
57 See Chapter 3 for a developed discussion of self-limiting mechanisms and their 
behavioural implications. 
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considerations, as if detached from social structure in an asocial way. As 
King suggests, Giddens seems committed to both a form of sociological 
determinism and to the assertion of individual agency at the same time 
(King 2010, p. 254). In addition, Giddens’s model seems to present a 
problem-free neutral self and a form of reflexivity that is normatively 
accessible to all and devoid of inscription or social position (Skeggs 2004, 
p. 53). 
 
As a human practice reflexivity is considered to be a cognitive process 
involving the agent’s internal conversations, consisting of the often 
repeated and relatively fixed narratives of agents, ranging from 
momentary pre-conscious day-dreaming and ruminations to conscious 
and purposive engagement (Giddens 1991).58 According to Archer (2003) 
this shows the self to be a potentially dialogical entity. In addition, Giddens 
has argued that the development of selfhood has become a ‘reflexive 
project of modernity’ (Giddens 1991, p. 33). He argues that it is now a 
cultural requirement of selfhood to constantly monitor, assess and modify 
one’s actions in the light of current consequences. To reconstruct one’s 
identity through the production of appropriate narratives (Giddens 1991, 
p. 35). He attributes this significant historical shift to the individualisation 
of the self (Giddens 1991, p. 200). Both Giddens and Beck argue that this 
has resulted in a reformulation of class identities in late modernity (Skeggs 
2004, p. 52; Savage 2000). 
However, Bradley considers this position to be only superficially 
persuasive. She argues that Giddens is making unsubstantiated 
assumptions in suggesting that a higher degree of reflexivity and an 
 
58 In Section 1.5, I introduced a discussion on Bourdieu’s use of the ‘unconscious’ 
as ‘history forgotten as history’ as a way of positioning the habitus as embodied 
history. I continue this theme in Section 2.5 by considering how the conscious 
part of practice relates to unconscious, habituated and non-habituated practices, 
with some relevant examples. Some further examples of reflexive ruminations by 
agents can be found in Bourdieu (2009, pp. 580-589). Of course, considerations 
of the unconscious mind are at the core of the Freudian paradigm. However, as 
indicated earlier a critique of Freud’s canon and discussions of topics such as 
sublimation and repressed needs would take the discussion on reflexivity into the 




‘elasticity of identity’ have emerged. She suggests that while we may have 
a heightened sensibility to the multi-dimensional nature of social 
inequality this form of social reality is not new (Bradley 2007, p. 213). 
Furthermore, Savage (2000) also challenges this idea of an erosion of 
class identities arguing that both Giddens and Beck misconceive the 
relationship between an individual agent’s identity formation and identities 
formed on class grounds. He argues that their suggestion of a decline in 
class culture would be better understood as a shift from working-class to 
middle-class modes of individualisation that are unquestionably class-
based (Savage, 2000). 
 
Beck concedes that the socially mobile are, in general, unable to escape 
the structural forces of society, but he argues that they can in fact decide 
which forces to act upon and which to ignore (Beck 1992, p.98). For 
example, he suggests that agents can adapt to economic threats such as 
unemployment by taking a flexible approach to their own career or job 
situation. He contends that by reflexive self-examination of their untapped 
potential, agents can re-invent themselves, for example, through re-
skilling and thus survive such structural pressures. Through the 
reformulation of their individual and deeply personal biographies aspirant 
agents are able to reflexively reconstruct their identities. This biographical 
production of selfhood is what Beck (like Giddens) calls ‘reflexive 
modernity’ (see Skeggs 2004, p. 52). However, this position is largely 
falsified historically with, for example, the high levels of unemployment 
and the collapse of many traditional industries and with no viable 
alternative job opportunities in the aftermath. 
 
Also, Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) and Lash (1993) argue that 
increased risk and uncertainty have sharpened the emotions of fear and 
anxiety in late modernity. In addition, they assert that routine and habit 
have been eroded and have been replaced by knowledge that has helped 
people cope with the loss of these familiar (traditional) social wrappers 
(Burkitt 2012, p. 460). In considering ‘ontological security’ in this way 
Burkitt argues that Giddens is treating reflexivity as disembodied and 
devoid of emotion, since by basing it solely on knowledge, he is ignoring 
 88 
the emotional considerations of the self 59. Burkitt’s position is that 
emotion is the source of all our thinking since it is integral to the relations 
we have with our world and the people within it (Burkitt 2012, p.461). 
Similar to Archer (2003, 2010) on the reflexive agency of the ‘internal 
conversation’, he asserts that reflexivity is based on the emotionally driven 
dialogues that humans hold within themselves. In a very real sense, the 
notion of ‘getting in touch with one’s feelings’ can be considered to be a 
challenging, often painful, though also therapeutic and healing approach, 




Archer’s research and route into reflexivity assumes, firstly, that her 
respondents would be able to tell something about the nature of their own 
internal conversations. Secondly, that people usually have the greatest 
difficulties in representing their inner dialogues to themselves, let alone to 
others (Archer 2003, p. 155). An examination of these assumptions is 
critical in formulating an ontological approach to class. Reflexivity must be 
said to allow a self-conscious awareness of such self-examination to 
enable the agent (aspirant) to externalise, that is, to unearth and 
articulate the nature and forms of such internal dialogues. This is 
irrespective of the difficulties in facing up to the need for substantial 
honesty with the self that is necessary in this reflexive process. 
 
Archer’s research concludes that respondents displayed three modes of 
reflexivity that mediate socio-cultural constraints and enablements in 
quite distinctive ways (Archer 2003, p. 153-154, 165). She classifies three 
modes of reflexivity as a) communicative, b) autonomous and c) meta-
reflexive. She contends that communicative reflexives are unsure about 
their internal dialogue and need to discuss aspects of this with a trusted 
other in order to complete their inner deliberations. By contrast, 
autonomous reflexives engage in a lone internal dialogue; are self-
 




sufficient in this and do not want it supplemented by exchanges with other 
people (Archer 2003, p. 210). She argues that the internal conversations 
of such reflexives are more to do with society and as such, with their 
aspirations and with an elastication and contraction of aspirations for 
different subjects and at different times. As a result, they have a higher 
propensity to change and to occupy new social contexts over the course 
of their lives (Archer 2003, p. 212). 
 
Archer’s third group, the meta-reflexives, self-consciously reflect on their 
own acts of reflexivity. However, they tend to withdraw into self-
interrogation; are contextually unsettled, which is demonstrated by a set 
of practices, including geographical mobility, job changes and career shifts 
and are therefore not good at setting down permanent roots. Archer 
argues that these reflexives are biographically volatile (Archer 2003, p. 
293). She argues that they are “idealists, ever seeking a better fit between 
who they seek to be and a social environment which permits their 
expression of it” (Archer 2003, p. 259). In showing this qualitative breadth 
and depth of reflexive forms Archer’s categorisation usefully contributes 
to a further understanding of this important human capability. 
 
One interesting and relevant aspect emanating from Archer’s classification 
of reflexive capability is the reflexive’s inner drive to aspire which might 
be shown in the character attributes relating to each of the three types. 
However, Archer’s typological approach may be of only limited value in 
reaching a core understanding of an ontological perspective of selfhood in 
relation to class. Given the uniqueness of each aspirant’s habitus and 
therefore, their disposition and circumstances, it would seem that any of 
Archer’s three reflexive types might be able to contend with the dynamics 
and challenges of ontological change encountered by mobiles undergoing 
class transition. Further empirical research on reflexive types in relation 
to class mobility would seem to be a useful undertaking. 
 
Taylor’s reflexivity. 
Taylor uses the term radical reflexivity in his examination of the historical 
development and process of the inward turn towards the self which he 
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contends is a dominant feature of late modernity (Taylor 1989, p. 30). In 
his non-class-oriented critique, he suggests that while this necessary 
inwardness is reflexive it is not radically reflexive until the agent makes 
the act of experiencing the object their focus. By becoming, as it were, 
aware of our ‘awareness’ he argues that it is in the experience of the act 
of experiencing that the full meaning of reflexivity emerges. This brings to 
the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is inseparable from being the 
agent of that experience. In this, Taylor argues that the self gains a kind 
of control by standing back and withdrawing from the ordinary bent of 
experience and, paradoxically, it is in the ‘engaging’ in the experience that 
is of most value (Taylor 1989, p. 163). 
 
In this way the process of withdrawing to find rational objectivity is only 
achieved by an inward examination of our experience of the act of thinking 
and feeling. Taylor says, “We fix experience in order to deprive it of its 
power, a source of bewitchment and error”. Furthermore, by living the 
experience more attentively; by being more ‘in’ the experience the 
reflexive act becomes more radical and illuminatory (Taylor 1989, p. 163). 
 
This discussion of the reflexive inward turn also has some existentialist 
implications. The self can be said to be continually seeking to discover, or 
impart some order, meaning or justification for our lives. We engage in an 
exploration of ourselves (or clarify key aspects of our self) in order to 
establish (or affirm) our identity. This is because the assumption behind 
modern self-exploration is that we don’t really know who we are (Taylor 
1989, p. 178). This point is pertinent in a discussion on aspirant reflexivity 
and, as discussed in Chapter 1, can be shown to experience existential 
confusion, anxiety and ambivalence and potentially a shifting of identity 
when moving into, and trying to adapt to, unfamiliar middle-class social 
milieu. 
 
Sayer (2005) amplifies some aspects of Taylor’s position when he points 
out that the embodied aspects of the self are somehow unreachable. The 
opportunities for bringing meaning to being are evidenced both in our 
physicality and in the socialised patterns of our thinking. Once learned, 
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these may change from something we struggle to grasp to something we 
can think with, without actually consciously thinking about them. That is, 
according to Sayer, for much of the time our conceptual apparatus is not 
itself the subject of reflection (Sayer 2005, p. 27). Also, it is not clear at 
what point, if at all, and if so in what forms, the unconscious embodied 
self can switch from a lack of reflexive self-awareness of the challenges to 
the inequalities and disadvantages experienced in working-class life, into 
a consciously active form of agency capable of making conscious choices 
about how to change its embodied state of being. 
 
An alternative view is presented by Sweetman (2003) who suggests that 
agents (aspirants) who possess a flexible form of reflexivity have the 
capacity to re-fashion the self and that this can, in effect, become ‘second 
nature’ rather than it being something that is difficult to achieve 
(Sweetman 2003, p. 528). He argues that while this reflexive disposition 
puts such agents at a potential advantage, by having a heightened 
experiential awareness, they may also face considerable difficulties 
thereafter in simply ‘being themselves’ owing to a tension-bound 
fragmentation of selfhood. Again, this point is of paramount concern in 
unpicking class transitional angst which I discuss in Chapter 4 and 
particularly in Chapter 5. 
 
The discourse on reflexivity and the embodied self is clearly extensive and 
the discussion here has been purposely limited to the main contributions 
of Bourdieu and his adherents and critics. Nonetheless, it complements 
other work on the reflexive self. For example, Savage’s (2000) critique of 
Giddens and Beck is useful for similar reasons to those cited above. In 
addition, Sayer’s (2005) critical realist view; Sweetman’s (2003) Post-
structuralist perspective on reflexivity as a habitual part of selfhood; 
Skeggs’s (2004) largely supportive response to Bourdieu’s reflexive 
habitus and Archer’s (2003) categorisation of reflexive types, all have a 
bearing and relevance to aspirants experiencing class transition. 
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In the next section I contextualise related aspects of the embodied self 
(habitus) in terms of reflexivity and consider the characteristics and limits 
of this capability in the aspirational endeavours of the socially mobile. 
 
2.4 Assessing the habitus and the limits of reflexivity among 
working-class aspirants. 
In response to Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1994, 2009) and Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (2007) a number of contributors have considered the 
importance of reflexivity in the habitus and the implications of this to 
aspirants’ psychical interiority and ability to progress their mobility 
pathways (see for example Skeggs (2004); Sayer (2005); Atkinson 
(2015); Stahl (2013); Sennett and Cobb (1973). The discussion in earlier 
sections of the chapter showed that there are specific conditional factors 
that affect the formation and degree of flexibility in the habitus of the 
mobile aspirant. Primarily, these relate to the complexions of internalised 
structures derived from prior experiences of family nurturing; formal 
education; community life, social networks, workplace hierarchies and 
cultures. For aspirants, the possibilities of engaging in a reflexive 
exploration and transformation of habituated unconscious patterns of 
feeling, thinking and acting would seem to be contingent on a willingness 
to probe their own interiority as their circumstances change and emerging 
potentialities are able to be assessed. Only then might aspirants identify 
their own uniquely internalised inhibitors that form their sense of a classed 
self and a sense of an evolving identity.60 
 
But how might aspirants arrive at the point where they are predisposed to 
make this exploration of their own interiority? Is it not a pre-conscious or 
unconscious process that is ongoing through internal conversations and 
narratives and the constructive responses of others? The puzzle would 
seem to persist in the social realm as much as in the autonomous 
engagement within the aspirant’s personal/private world. 
 
60 Here again, a developed discussion on the benefits of psychotherapy as part of 
the reflexive process would be useful. However, this is considered to be outside 
the scope of the thesis. 
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Another approach in lifting the lid on the forms of reflexivity adopted by 
aspirants is to be found in examining routinisation; in the habitual daily 
practices and how these might be adjusted prior to and during mobility 
and the class transition process (Crossley 2001, p. 104). The ‘letting go’ 
of hitherto ingrained embodiments and rituals and the forming of, albeit 
middle-class, forms of embodiment, is seen to be most challenging in 
areas of life where class distinction and difference is marked and where 
socio-cultural practices are noticeably incongruous (see Lawler 2000; 
Stahl 2013). 
 
The earlier discussion in Chapter 1 of Sennett and Cobb’s (1973) research 
on the character and dispositions of the upwardly mobile can be used in 
contrasting some of the key assertions made here regarding the reflexive 
habitus. For example, the aspirant could develop, or indeed may already 
possess, the robustness of character to successfully manage the 
uncomfortable challenges of a class transition process (see also Friedman 
2016, p. 135-138). 
 
Furthermore, as part of a reflexive assessment of the self, the aspirant 
might choose to seek help and guidance in accessing the psychological 
resources and self-affirming tools to engage in a carefully measured 
reflexive exercise. Tools such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and 
other forms of counselling can be seen as aids to build emotional capital, 
which can be used to successfully resolve inner tensions and 
contradictions. However, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that 
class is, again, a barrier in terms of working-class aspirants being 
predisposed to addressing their class scars or hidden injuries and in 
working to develop a robustness of character through various 
psychotherapeutic mechanisms and tools (see Waller and Gilbody 2009).61 
 
It is also important to further unpack the discussion so far on emotions 
with regard to the reflexivity in the habitus. The reflexive project of the 
 
61. However, again, further discussion of this kind would take the discussion 
beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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self needs to embrace states of being beyond mere reflexive ‘thinking’. It 
is also beneficial to consider the range of emotions that make up the 
embodied self and how these are manifest. These are explored further in 
Chapter 3. For example, Brownlie (2011, p. 478) has argued for a 
multidimensional, reflexive approach to researching emotional lives which 
can help in exploring the stubbornly patterned aspects of emotional life. 
Holmes (2010, p. 147) however, stresses the need for the 
‘emotionalisation’ of reflexivity, since more work needs to be done in 
understanding how emotions are involved in reflexivity. Burkitt goes 
further, arguing that while emotion is considered in theories of reflexivity 
it is generally held at bay, with it being seen as a possible barrier to clear 
reflexive thought. He argues that feeling and emotion are central to 
reflexive processes since they colour the perception of self and others in 
the social world and actually inform the reflexive self (Burkitt 2012, p. 
458). 
 
Moreover, the emotions reactions attributed to the nuanced behavioural 
practices of class domination can be so subtle and even banal until class 
incongruities are exposed. Here, such embodiment violations can 
instantaneously generate emotional triggers such as embarrassment and 
awkwardness for the unguarded mobile aspirant. No words need be 
spoken, though they may well be. But the condescension, patronisation, 
‘snob-value’, expressions of disgust and belittlement, as forms of cultural 
domination, become transparent even when there is a veil of rational 
behaviour to give it legitimacy (Lawler 2005). An example of this, 
discussed earlier (see Sections 1.4, and 1.7, and Vignette 1.1) shows the 
symbolic domination embedded in the elitist use of so called ‘superior’ 
language and speech. Bourdieu’s work on language and taste shows how 
class-based discomfort emerges and how it can be symbolically and 
emotionally damaging (Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Thompson 1984; Bernstein 
2003). Routine acts of class distancing are shown to be fertile ground for 





2.5 Bourdieu’s habitus and the processes of ‘internalisation’: 
further discussion. 
At this point I return to the discussion undertaken in Chapter 1, Section 
1.5 to provide a further critique of Bourdieu’s use of habitus as a process 
of internalisation through the lens of the unconscious and consider how 
this might configure in relation to conscious practice. This has implications 
for understanding the reflexive process in Bourdieu’s habitus and what he 
means when he refers to the embodied self as an accumulation of 
experiences, ‘forgotten as history’, and, crucially, the ways in which 
habitual practices might be changed reflexively (see Section 2.2 above). 
Such an examination should clarify how and why the ‘class habitus’ of 
working-class mobiles is able to adopt middle-class mores during the 
mobility trajectories of aspirant mobiles. I revisit this complex matter 
through a further critique of secondary sources. 
 
Noble and Watkins (2003) take issue with Bourdieu for stressing the 
unconscious nature of embodiment in the habitus and his limiting of 
conscious deliberation to ‘times of crisis’ (hysteresis), which he dismisses 
as ‘calculation’ (Noble and Watkins 2003, p. 529). They argue that he 
conflates habitus with embodied practice leading to a confusion of the 
argument that practice is largely habituated and unconscious by claiming 
that practice is only unconscious. They note that this remains a 
contradiction within his analysis. Thus, while Bourdieu stresses “a 
spontaneity without consciousness or will” he also concedes that the 
improvisations (for example, made by a training athlete) “are never 
performed without a certain presence of mind” (Noble and Watkins 2003, 
p. 529). 
 
From this the authors argue that consciousness is not a simple or singular 
category. They differentiate between various modalities of consciousness. 
For example, ‘agentic reflection’ (that discursive practice in which we 
consider our behaviour and its principles - an awareness of what we have 
done and what we can do); ‘bodily attention’ (the consciousness attendant 
in constantly monitoring the body when we engage in everyday activities) 
and ‘practical sense’ (the levels of awareness and the forms of 
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consciousness where there is an instinctive competence in engagement - 
an ‘automaticity’ and going with the flow - the ‘flow state’). This idea of 
‘being in the zone’ they argue, is not pure unconsciousness, but the 
controlled concentration achieved through ‘over-learning’ necessary to 
make things feel ‘automatic’ (Noble and Watkins 2003, pp. 530-534). 
 
Noble and Watkins favour the concept of habituation and they argue that 
such an approach can account for how conscious behaviour can become 
unconscious. They concede that much of what people do remains 
unconscious, however, taking the example of the process of physical 
training they argue that we have the capacity to reflect upon our practical 
sense (Noble and Watkins 2003, p. 535). Moreover, learning the ‘feel for 
the game’ takes time and enormous application often based on tedious 
processes of learning for it to become ‘second nature’. In this, competence 
is achieved when we return much of the bodily process to the realm of the 
unconscious. Thus, they argue, there is a dialectical relationship of 
bringing behaviour to consciousness in order to alter it, and then 
habituating that behaviour. By dialectically ‘remembering’ and then 
‘forgetting’, a ‘disengagement’ is developed. This, they argue, is an 
indispensable precondition for continued activity (Noble and Watkins 
2003, p. 535). Since it is not plausible to think about all the actions we 
need to undertake (since we wouldn’t actually then have time to partake 
in practice) they assert that this disengagement saves time and, as a 
partly conscious state, allows actions to subside below the level of 
consciousness. This, the authors suggest, allows for the possibility of 
returning habituated activity to the realm of consciousness since we can 
forget things because we can recall them (Noble and Watkins 2003, p. 
536). Furthermore, they contend that habituation could assist in exploring 
the links between mimicry, repetition, experimentation and appropriation. 
Perhaps this interpretation of habituation may explain how some aspirant 
mobiles assimilate middle-class mores during their mobility trajectories? 
 
In a similar way Akram (2012, p. 55) wants to make the unconscious 
aspects of the habitus explicit and, like Noble and Watkins, show that 
Bourdieu’s notion of practice is over-reliant on the unconscious. But she 
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contends that if habit is rejected in place of reflexivity a situation she calls 
‘hyper-deliberation’ may arise such that agents would be caught in a 
continual process of deliberation, thereby resulting in mental paralysis 
(Akram, 2012, p. 55). Thus, she suggests that a ‘mediatory process’ exists 
that can be seen as a form of ‘social conditioning’ or of constraints and 
enablements. Citing Sayer, she challenges Archer’s position of privileging 
reflexivity (see above, Section 2.3) thus avoiding situations where agents 
are passively moulded by social structures (Akram 2012, p. 50). Whereas, 
she suggests, they can be shown to actively negotiate them, to absorb 
them through habit, or through unconscious internalisation. Thus, the 
structure and agency debate, which Bourdieu’s habitus seeks to sidestep, 
remains contentious around issues of non, or pre-reflexive habituation and 
when placed alongside conscious deliberation. Here, Akram concludes that 
what is needed is an in-depth and subtle understanding of the 
aforementioned ‘mediation process’ and of factors other than reflexivity 
(Akram 2012, p. 51). Bourdieu’s embodied habitus may indeed be a 
construct of value, but as my comments in the opening vignette of the 
thesis suggest (see pages 6-11) the formation and depth of an individual’s 
habituated embodiment, if problematic to them, may be so inaccessible 
and impenetrable as to require explanations and approaches, perhaps 
from disciplines other the sociology and social theory (see Baumeister 
1993; Steinmetz 2006; Fourny 2000). 
 
Osterlind (2008) provides a further critique of Bourdieu’s habitus arguing 
(much like Freud) that patterns of continuity are important in 
guaranteeing a certain degree of stability for individuals and for society as 
a whole.62 However, she seeks to explore the times when stability 
potentially leads to stagnation. Interestingly, she uses psychoanalytical 
and psychotherapeutic terms such as internalised parents as a lifelong 
part of the personality that affects the capacity to change the self. 
 
62 The thesis recognises the importance of Freud in relation to Bourdieu and the 
obvious overlaps in discussing the latter’s Theory of Practice. However, as I have 
indicated earlier, I consider a formal discussion of Freud’s work to be outside the 
scope of the thesis. 
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Sociologically however, personality problems are described in terms of 
internalised social structures working to maintain the status quo or doxa. 
 
The author challenges the assumption that the personal and political, 
individual and society are separate, asserting that the inner structures of 
the self often serve to maintain social structures. Moreover, as discussed 
earlier in Bourdieusian terms, she asks where these inner structures come 
from, and how they can be so enduring and sustainable. Concurring with 
much of earlier the discussion on Bourdieu’s habitus, Osterlind argues that 
its main purpose is in filtering all impressions and expressions with 
stability and continuity (Osterlind 2008, p. 73). In this way social patterns 
are inherited and experienced as ‘natural’ and this is most obviously shown 
when we are insecure or uncomfortable in social situations, or when old 
habits are maintained even though they may no longer work. She asserts 
that it is the early experiences that work as a defence against change and 
avoidance strategies are seen as mainly non-conscious (Osterlind 2008, 
p. 74). 
 
However, these contributions and critiques of the habitus and Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on the unconscious may be questionable, or more a matter of 
emphasis and degree. The quotation I used in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, does 
seem to accommodate the possibility for a conscious reflexive assessment 
of one’s disposition. Thus  
 
“Aside from the effects of certain social trajectories, habitus can also be 
transformed via socio-analysis, i.e., via an awakening of consciousness 
and a form of “self-work” that enables the individual to get a handle on his 
or her dispositions.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, p. 133). 
 
This would seem to show that individuals can apply what Bourdieu terms 
‘socio-analysis’ and to enable them to reflexively work on their own 
habitus at the level of consciousness, in conjunction with the unconscious 
(see above Section 2.4). It implies that it is possible to ‘work through’ and 
dislodge unwanted and ingrained thought processes and feelings 
reflexively, and to bring about beneficial psychical changes to the 
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embodied self. In considering how aspirants might have internalised the 
predisposition to become upwardly mobile and to then put this into 
practice, it would seem that the above discussion goes some way to 
unpicking the constituent elements in such processes. However, for the 
temporal, historical thread of the embodied self to be short-circuited and 
for the past experiences (now manifest in current practice) to be 
confronted, it would seem that Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (looking at 
habitus through his lens of the unconscious) is knocking on the door of 
another established discipline. I consider this briefly below. 
 
Steinmetz (2006) and Fourny (2000) both question the way in which 
Bourdieu seems to be distancing himself from the field of psychoanalysis, 
and thus the work of Freud and Lacan, while using very similar concepts 
and terms, such as ‘socio-analysis’( see the above quotation), in the field 
sociological research. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s early rejection of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory and examination of the unconscious appears to shift 
to an acceptance of its intrinsic merits later in his life (Steinmetz 2006, p. 
445). Steinmetz also notes that Bourdieu uses the terms ‘disavowal’ and 
‘denegation’. Freud also uses these terms in recognising a particular kind 
of resistance to the deepest layers of repressed material in which the 
patient disavows memories even in reproducing them, and where the 
repressed image or idea can come into consciousness on condition that it 
is negated. That is, it involves a lifting of the repression, though not 
accepting what is repressed. The subject still refuses to recognise the 
negated object as an intrinsic part of the self (Steinmetz 2006, p. 445). 
 
Thus, Steinmetz suggest that Bourdieu’s treatment of Freudian 
psychoanalysis “more often takes the form of admitting Freudian 
terminology and some psychoanalytic arguments into his texts while 
surrounding these passages with rhetorical devices that seem to condemn 
psychoanalysis” (Steinmetz 2006, p446). Throughout his paper, 
Steinmetz (also Fourny 2000) cite several similarities and parallels 
between Bourdieu’s and Freud’s work. 
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From these accounts the authors argue that while attempting to avoid an 
inside/outside problematic, Bourdieu’s use of the habitus is perhaps a 
negation of his attempts to avoid discussing the unconscious as used in 
psychoanalysis, and thus in the way Freud discusses it. That is, Bourdieu 
says he does not use it in this way, but in fact Steinmetz (2006) and 
Fourny (2000) both show from their findings that he does. 
 
In returning to the context of social aspiration and mobility, how might 
this discussion be relevant? I suggest a possible connectedness here by 
contextualising this denegation and disavowal theme to my earlier 
discussion on what is my secondary theme in the thesis, the manipulative 
nature of meritocracy. I therefore suggest that this could also be 
considered as a form of ‘historical unconsciousness’, but in the form of 
social and individual denial by working-class aspirants. That is, 
speculatively, some aspirant mobiles may realise intuitively that they are 
disadvantaged in seeking personal betterment and in trying to develop a 
‘feel for the (middle class) game’ (Bourdieu 1990). However, they strive 
nonetheless since they consider that the dominant economic, social, 
cultural order, in its class domination, leaves them little option, particularly 
in their day-to-day existential struggles for legitimacy and recognition, 
which has denied them in their classed embodiment. Furthermore, that in 
so doing, they can be said to be denying the collective power of their class, 
which, arguably, does not ‘need’ to aspire or seek to be mobile since it 
could, at the right historical junctures, be shown to ‘see through’ this 
manipulation and seek other courses of (collective) action to resolve class 
inequalities and domination. 
 
This theme of class denial in the perceptions and practice of aspirant 
mobiles throws up other issues of ‘individualism’ which I discussed earlier 
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The unconscious in Bourdieusian terms may seem 
useful in showing the habitus as avoiding structure/agency dichotomy 
issues. However, a collective class ‘unconsciousness’ would also seem to 
be an interesting line of enquiry in considering the conditions and extent 
to which this might then interplay with a collective ‘consciousness’ in class 
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terms and to explore the implications of this in socio-cultural and political 
terms. 
 
2.6 Working-class aspirant mobiles’ internalised perceptions of 
middle-class ‘success’. 
A key objective emerging from the above discussions has been to identify 
the ways and means by which aspirant mobiles unconsciously internalise 
and consciously perceive ideas of ‘success’. What might these notions of 
success be in classed societies where disparities in wealth and opportunity 
are starkly differentiated and dominated by a middle-class that appears to 
distinguish itself using class signifiers? (see Atkinson 2015; Bradley and 
Devadason 2008; Bradley 2007; Carbone 2011; Loveday 2015; Savage 
2015). In Chapter 1, Section 1.2, I speculatively articulated the 
parameters of and the motives for working-class aspirational endeavour 
and social mobility. However, these now need to be made more 
transparent and explicit. 
 
For brevity, I take an obvious and fundamental starting point of where 
ideas of middle-class success might germinate, by considering studies of 
working-class social mobility from within the education sector. I include 
research findings from primary school level through to secondary and on 
to higher education. Much of the assumed superiority of the middle-class 
can be shown in this research. However, aspirants’ desires for 
achievement and success, need to be measured alongside the anxiety and 
trepidation that potentially able working-class pupils and students 
experience. They are, in effect, ‘set up’ to be culturally coerced to 
assimilate (internalise) and mimic the dispositions and practices of the 
middle-class (See Allen 2013; Calarco 2011; Kupfer 2015; Loveday 2015; 
Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine 2003; Morley 1997; Reay 1997b, 2001, 
2013; Reay, Crozier, Clayton 2009, 2010; Stahl 2014). Of course, it is not 
all one-way traffic, since this research shows this class assimilation 
process to be fuzzy, incomplete and often challenged, with alternative 
discourses that defend the working-class, and where pride and collective 
autonomy is expressed (see Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2009; Stahl 2016). 
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However, this research also shows that working-class perceptions of the 
‘good life’ and wellbeing are often based on specific assumptions about 
what the ‘good life’ is, and how it can be achieved. Obvious class-defined 
goals such as educational achievement through academic qualifications; a 
good secure job; a comfortable lifestyle and the accompanying material 
trappings are all evident. However, as Reay asserts, in the face of widening 
inequalities  
 
“Social mobility has a totemic role [in UK society] not just figuring 
powerfully in the strategic policies of our political elites but also capturing 
the popular imaginary” (Reay 2013, p. 664). 
 
Bradford and Hey (2007) note that ‘discourses of success’ are, almost by 
definition, normative and dominant in successful schools. They 
speculatively use the term ‘psychological’ capital that they say is 
differentially distributed and constituted in practices of self-esteem, 
confidence and self-belief.63 These are shown to be generated in a range 
of settings. including the family, community and through friendships. 
Importantly however, they suggest that these can be transformed into 
qualities such as resilience and those dispositions needed to cope with the 
exigencies of contemporary classed life (Bradford and Hey 2007 p. 600). 
 
Moreover, from interviews with aspirational school pupils, they formulate 
what they term the ‘vocabularies of success’. From these responses a 
range of qualities are recorded including fortitude and determination. 
‘Trying hard’ is valorised along with other qualities including ‘stickability’, 
cleverness developed from effort, rather than from natural talent, 
resilience, patience, tolerance, perseverance, not giving up, and getting 
focused. Their interviewees, predominantly from working-class Indian and 
Pakistani communities in the UK, stressed that while getting pushed 
forward by other people may be advantageous, the capacities for success 
need to come from “within yourself” (Bradford and Hey 2007, p. 608). Of 
course, It would be fanciful to assert that such qualities are the preserve 
 
63  See Chapter 3 for a discussion on levels of self-esteem and self-worth in 
relation to social class. 
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of the middle-class. However, with greater available cultural (symbolic) 
capital in the social field it would be interesting to explore empirically 
which of these qualities would be seen as most important. Would they be 
the internalised character attributes deemed necessary for success, or 
those unconscious, ‘forgotten as history’ forms of legitimacy entitlement 
that give middle-class pupils/students the edge? 
 
Further research examples apply. Allen’s research of working-class female 
pupils in ‘progressive’ schools shows how they are drawn to fame and the 
glamour of celebrity and tasteful fashion, while also being considered 
naive by school staff (Allen 2013, p.768). The research by Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody (2001) can be contrasted with Allen’s research. They 
found that the most able female school pupils’ ambitions were being 
jeopardised by their mothers’ anxieties about their own past school lives 
and their inability to understand the ‘nuanced ways’ of their daughters’ 
school regimes. As Reay (2013), reminds us, as a rhetorical or policy 
mechanism for redressing class inequality, social mobility merely 
scratches the surface of the problem and is unable to compensate for the 
structural inequalities that persist. 
 
2.7 Personal vignettes. 
 
Vignette 2.1. 
Here, I recall an unpleasant interchange while studying for my ‘A’ Level 
examinations. I was a twenty-six-year-old mature student at the time and 
was still finding my way in college, being largely ill-equipped in terms of 
appropriate academic skills. However, I learned some valuable, though 
painful lessons as a result of this encounter... 
 
It was 1973 in Liverpool, and I had cause to visit the city’s central 
reference library to do some research for an essay I needed to write. I 
approached one of the librarians and asked for some help. His demeanour 
immediately gave the impression that he was very knowledgeable and 
experienced, but he came across, to me at least, as very aloof. Admittedly, 
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I was very unsure of myself in terms of knowing which books might be 
appropriate for researching my subject.  
After asking me some probing questions on the topic area I became aware 
that I was repeatedly replying in a circumspect fashion, and prefixing my 
replies with the phrase “Well, you know’. I must have sounded very 
monotonal and unclear about what I wanted because very soon he became 
exasperated saying “No! Actually, I don’t know, and if you can’t be more 
specific then I can’t waste any more time with you!” I felt embarrassed 
and humiliated. It was an intensely demeaning moment for me in a very 
intimidating and studiously high-brow cultural environment. It put me off 
going to the library for many weeks and I felt the shame of the encounter 
to my core. His condescending attitude towards me left an indelible scar 
that has stayed in my memory to this day. (I consider the emotional 
nature of shame in Chapter 3). 
 
This kind of encounter emphasises the mismatch of dispositions and 
embodiments (habitus), in this case, relating to the field of academic 
knowledge where this knowledge is power and the class differentials that 
can ensue can conflict with one another. The patronising display of class 
domination administered to (upon) me by the librarian can be seen as 
typical of such encounters. It could be said that I simply lacked the 
academic awareness, experience and study tools to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue. That is, I lacked the ‘intellectual capital’ to enable 
me to tune into the librarian’s mind set, cultural field and habitus that 
would surely have won me over to him and garnered his help. I was clearly 
not on his wavelength. 
 
But perhaps, when reflecting upon, and rationalising this encounter, in 
different class and cultural ways neither of us were directly at fault. 
Perhaps I should have challenged the librarian for his patronising manner? 
Or perhaps, if my preparation had been more considered, it would 
certainly have helped the librarian to help me more. This was one of my 
first emotionally charged encounters with high-brow nature of academia 
and its class-derived cultural domination.  
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In later years my aspirational trajectory took me further away from my 
class origins and, imperceptibly, enabled me to better manage challenging 
academic research enquiries. However, experiencing these kinds of 
middle-class academic environment had come late for me. I had moved 
from garage workshop to further, then higher education as a mature 
student, having worked for ten years in a manual trade and other types 
of work that required limited academic skills. Thus, it took me years of 
adaptation and reflection; of questioning my inner-self and identity, and 
many similarly visceral encounters before things began to change. In 
many subtle ways, by increasingly mingling with educated peers, and 
being able to confidently ‘play the game’ of being a student, I was 
‘becoming’ someone different. In many respects, I am still ‘becoming’ an 
academic. 
 
Yet this personal account seems to say as much about the reflexive 
potential and character of the aspirant, and their embodied habitus as it 
does about the impacts of cultural capital, social class differentiation and 
domination and the nature of subjugation in classed society. Aspirational 
endeavour and striving to be socially mobile can bring about significant 
challenges and adjustments to the aspirant’s embodied self. It can test 
specific aspects of character when in the proximity of unfamiliar middle-
class values and cultural settings. In this regard, trying to analytically 
separate the two aspects of determinant cultural practices and norms from 
an aspirant’s embodied states and dispositions is clearly complex and 
problematic 64. Perhaps a more effective dynamic, indeed, dialectical 
interpretation of such examples of the class divide, is to place them 







64 However, it is not the intention here to engage in a diverse theoretical debate 




Here I seek to historically position my own habitus, aspirational endeavour 
and potential mobility in a reflexive fashion. However, this leaves much 
room for further introspection... 
 
After some years gaining academic qualifications and socialising within a 
middle-class friendship network, I gradually internalised many of the 
social and cultural attributes of that class. How did this occur and manifest 
itself? I think it changed me intellectually and marginally raised my level 
of confidence and self-assurance. I was eventually appointed in 1989 to 
an academic post where the majority of my colleagues were middle-class. 
However, many aspects of my working-class self still remained as 
‘residual’ embodiments of my previous life. I still ‘’lived in’ my old head in 
many ways and could easily ‘flip back’ to being who I used to be. Was this 
a barrier to my mobility? The socio-cultural unfamiliarity and angst that I 
regularly felt was not simply about the new or unfamiliar working practices 
of the organisation. It was more to do with the ‘symbolic capital’ in 
evidence and the nuanced and unspoken social and cultural ways of ‘doing 
things’; the verbal and practice-based exchanges that took place, and how 
these were taken as ‘given’ by the majority in the organisation. 
Experiencing these fine distinctions; the unfamiliar and middle-class-
biased mores and practices, I felt strangely uncomfortable and out of my 
depth in my sense of self, as the psychical and job-related pressures to 
adapt became apparent. Occasionally, as in my earlier contacts with 
middle-class friends, I could smile and put on a front (or mask) in order 
to cope. But the discomfort I felt in these workplace encounters persisted. 
I constantly reflected on how I might be more accepted and thus able to 
avoid being seen as a ‘fish-out-of-water’ or an ‘imposter’ (see Chapter 4) 
and an unsuitable/inadequate’ appointee. In these ways I struggled to 
make the necessary ontological adjustments and to develop coping 
strategies to fully integrate into this new socio-cultural setting. 
This struggle to adapt, or to change my ways of being in order to be 
accepted and to ‘belong’, was an ontological and existential matter 
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because I felt to affect the very core of my being. It consisted of a profound 
(sometimes sudden and stark, other times lingering and gradual) 
dispositional change in myself, whereby I had to grow to accept and 
rationalise the organisation’s orthodoxy. Not only did I feel coerced to 
adopt a range of codes of practice, but I also had to accept this prevailing 
organisational doxa, constituting an array of unfamiliar middle-class 
value-laden assumptions and approaches that formed the day-to-day life; 
the lived experience, and culture of the organisation. The overriding 
cultural message seemed to be: “This is the way we do things in this 
organisation”. Thus, the appointee either had to learn to fit in, or stymie 
their career progression, or even leave the organisation. 
In this disconcerting and often emotionally demanding and internal 
struggle the appointee’s habitus is challenged. This process of developing 
a sense of class ‘belonging’ and in securing and stabilising a changing 
sense of self and identity, also involves a struggle for self-affirmation, and 
can create ontological disruption and anxieties that can be difficult to 
control (see Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 90-98). 
How the appointee is seen by colleagues and peers during this process 
may never be discussed; it may never be entirely clear and known, but 
impressions will have been formed, nonetheless. The nature of the 
working-class habitus would have been exposed, evaluated, and 
surreptitiously judged. As discussed in Chapter 1, such forms of class 
disparity can be seen as symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1994, p. 168; 
also, Sayer, 2005). Such cultural (classed) dissonance would be likely to 
develop and persist in workplaces where overt selection policies based on 
class and social background are practiced. Where aspirant mobiles are 
appointed on the basis of their potential and proven abilities alone and 
were their social class disposition or background is not a criterion for 
selection, then a more ‘even playing field’ and culture is likely to develop 
(Knights and Clarke 2013; Loveday 2015). However, honourable and non-
discriminatory selection procedures do not always block out class-based 
biases. Thus, while a positive and non-discriminatory approach and culture 
can, and often does exist, the discordance for working class aspirants will 
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be difficult to overcome. Also, the extent of cultural, dispositional and 
character displacement may be problematic and contradictory both to the 
aspirant and to the organisation as a whole. 
 
Vignette 2.2 shows the nature and validity of conscious deliberation and 
the reflexive discussions within the self. Indeed, as Sayer (2005, p. 27) 
suggests, this may well be the normal process of reflexivity in the ‘mulling 
over’ of difficult or viscerally-challenging issues and situations as a process 
of osmosis and of shaping and reshaping.65 However, the vignette also 
shows how reflexivity can be undertaken alongside the unconscious 
cultural biases bound up in the middle-class mores of organisations. In 
these contexts, the gap between expectations, assumptions and actual 
experience may generate not only a need for conscious reflection and 
deliberation, but as Elder-Vass points out, a clear need, or imperative, to 
modify the habitus (Elder-Vass 2007, p. 329, citing Bourdieu 2000, p. 
149). Given the internalised and habitual nature of dispositions that form 
in the self over time, this critical idea of habitus modification may take a 
number of forms, degrees and timescales depending upon the specific 
history, character, internal challenges and mobility trajectory experienced 
by the individual aspirant. 
 
2.8 Conclusion. 
In this chapter, I have evaluated Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and 
considered the reflexive potential of the embodied self and how this self-
examination can benefit aspirant mobiles throughout their mobility 
trajectories. I have also presented a number of brief critiques of the 
habitus to assess the extent of determinism in Bourdieu’s interpretation of 
the concept. I considered this an important inclusion since the central 
thrust of the thesis is in assessing the impacts of the structural barriers of 
 
65 However, any discussion of the ‘unconscious’ would seem to necessitate the 
inclusion of the work of Freud and psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, it has been 
necessary to bracket out this ‘grand narrative’ if only to retain the specific focus 
of the thesis. But it is important to recognise that Bourdieu’s work on embodied 




class in blocking or enabling social mobility that the forms of 
internalisation can bring about in habituated practice. Principally here, I 
have used the work of Crossley (2001), Chandler (2013), Sweetman 
(2003), Elder-Vass (2007), and Beck (1992). I then followed this with 
three brief critiques of reflexivity, specifically, those of Giddens (1991), 
Archer (2003) and Taylor (1989). Taken together these show how 
reflexivity might materialise as a mechanism of self-evaluation for aspirant 
mobiles. I have also included personal accounts of my own experiences of 
reflexivity. This was followed by an assessment of the reflexive habitus 
and its potential limits in contexts where aspirants might need to consider 
such self-examinations. 
 
I noted that this discussion on habitus, field and reflexivity needs to 
include an examination of emotions which I briefly mentioned in Sections 
2.1 and 2.7. The literature appears to show that aspirants may need to 
reflect on their emotional makeup and if necessary, to raise their levels of 
self-regard and self-esteem (see Chapter 3). Aspirants may need to 
reflexively engage in significant personal change or strengthen their inner 
resolve (see Vignette 2.2), in order to protect themselves against the 
vulnerabilities derived from class domination during class transition. 
Sennett and Cobb (1973, p. 30) consider how their respondents feel 
socially exposed and vulnerable in their upward mobility. The authors 
suggest that one message resulting from these class vulnerabilities is that 
people might feel happier if they didn’t try to push themselves to socially 
aspire (1973, p. 31). The implications of this are clearly crucial in 
assessing the limitations and psychical impacts of the meritocracy. 
 
Thus, mobile aspirants can be shown to face a number of challenges that 
impact on their sense of self during their mobility trajectory. For example, 
they may shift from a parochial-minded working-class background to the 
more ‘refined’ and privileged ethos of higher education, or to a 
professional world of work with its accustomed middle-class lifestyle, 
practices, values and entitlements. In such contexts this unfamiliarity with 
the new field and its social space can generate a range of emotions for 
aspirant mobiles. Some will be positive, such as the injection of pride 
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through achievement. However, there can be negative states of being such 
as feelings of self-consciousness, guilt, betrayal, shame, anger and 
belittlement and a potential double isolation of no longer fitting in with 
family and friends, nor with the new world they have entered (Atkinson 
2015, p. 116; Friedman 2016, pp. 141-142). Bourdieu referred to this 
painful breaking away from, and rejecting of the parental mould of being, 
as habitus clive’. Here, the habitus is struggling to make sense of these 
contradictory psychical forces, and an incongruency with dispositions of 
the past compared with aspirants’ emerging new life (see Mailman 2017; 
Friedman 2016). 
 
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the reflexive nature of social 
and personal transformation. This shows how aspirants can be active 
change agents of their own destiny, since they are motivated, for a 
number of reasons, to change themselves as social beings in a classed 
society. However, in changing their class surroundings and culture, it is 
not always clear whether, and how, they may also change themselves in 
terms of their identity, values, attitudes, and how the display of specific 
emotions may impact on their changing sense of self. This is crucial to this 
examination of class mobility and will be considered in later chapters. This 
also suggests that there is scope for further empirical research to establish 
a more complete picture of aspirants’ feelings and states of being when 
engaging in a reflexive analysis of their embodied selves and how the 
tensions of aspirational striving affects the habitus of aspirants. 
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Chapter 3. Working-class aspirants’ perceptions of self-worth, 
self-regard and self-esteem during class transition.  
 
3.1 Introduction. 
The previous chapter considered the ways in which the aspirant’s 
embodied self and character could be reshaped by adopting a reflexive 
approach. It was considered that such reflexivity could help in mitigating 
or resolving the tensions, contradictions and ambivalences within the 
aspirant’s habitus. Here however, I expand upon these concerns of the 
embodied aspirant self by considering aspirants’ perceptions of self-worth 
and their emotional responses to, and struggles against, the impositions 
of structural barriers in the psychic landscape of class that I discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2 (Bourdieu 1984; Allen 2014 and 2015; Friedman 2016; 
Sayer 2005; Reay 2005). 
 
It is also important to consider this specific ‘emotional’ landscape 
experienced by the aspirant in terms of the psychodynamics involved in 
striving to be upwardly mobile. In so doing, I reveal the contradictory and 
‘tension-bound’ nature of class mobility. In addition, I consider the de-
stabilising factors that may prevent mobility, since it must not be assumed 
that aspirational intent will, in and of itself, bring about a comfortable and 
seamless change in class position and class identity. 
 
The main focus here, therefore, is to examine the aspirant’s perception of 
their own self-worth and value as they progress towards and through class 
transition. I provide examples of how self-regard and self-esteem are 
threatened when confronted by what are, in effect, significant, yet often 
nuanced, ontological challenges of class. It is also important to understand 
the strength and degree of emotional impact that can arise for mobiles in 
the re-shaping of identity during this crucial ontological transformation. 
This chapter, along with Chapters 4 and 5, focus on these matters in 
greater depth. 
 
Firstly, therefore, I evaluate aspirants’ sentiments and perceptions of self 
during class transition and provide a background to the emotionality of 
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aspirant endeavour. Friedman (2016, p. 129) refers to this as “the psychic 
and emotional life” of the aspirant. There is evidence to show that the 
emotional fabric of the self is embedded in the hitherto discussed 
embodied self. The relationship between thoughts, feelings, moods, 
emotions and behaviours, are, for the purposes of the discussion, deemed 
to be closely linked. In the case of the emotional makeup of the aspirant, 
it becomes evident that the way in which a person reacts to a given 
situation is, in large part a product of their early socialisation or 
internalisation (see Section 2.5), and hence to the ongoing development 
of the embodied self (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007; 
Burkitt 2012; Akram 2012; Noble and Watkins 2003). I consider the 
impact of emotions such as shame, guilt, envy, jealousy, and pride in 
social contexts where aspirants are confronted by forms of class 
domination that may be shown to trigger such emotions. 
 
Secondly, I examine what factors link to issues of self-worth and self-
esteem and related emotions such as shame and guilt with regard to class, 
to determine whether these figure in the context of aspirational 
endeavour. I look at the evidence as to whether working-class aspirants 
are prone to experiencing low self-esteem. However, as considered earlier, 
the extent to which this trait may be evident is likely to vary markedly 
from one aspirant to another. 
 
The third and final section includes a further selection of personal accounts 
of specific contexts where my emotions were displayed with regards to 
self-esteem and feelings of self-worth and self-belief. These experiences 
show the tensions found in processes of upward mobility and during class 
transition. In addition, the emotional facets of selfhood located in class-
related experiences of mobility are evaluated. These show the sometimes-
visceral nature and injuries of a classed life exacerbated during mobility. 
 
It is important to note that some of the secondary sources I use in the 
particular critique on self-esteem have unavoidably come from within the 
discipline of Social Psychology. The reason this has arisen is principally 
because of the dearth of relevant sociological material available in 
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examining the emotionality of self-esteem. The objective here, therefore, 
is to contextualise a range of emotions in situations of social mobility. 
 
3.2 Aspirants’ sentiments and perceptions of the self during 
class transition, background and context. 
Here I examine some of the familiar emotions that aspirant mobiles might 
experience when feeling uneasy in middle-class settings, and to evaluate 
their impact. I consider this useful for the following reasons. Firstly, it is 
important to acknowledge how structures and embodiments affect the 
habitus in emotional terms and in the reflexive lives of aspirants during 
their ‘short-range’ or ‘long-range’ mobility, class transition and self-
transformation.66 Secondly, to exclude any discussion of emotional 
responses and challenges to mobility would leave the analysis of the 
embodied aspirant-self incomplete. I revisit this matter again when 
discussing issues of authenticity among the upwardly mobile in Chapter 4, 
and in Chapter 5 when examining the ontological anxieties of aspirants in 
their mobility trajectories. 
 
Sayer (2005) notes that emotions and sensitivities exist despite class 
divisions. So, it is important to see how they are manifest in contexts of 
upward mobility. Referencing class domination, Sayer states that where 
compassion is directed ‘downwards’ to the weaker party, pity can become 
condescension or humiliation (Sayer 2005, p. 147). He suggests that there 
are different forms of envy and resentment and even when justified, he 
says that resentment can be more painful than acceptance for those who 
have been exploited or excluded. However, in this way, he suggests that 
the attempts of the dominated to maintain goodwill and avoid this 
resentment can actually help to maintain their domination and indicate 
class deference towards the dominant (Sayer 2005, p. 150). Thus, for 
aspirants, they may wish to reflexively assess the motives for their 
mobility since their striving may be based on one or more forms of envy. 
This may lead them to lose sight of why they are actually aspirational and 
socially mobile in the first place. 
 
66 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2 for a description of these forms of mobility. 
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However, according to Steedman, (see Sayer 2005, p. 150) caution is 
needed to ensure that envy is not confused with injustice. Thus, there is 
the form of envy linked to the struggle of people who are in a state of 
dispossession and are seeking to gain what is unequivocally seen as 
rightfully theirs. Framed in this way, envy can, perhaps, be justified on 
the basis of attempting to alter a world that has produced considerable 
inequality and unfulfilled potential. Again, in the clamour of mobility and 
in becoming middle-class, aspirants may need to self-check the rationale 
upon which they are conforming to the prevailing rhetoric of meritocracy, 
social climbing and one-up-man-ship. 
 
More pertinent still is the emotion of ‘shame’ that can emerge when 
aspirants move in middle-class circles. Here, Sayer notes that shame has 
been described as the most social of emotions and a mechanism of social 
integration, making individuals conform to external judgements and 
norms. Furthermore, he argues that shame is a particularly private and 
reflexive emotion which invokes an evaluation of the self by the self (Sayer 
2005, p. 152). It is evoked by the failure of an individual or group to live 
according to their values, or commitments to others. This makes them 
believe themselves to be defective. According to Williams it can be a 
response to real or imagined contempt, derision or avoidance of real or 
imagined others, particularly those whose values are respected (see Sayer 
2005, p. 152). 
 
To act in a shameful way is to invite the contempt of others, but primarily 
self-contempt. It may be prompted by a sense of ‘lack’ and may be a 
largely unarticulated feeling, existing below the threshold of awareness, 
and an emotion that is difficult to get in touch with. But Sayer indicates 
that it is still capable of blighting the person’s life in terms of the self-other 
relationship (Sayer 2005, p. 153). Sayer suggests that such ‘low-level 
shame’ can shade into low self-esteem and that this is particularly 
common among subordinated groups.67 However, other research I cite 
 
67 Although Sayer does not state it explicitly, his reference to ‘subordinated 
groups’ here might be taken to include the working-class, since the substantive 
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below suggests that no clear correlation exists between class and levels of 
self-esteem (see Section 3.3). 
 
The discussion on structural determinants in Chapter 1 is also relevant 
here in structurally binding shame to class-based sentiments and specific 
states of being. Examples include aesthetic shame, such as how one 
dresses and looks; performative shame, in terms of how one conducts 
oneself, or moral shame, in which people are expected to live in acceptable 
ways and to conform to specific (often shifting) standards. Bourdieu’s work 
on the judgement of taste is significant in this respect (see Bourdieu 1984; 
also, Skeggs 2004, p. 108 and pp. 141-152; Lawler 2005). 
 
However, other forms of shame are also evident. For example, it can be a 
product of the internalisation of the views of others, which may generate 
contempt for one’s own sense of self and identity (Sayer 2005, p. 154). 
As indicated above, this is relevant to earlier discussions on class, insofar 
as class inequalities can mark or stigmatise a person through a shameful 
failure to conform to the current doxa and normative signifiers of class. 
Mobile aspirants may be, or may become, sensitive to how they are seen 
and judged when in middle-class circles. They may, perhaps, feel they are 
being subtly coerced into ‘refining’ themselves in order to conform, with 
the promise of being accepted if they do so, and thus to feel that they 
legitimately ‘belong”. As indicated in Section 1.4, in the context of an 
‘approved’ use of language, this kind of conformity would seem to be 
based upon an emotionally powerful form of symbolic domination 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007). The work of Schubert (2012), Reay 
(1998b, 2013) and particularly Lawler (2005) is useful here in showing, 
for example, how emotions such as ‘disgust’ can be experienced by 
working-class aspirants when circulating in the social and cultural 
preserves of the middle class. This ‘classed disgust’ or contempt, is often 
misjudged as immoral. For example, from the 1950s onwards working-
class men were shamed when their wives had to go out to work, 
 
discussion in his text relates to class, while also including considerations of 
gender, sexuality and race. 
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suggesting that they were ‘unable to keep them’ on one wage! Similarly, 
in education, a combination of shame and low self-worth can be felt by 
those who fail to progress or harbour the threat of failure. In this respect 
it can be considered to be a structurally generated effect (see Calarco 
2011). In Calarco’s study, working-class students are expected to 
compete on equal terms with middle-class ‘others’ and, at the same time 
are, implicitly, expected to fail (see also Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
 
Felski’s research on identity and shame among the lower middle-class 
provides some further examples that show familiar sentiments to those 
shown among the upwardly mobile (Felski 2000). She recounts the 
experiences of being ‘tortured’ by the constant struggle to ‘keep up 
appearances’ on a low income. She views this as a ‘status anxiety’ based 
on a “craven respect for high culture without any real knowledge of its 
content” (See also Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 23). Here the anxiety is 
seen as an internalisation of the ‘strictures of authority’; an ultimate 
example of the psychic self-regulation of a class and the confusing codes 
of class distinction (Felski 2000, pp. 35-36).68 
 
Felski argues that by focusing on the emotion of shame it raises broader 
questions about identity. For example, does class mobility imply that it 
has a contingency? She suggests that it does, not simply in economic and 
sociological terms, but the cultural and psychological dimensions mean 
that it involves feelings, and a complex psychological matrix acquired in 
childhood (Felksi 2000, p. 39). She cites Steedman (see Felski 2000, p. 
39) in pointing out that class consciousness is ingrained from an early age 
in the psychological rhythms and flows of the mother-child relationship. 
Also, that class-based attitudes of fatalism, perhaps a form of pathological 
determinism, resentment, envy and shame are inexorably transmitted 
from the working-class mother to the child. Thus, she argues, working-
class mobiles can remain ‘haunted’ by these psychic markings of childhood 
and are unable to celebrate their class origins because these origins 
 
68 This reference to anxiety in this form also has a bearing on my discussion 
regarding class-related existential angst in Chapter 5. 
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represent a material and psychic impoverishment which they may seek to, 
or indeed, be glad to escape from. Furthermore, she suggests that such 
class origins may no longer provide a source of positive identity (Felski 
2000, p. 37). 
 
However, again, depending on the context and the perspective of the 
aspirant, class origins can often be valorised (see Vignette 3.2 on a 
rationale for the glorification of working-class origins). But why would the 
aspirant seek to do this? Perhaps it is because there is a deep-rooted need 
to reclaim the core, or authenticity, of one’s class background? Thus, as a 
result of class transition, one’s sense of class identity is in danger of being 
obliterated by an erosion of social class ‘belonging’ (see Chapter 4 for a 
further discussion on this issue). However, such ‘nostalgia’ may be 
considered superficial, false, skin deep and contradictory; a confused form 
of inverted distaste for where the aspirant is heading, and which may be 
viewed as a curiosity by more ‘refined’ middle-class observers! (See 
Friedman 2016, pp. 137, 138). Perhaps such ‘retrospective glances’ are 
merely attempts to cover up the reality of the aspirant’s class insecurities, 
which also hide, in terms of class signification and orientation, an 
excruciating sense of being lost or displaced? I explore the existential 
implications of this issue in Chapter 5. 
 
However, Felski’s work on guilt and shame is useful in highlighting the 
entangled emotions accompanying class mobility. She defines ‘guilt’ as a 
sense of inner badness caused by a transgression of moral values, and 
‘shame’ as a sense of failure or ‘lack’ in the eyes of others (see also Sayer 
2005). Felski contends that shame is related to violations of social codes 
and a consequent fear of exposure, embarrassment, and humiliation 
(Felski 2000). For example, according to Lynd (see Felski 2000, p. 39) 
shame can be invoked by the most trivial of events, yet it can produce 
excruciating dis-ease among the poor who experience shame when their 
poverty is exposed before the eyes of others; a discrepancy between 
certain values and norms seen by others to be ‘superior’. She suggests 
that the opportunities for shame increase dramatically with forms of social 
mobility. An infinite array of chances of failure portray the fact that 
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aspirants feel they don’t belong (at least in the interim or transition) to 
the emerging, and seemingly more refined environment, nor to the one 
they are leaving behind (see also Friedman 2016, 137). Furthermore, Lynd 
considers this fracturing of old identity and the way shame plays a part in 
this. The feeling of shame, as a single life experience, throws light on the 
whole personality structure. In this, she develops a conceptualisation of 
identity in which a series of clues are offered. She considers this highly 
complex subject within psychological theory by developing the relationship 
between the significance of shame, with its involvement with guilt, and 
the concept of identity (see Felski 2000, p. 39). 
 
So far, the discussions on class inequality and the extent of opportunities 
for class transition and its related challenges have underlined some key 
problems for the upwardly mobile. Specifically, these translate into a 
number of inner conflicts largely stimulated by the normative structures 
of the dominant middle-class (see Chapter 1). However, as I have 
emphasised so far, the outcome of these inner conflicts can be an 
ingrained and visceral sense of ‘lack’ (see Felski 2000; Sayer 2005). This 
is often accompanied by low self-regard, low self-belief, or low self-esteem 
and threats to the individual’s self-respect (see Sennett and Cobb 1973, 
pp. 28-29; Sayer 2005, pp. 155-158). 
 
However, it would also seem that some aspirants can find a strength of 
character and agency from the recesses of their self that enable many to 
overcome the structural constraints in the social and cultural field of class. 
They are able to sidestep what often appears as class fatalism or 
defeatism. They are able to demonstrate significant degrees of persistence 
and resilience which will assist them in moving away and securing a 
different future. This inner resolve will, more than likely, emerge as a 
result of the self-reflexive engagements and follow-on practices of self-
analysis; from aspects of character that show aspirants to be highly 
motivated and with sufficient self-belief to persist in challenging those 
negative sentiments and unwanted realities of class subjugation and 
deterministic, fatalistic rationalisations (see Friedman, 2016, pp. 135-
136). 
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This begs the further question as to whether specific emotions relating to 
changes in class embodiment need to be confronted and managed. Also, 
whether this is somehow instrumental in sustaining levels of motivation to 
succeed and to maintain sufficient levels of self-belief to press ahead, in 
the face of the inevitable daily challenges. That is, to have the resilience 
to be prepared to pull away from working-class ties; to weather the storm 
of potential class detachment and to face possible rejection or 
estrangements from family and friends and the unwanted scrutiny of 
middle-class others in forthcoming encounters (See Friedman, 2016, pp. 
138, 140). 
 
Of course, these outcomes may not materialise in such a disruptive 
manner. Some aspirants will be applauded by their family and friends who 
will feel proud of their social elevation and ambitions and will respect them 
for it.  They may wish them every success in their future classed lives. 
Such positive responses may indeed help mobiles both psychologically and 
socially in dampening any feelings of self-doubt, dis-ease, and 
ambivalence arising from their aspirational endeavours. Aspirants may 
then feel that they are doing the ‘right thing’ and feel assured that their 
closely felt working-class ties can be positively preserved. Indeed, this 
may be essential if the process of transition is to be achievable with 
minimal emotional upheaval. For example, this could be realised in the 
particular case of ‘short-range’ mobility trajectories (see Friedman 2016, 
pp. 131, 136-137).69 
 
However, in considering emotional impacts, such short-range mobility 
may bring little or no change; only marginal positive or negative change, 
on levels of self-worth or self-esteem. The aspirant may not be 
significantly affected in psychological or emotional terms. This may be the 
 
69 Friedman (2016) cites Bourdieu in referring to ‘short-range’ and ‘long-range’ 
mobility where the shifting state of the habitus may or may not be problematic. 
‘Short-range’ mobility in occupational terms might be were the aspirant moves, 
for example, from unskilled manual working-class to skilled manual working-
class. In the case of ‘long-range’ mobility we might see the aspirant moving over 
time from skilled manual working-class to professional/managerial middle-class 
with either abrupt or gradual transformations of the habitus. 
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extent of changes in the embodied self for many aspirants. Thus, in 
mobility terms this might be considered to be a ‘successful’ outcome; a 
manageable socio-cultural steppingstone or journey’s end, depending on 
the ambitions of the aspirant. It might avoid any glaring fractures of 
habitus (hysteresis), or situations where the aspirant mobile is psychically 
unsettled, or experiencing ambivalence about matters of self and identity; 
of feeling ‘out-of-place’ or of feeling like an ‘imposter’ (see Chapter 4). 
Also, the impacts on the aspirant’s family of origin and previous social 
networks may be minimal. So clearly there are strategies that aspirants 
can utilise to avoid excessive shaming contexts and where such ‘in-
betweeness’ does not lead to painful and shameful experiences such as 
those cited in Section 3.4 (see also Mallman 2017, pp. 23-26; Chapman 
2015; Morley 1997; Reay, 1997b). 
 
However, the reverse side of this would appear to be a ‘detachment’ from 
significant others; the fallout that comes from being socially and culturally 
‘homeless’, and the emotions that can be triggered both in the short and 
long term. Furthermore, despite the higher utility value that comes from 
enhancing their social and cultural capital, the aspirant’s embodied self 
can be further undermined with a sense of ‘not belonging’, or more 
accurately, belonging ‘incompletely’ in two distinct classes. They can be 
said to have ‘one foot in both camps, but are not fully immersed, or at 
home in either’, since they embody conflicts generated by such cultural 
differences of class. The upward trajectory pits them in opposition to their 
old (other) selves, families and communities (Mallman 2017, p. 20; also, 
Friedman 2016, p. 142). Here class mobility dynamics can create a 
fractured habitus and a challenge to the ontological coherence of the self. 
This raises the prospect of a disembodiment and dislocation of the self 
that begs the question whether a working-class aspirant-self can, in cases 
of such transmutation, successfully complete the transition into a middle-
class social and cultural life and to flourish therein. Indeed, as Bourdieu 
notes, the upwardly mobile face the prospect of a ‘failure to fully assimilate 
into the Bourgeoisie’ (Mallman 2017, p. 20). 
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Furthermore, Friedman states that such mobility dynamics show the 
aspirant trying to reconcile an array of difficult emotions and demands and 
facing an exhaustive amount of mental work as a solitary undertaking 
(Friedman 2016, p. 145). The disjuncture arising from this splitting and 
separating from class origins, and from familiar traditional cultural 
signifiers, presents the aspirant with anxieties that can become barriers 
to self-development and wellbeing. This is so since the classed self can be 
considered to be a split, (or fragmented) self that can, potentially, become 
unhinged as a result of this socio-cultural transformation. 
 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.8, I showed how Friedman (2016) in citing 
Bourdieu made reference to habitus clive’ as “a sense of self torn by 
contradiction and internal division” (Friedman 2016, p. 129). That is, the 
negative impact of social mobility on the psychic and emotional life of the 
aspirant as well as on the ontological coherence of the self. As Friedman 
says in the abstract to his paper, a divided habitus “helps explain how the 
emotional pull of class loyalties can entangle subjects in the affinities of 
the past”. He contends that this may be why, irrespective of the rhetoric, 
“upward mobility may remain a state that not everyone unequivocally 
aspires to” (Friedman 2016, p. 129). 
 
Friedman’s article seems to be one of very few that convincingly links the 
self with class; with the psychological and emotional fallout during class 
transition and importantly, with Bourdieu’s habitus. Friedman contends 
that the upwardly mobile individual is forced to reconcile an array of 
difficult emotions. This theoretical position follows on from the so-called 
dissociative thesis which argued that social mobility results in a high 
incidence of social and psychological problems (Friedman 2016, p. 133).70 
 
70 Although not directly related to class mobility, Skeggs (2004, p. 32-33) cites 
the work of Day on the splits in ‘the self’ as forms of class conflict. Day draws 
parallels between Freud, on the divisions in the self from the point of view of the 
individual psyche, and Marx from the point of view of divisions in classed society. 
Thus, a model of class structures is shown to link with the individual psyche. The  
counter view is that aspirants do not experience any problems of this kind and 
that they are overwhelmingly content and are rarely plagued by disequilibrium. 
Here, Friedman 2016, p. 133 cites Goldthorpe (1980) as holding this view. 
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Thus, the habitus clive’, or divided self, suggests that the self, while in a 
state of mobility, is disrupted, fractured or split and in ontological terms 
becomes incoherent and insecure. Clearly, this idea is complex since it is 
not clear the extent to which the self, in terms of the habitus, is able to 
deal with this disruption, particularly in emotional terms. Furthermore, if 
it is able, it is not clear whether it can continuously or intermittently 
manage the problem in a temporal sense.71 However, the presumption is 
that each aspirant’s attempts to re-adjust his/her habitus will be unique 
to the individual in the way that they approach this reflexive process (see 
Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 53- 118; Stahl 2013; Holmes 2010). 
 
In Chapter 2, I referred to Taylor’s ‘inward turn’ (Taylor, 1989, pp. 177-
178). However, another way of understanding this is to consider how the 
reflexive habitus might function as it were, dialectically. In this way 
aspirants’ personal challenges could be identified in the tensions of their 
specific social and personal context. They could then explore these 
analytically, in order to appreciate the parameters and magnitude of 
ensuing contradictions. This might be considered an authentic and honest 
search for the nub of the problem, before identifying possible solutions 
which might then be acted upon. However, this approach might be seen 
as somewhat mechanical and even simplistic when put in these terms. 
Nonetheless, this dialectical interplay between the emotional response in 
engaging in this way; the reasoning or rational thought that can be evoked 
and the potential practice necessary to make the transformative change, 
does illustrate the nature of the psychical arena the aspirant is reflexively 
coping with, in attempting to reconcile a given issue (see Holmes 2010; 
Reay 2005; Noble and Watkins 2003). 
 
Thus, the aspirant’s emotional makeup and internal narrative can both be 
shown to play a part in understanding and confronting the inner conflict, 
or the pressing ‘social-other’-related problems that class transition can 
bring. Importantly, the reflexive dialectic will include the observations and 
 
71 This is a further complexity which I discuss in Chapter 5. 
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reflections on the contributions made by significant others in the aspirant’s 
life. As Holmes says, emotions are felt and expressed in relations with 
other people and things; they are not easily managed and can emerge in 
ways that are overwhelming (Holmes 2010, p. 145). This is by no means 
an easy thing for the aspirant self to cope with. 
 
Thus, in large part emotional relations with others can be shown to play 
“a more complex part in deliberations” and in forming (and re-forming) 
the reflexive self (Holmes 2010, p. 142). She argues that 
 
“people may often be unaware of, or unable to articulate the sometimes-
tangled emotions that fuel and emerge from everyday interactions”. 
(Holmes 2010, p. 145) 
 
Furthermore, she rightly underlines the resistance or ‘inertia’ that can 
develop in the individual’s psychic landscape. The difficulties in the shifting 
or adjusting of embodiments in the reflexive process are borne out when 
people do not always quickly move on to new ways of living when 
experiencing dissatisfactions (Holmes 2010, p. 147). Importantly, these 
‘new ways of living’ could easily apply to the reflexive aspirant’s ambitions 
since, as Holmes notes, individuals may develop new ways of interacting, 
which may be more emotionally satisfying. However, aspirants may also 
develop ‘avoidance strategies’ to sidestep the most challenging emotional 
aspects of their reflexive process. In this event the self (as durable 
habitus) and its sociality may fail to benefit reflexively, seeing the pain or 
discomfort as too psychically unsettling or ontologically frightening. In 
turn, such avoidance strategies may, or may not, stall the aspirant’s 
planned upward mobility trajectory. 
 
In temporal considerations Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) also provide 
some clues to the emotional aspects of reflexivity, suggesting  that ‘short-
range’ mobility is more manageable than the more problematic ‘long-
range’ mobility, particularly when the ‘trajectory’ of the individual 
provokes abrupt, rather than gradual, transformations of the habitus (see 
Friedman 2016, p.131). Furthermore, Friedman cites Bourdieu’s use of the 
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hysteresis effect to describe these periods of profound, large-scale 
changes when there is a mismatch between one’s (primary) habitus and 
the habitus required in a new field (Friedman 2016, p. 131). An example 
of this long-range mobility trajectory might be that of a working-class 
student struggling emotionally with identity and cultural issues when 
adapting to life in an Oxbridge University college or similar highbrow 
academic environment. S/he may be caught in painful social limbo, of 
‘double isolation’, from both their original and their destination class. This 
could be shown to be a habitus divided against itself and doomed to a 
double perception of self (see Friedman 2016, p. 132).72 
 
But is it possible that the ‘splitting’ of the self, as described in this way, 
might be somewhat over-stated? Surely there are cases where aspirants’ 
disenchantment with working-class life has grown so acute that they are 
more than happy, perhaps desperate, to leave the insufficiencies of 
working-class life and to embrace those of a more ‘refined’ and 
sophisticated, albeit unfamiliar kind? Considering this, Friedman asks 
 
”Does the contemporary experience of upward mobility [necessarily] imply 
a traumatic break with the primary habitus, or is it fluently incorporated 
into an individual’s band of possible trajectories?” (Friedman 2016, p. 
132). 
 
However, once again, this question must remain open at this point, since 
if we are to assume that aspirant disequilibrium and trauma occurs in 
every case this must surely be contingent on social context and the specific 
emotional and psychical profile of the aspirant? In the absence of empirical 
research and only by detailing specific case examples, could we confirm 
Bourdieu’s theoretical position with regard to the splitting of the habitus 
and the existential and emotional fallout from this. 
 
Friedman’s own empirical research highlights some clear emotional 
difficulties stemming from both short-range and long-range mobility 
 
72 I have adopted this example from the one that Friedman cites as being used in 
one of Bourdieu’s texts. 
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trajectories. These include the belittlement and embarrassment felt by one 
respondent towards her parents whom, she felt, did not have the 
appropriate cultural signifiers for her to feel comfortable when they were 
with her in the presence of her more affluent colleagues. She was then 
consumed with guilt for pitying her parents. Another example shows that 
the emotional imprint of dislocation which can be felt less through the 
judgement of others and more through self-doubt which leaves some 
respondents with a paralytic suspicion that they somehow ‘aren’t good 
enough’ (Friedman 2016, p. 140). Comments such as ‘feeling like a fraud’ 
and that a ‘fall’ was immanent, were also commonplace, leaving the 
respondent feeling forever in danger of being ‘caught out’.73 Although 
these respondents should have felt proud and content with their success, 
with many having striven against considerable odds, they frequently 
reported the reverse. This was compounded by an ambivalence in the 
belief that they did not fully ‘want to belong’ in their destination field and 
that success implied abandoning one’s origins (Friedman 2016, p. 140). 
Once again here, the dominant social norm of upward mobility was 
coercively disrupting the self’s desire for an existentially grounded sense 
of place or space. 
 
One final example that Friedman illustrates, is profoundly revealing in 
showing the class tensions between the ‘providers’ of mobility and the 
‘recipients’. Friedman recalls the case of a respondent of working-class 
origins whose parents sacrificed everything to enable their daughter to 
attend and succeed at one of the best universities. She felt profound guilt 
that she was the only one in the family who would benefit from this 
success. But this ‘survival guilt’ (see also Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 
2001, p. 161) was fuelled by her mother’s passive aggression, whereby 
she used the sanction of inducing embarrassment to remind her daughter 
not to be, or behave, like somebody ‘that she was not’ in terms of her 
class and ethnic origins. 
 
 
73 See Chapter 4 for further discussion of this aspect of aspirants’ sense of self-
worth and authenticity during class transition. 
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In this way, the upwardly mobile can be made to ‘feel’ their success as 
actually a kind of failure. Friedman notes that later in this respondent’s 
mobility trajectory the daughter felt unable to engage with her parents 
and siblings on an emotional level. The guilt she was made to feel for her 
success also lead her to feel jealousy towards her siblings’ relative 
immobility and shared social strife. This had actually enabled them to 
maintain emotional bonds which she was losing through her ‘moving on’ 
and thus her fracturing of ties with her family. In this example Friedman 
demonstrates the complex web of ‘psychic bi-products’ implied by long-
range upward mobility (Friedman 2016, p. 141). 
 
In a similar way Mallman (2017) argues that mobiles enter a moral 
economy and an upward trajectory that pits them in opposition to their 
‘old’ selves. He also refers to this as a ‘divided self’ since increased 
freedom also brings increased vulnerability in relation to selfhood and 
identity. Bourdieu describes this social and familial schism as a ‘dialectical 
confrontation’ between a socialised self in a working-class family and an 
emerging middle-class self (see Mallman 2017, p. 19). The processes 
pertaining to learning, or in assimilating, a different class culture is 
rigorous, and this adaptation is seen in the inherent struggles of the 
upwardly mobile and in their often-qualified successes (Mallman 2017, p. 
20).74 
 
From these examples we can see other aspects of emotional and psychic 
discordance. These include an inadequacy in being unable to help others 
in an emotional sense; a disengagement and a distancing from envious or 
shame-based family cultural ties and an erosion of identity through a 
splitting from cultural practices. In other words, there is a disidentification 
from the now unacceptable family and class/cultural practices and 
attitudes, and subtle resentments of family and friends who may feel that 
the aspirant mobile has ‘left us behind’. 
 
 
74 See also Sennett and Cobb (1973, pp. 206-210). 
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A large body of exploratory research on the emotionality in class mobility 
has considered the visceral experiences of self-worth, much of it in the 
context of educational institutions (see Abrahams 2017; Allen 2013; Reay 
1997b, 2001, 2004, 2012; Kupfer 2015; Mallman 2017; Calarco 2011; 
Emler 2001). Bourdieu also provides vivid examples of the feelings 
aspirants have from social encounters that illustrate his concepts of 
misrecognition and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1984, 1994, 2007).75 
 
As indicated earlier, the working-class pupil/student is often ‘shown up’ as 
being ill-prepared, unduly modest, socially immobile; diffident or (falsely) 
inarticulate in meeting the requirements set by, and the expectations of, 
middle-class teachers (see Calarco 2011; Stahl 2015). For example, 
Kupfer (2015) cites the findings of research on upward mobility in German 
educational institutions, showing the rifts in the embodied self and how 
practical changes that are made to improve matters can make things 
worse, creating marginality, social anomaly and deviance. Specifically, she 
cites Albrecht-Heide’s research (see Kupfer 2015, p. 22) where employed 
adults were persuaded to change their work role by becoming financially 
dependent students. Initially, many considered this to be a regressive 
move. However, Albrecht-Heide concluded that the students eventually 
accepted this change and were reconciled with the discomfort of the 
experience. Kupfer also cites Bublitz who recalls a case of a working-class 
family who coerced their daughter to acquire knowledge from books 
written in an inaccessible language, expecting her to learn abstract theory 
that was clearly contradictory to her familiar working-class experiences 
and the commonplace interactions with others, making the experience 
oppressive rather than liberating (see Kupfer 2015, p. 22).  
 
Finally, Kupfer cites the research of Theling who recounts female working-
class students feeling lonely and not feeling part of the middle-class, yet 
no longer feeling part of the working-class either. She describes their 
feelings of isolation and disorientation and their wish to work with working-
class people once they had finished their studies so as to increase their 
 
75 See Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
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social contact with those to whom they felt an affinity (see Kupfer 2015, 
p. 23). Clearly, in this example, there was no positive outcome to habitus 
shift or any aspirational endeavour to become part of another class. 
However, this shows that in some cases allegiances to class origins can 
persist and remain unbroken in the wake of exposure to middle-class 
environments. Theling recommended that working-class students form 
into groups to enable collective changes in their situation in order to 
overcome such isolation (see Kupfer 2015, p. 23). 
 
Furthermore, Mahony and Zmroczek (1997), in citing the difficulties of 
social ascent noted that a number of working-class students found some 
positives from their ambivalence, such as in writing and reading, which 
enabled opportunities for acquiring new identities. However, one student 
noted that while she was seen as successful by her relatives, she didn’t 
‘feel’ it within herself. Thus, in this case example there was a mixture of 
both admiration and resentment. This chimes with the view of Reay, 
Crozier and Clayton (2010) who thought that working-class academics 
were unlikely to feel at home in academia and that the higher their position 
on the academic ladder, the more alienated they would become. As 
mentioned earlier, both Skeggs (2004) and Chapman (2015) but also 
Walkerdine (1990) have similarly observed that the higher the position 
the more uncomfortable working-class academics feel. They cite examples 
of ‘feeling a fraud, of getting found out and that you shouldn’t really be 
there’. This alludes to what is often referred to as the ‘imposter syndrome’ 
which I make further reference to in Chapter 4. 
 
In a study of working-class boys attending a grammar school in a working-
class neighbourhood in Belfast, Ingram (2009) found that they had 
difficulty in dealing with two identities. The boys had problems relating 
openly and comfortably with families in the neighbourhood on the one 
hand and their middle-class classmates on the other. In another study 
Hurst (2010) argues that by succeeding in college, working-class students 
are effectively embracing middle-class types of work when they leave and 
that this appears to endorse the hegemonic view that manual labour is 
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‘less worthy’.76 Hurst concludes from this that education favours 
inequality, competition and hierarchy rather than solidarity, collective 
advancement and equality. From this it appears that working-class 
students who get into college are in a tension since they must forego their 
earlier, established values in order to succeed. Hurst (2010) argues that 
the competitive individualism required for social mobility, through the 
educational route, would appear to be a doomed strategy for the working-
class to adopt. However, these conclusions are not without criticism. There 
would seem to be a dilemma here for working-class aspirants. While they 
may benefit from the resources (capital) that higher education offers, they 
also seem to be subtly coerced into striving in a competitive environment 
where, on entry, their classed disadvantages are often not taken into 
account. 
 
Thus, in moving on to consider the major theme of the chapter of 
aspirants’ perceptions of self-worth, these studies, pertaining to the 
aspirant-self in educational contexts, frequently show the diminishing 
levels of self-worth and self-esteem predominantly experienced by 
students from less privileged backgrounds.77 It is tempting therefore, to 
assume from this that these character or personality traits are a common 
feature of those from the working-class and perhaps of the dispositions of 
working-class aspirants in general. However, given the prevailing doxa 
and legitimation of a universal ethos of competition; the high-performance 
targets and the normative expectations of high levels of ability, perhaps it 
is not surprising that many working-class people can be shown to develop 
a lower self-concept than their middle-class counterparts (see Reay 
1997b, 2001). The nuanced differences between working-class and 
middle-class students are shown, for example, in the ‘honourable’ naivety 
and rejection of the importance placed on networking by working-class 
graduates in the context of the graduate labour market (see Abrahams 
2017), or in refusing to appreciate the importance of maintaining the 
 
76 See my opening vignette for an account of how my own shifting sentiments 
about ‘garage work’ seem to concur with the findings of Hurst (2010). 
 
77 For convenience from this point, I use ‘s-e’ as an abbreviation for ‘self-esteem’. 
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motivation to succeed and the dangers of losing an appreciation of the 
value of education (see Stahl 2013). 
 
Emler’s work on the costs and causes of low s-e in the context of 
educational under-achievement is also relevant here (Emler 2001). Like 
Calarco (2011) he seeks to establish whether children fail at school, at 
least in part, because their self-esteem is low. He reasons that while the 
most important direct determinant of educational attainment is ability, it 
is not the whole story. Some students over-achieve while others under-
achieve relative to their intellectual potential. Emler further notes that s-
e has been viewed as a potential mediator of other factors such as social 
background. In effect it is a ‘proximal’ cause through which more remote 
influences work. It has also been used as a moderator, amplifying or 
dampening the impact of such variables as degrees of parental support. 
However, as with the conclusions of others cited below, although s-e and 
educational attainment are related, they do not appear to be strongly 
related (Emler 2001, p. 27). On average, the correlations in studies 
focusing on the profiles of individuals have been low. 
 
Emler (2001) also notes that the level of global s-e does not have much 
impact on what young people want or try to achieve. However, it does 
influence what they expect to achieve in the domain of educational 
attainment. For example, according to McFarlin and Blaskovich (see Emler 
2001, p. 28) people with low s-e want to succeed as much as anyone else. 
That is, they try just as hard, but unlike people with high s-e, they have 
an expectation of failing. This clearly chimes with Sennett and Cobb’s 
(1973) findings cited throughout this thesis. However, because 
performance is influenced by effort rather than by expectations of success 
or failure, there appear to be few differences in the achievements of low 
and high s-e individuals. 
 
Of course, the setting of these sentiments and signifiers of class are 
established well before entry into the world of education, and the moulding 
of selfhood is then further reinforced in such settings in terms of the 
ongoing ‘durability’, but also in the potential mutability of the habitus 
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throughout the rest of the individual’s life (see Bourdieu 1984, 2005 and 
2009). Such reinforcements of self and its sense of value then appears to 
stem from questions of how this, in turn, is formed and how significant 
‘classed others’ perceive the individual long before any aspirational intent 
emerges. 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 1.2, Sennett and Cobb (1973) argue 
that self-worth is significantly linked to a core sense of, and need for, 
legitimacy and dignity. However, in order to establish dignity in their lives 
and a sense of a core or ‘centred self’, they argue that the structurally 
disadvantaged appear to deal with the world in a controlled and 
emotionally restrained way. This is often manifested in forms of self-
sabotage and defensive, or reactive, forms of rationalisation. In contrast, 
the authors suggest that those who are already attuned to the values of 
self-respect and rational control have a ‘head start’ in terms of emotional 
intelligence and emotional development. Sennett and Cobb are able to get 
an insight into the ambivalence and fears their respondents have in 
struggling to grasp the nuanced and changing nature of class (Sennett and 
Cobb 1973, p. 22). 
 
However, a further complication is that aspirants cannot be considered to 
be a homogenous social group. While there may be common patterns of 
circumstances and context, each aspirant mobile will surely emerge with 
a uniquely contingent classed profile; a uniquely malleable embodied 
habitus and a unique emotional makeup? Moreover, at some stage in their 
trajectory, most ‘long-range’ mobiles will be expected to grasp the social 
and cultural advantages of middle-class life. As a result, it can be widely 
assumed, within an established doxa that they will cultivate that 
ubiquitous middle-class capacity to exude a dignified presence of being 
that comes from a class-refined and enhanced self.78 
 
 
78 This last point is unsubstantiated, although it is largely seen as a commonplace 
feature of an educated middle-class. See Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1994; also, more 
obliquely, Goldthorpe et al. 1969). 
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However, Sennett and Cobb’s respondents’ ruminations, contemplations 
and anxieties were shown to be a poignant feature of their classed lives. 
This showed them as trying to cope with threats to their self-worth 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 63). The adolescents among their respondents 
were exchanging aggressive ‘put-downs’ in seeking to better each other 
and stand out in ‘games of inequality’ in order to validate themselves 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 65). But they were also shown to be self-
defeating or self-condemning and were experiencing feelings of 
inadequacy for not proving themselves ‘good enough’ to be loved (Sennett 
and Cobb 1973, p. 67). Furthermore, they were shown to be deluding 
themselves about who they were and should be or have become in life; 
why states of inertia, procrastination or ambivalence might have set in 
and why they might choose, ultimately, to do nothing about their 
situations. 
 
Sennett and Cobb (1973) further concluded that their respondents 
formulated ‘avoidance strategies’ by deferring to what were, in effect, 
quite rational choices that could have improved their predicaments and 
created more flourishing lives. They also concluded that their respondents’ 
interior emotional world seemed to be at odds with the rational world, with 
their emotionality taking hold of events. These painful experiences and 
often confounding outcomes of classed life were manifest in a low sense 
of achievement, ambition and satisfaction; moderate-to-high levels of 
anxiety (see Chapter 5) in relation to current and future prospects and 
ambivalence about making changes in life. Of course, as hinted earlier, 
these working-class behavioural dispositions are not to be viewed as 
universal across all sections or groups within the working-class. The point 
to make here however, is that these class sensibilities are underlying 
‘tendencies’ that can often go undetected in discourses of mobility since 
the discreet signifiers of class can be made to look invisible, disguised or 
misrecognised through the structural strategies of concealment.79 
 
79 See again Bourdieu’s conceptual framework (Chapter 2) and also Kuhn (2002, 
p. 117) noting that “Class is something beneath your clothes, under your skin, in 
your reflexes, in your psyche, at the very core of your being”. 
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However, attempts at ‘covering over the cracks’ of class is, in itself, an 
issue of identity and authenticity that is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3 Levels of self-worth/self-esteem among aspirant mobiles: 
are there any links with processes of ‘internalisation’? 
Given the discussion so far with regard to structures and internalisation, 
it would now seem pressing to consider the current social perspectives 
towards high and low s-e and self-worth as indicators of personal wellbeing 
and the extent to which they correlate with class in general and with 
mobile aspirants in particular. However, since much of the relevant 
literature on s-e is located within the discipline of Social Psychology this 
section will explore some of the findings of key contributors to this body 
of knowledge. 
 
Research within Social Psychology, particularly by Baumeister (1993); 
Rosenberg (1981); Tice (1993); Harter (1993); Blaine and Crocker 
(1993); Emler (2001), among others, has examined the concept of s-e, in 
terms of its social links and the possible causes of low and high s-e. 
However, from these accounts and other attributed social psychology 
academic sources, there appears to be little firm evidence to suggest that 
levels of s-e are directly related to, or indeed affected by, social class 
background. Moreover, there appears to be little ground upon which to 
establish a link between levels of s-e and working-class aspiration and 
upward mobility. 
 
However, this seems surprising given the established and widespread 
discourses on the personal impacts of class inequality and division; the 
aforementioned discussions on the internalising of structural barriers; the 
challenges of class domination and the class injuries experienced by many 
working-class mobiles (See Sennett and Cobb 1973; Savage 2015; 
Friedman 2016; Reay 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2013; Skeggs 2004). 
Considering the social psychology research cited above it would seem, for 
example, that a person from a poor, underprivileged background, with 
little or none of the benefits of the social, cultural and symbolic capitals 
previously discussed, may not necessarily experience low s-e. Nor, that 
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individuals with ready access to the various forms of capital will necessarily 
have high s-e. Thus, a worthwhile exercise here would be to take an 
exploratory and speculative approach to assessing the incidence of high 
or low s-e in a given social class. For example, might there be a general 
preponderance of a certain level of s-e among those of a given social class? 
Is such an investigation plausible and if so, what might be the result? 
Furthermore, when considering the socially mobile from the aspirant 
working-class, could one or other level of s-e be evident or predominant? 
This section explores these possibilities. 
 
As suggested so far by dismissing any link between s-e and class and in 
rejecting the idea of high or low s-e being widely represented in a given 
class, some of the aforementioned social psychology research would 
appear to contradict many of the critiques regarding working-class agency 
and the mobility of aspirants (see Allen 2013; Bourdieu 2009; Savage 
2015; Calarco 2011). The aforementioned ‘hidden’ injuries of class were 
shown to include feelings of low self-worth and conflicting states of 
ambivalence and related disruptions in the emotional makeup of aspirants 
(see Section 1.6). Surely therefore, the link between the self (and the 
aspirant-self in particular) and its socio-cultural environment would seem 
to have some traction? Furthermore, the thrust of the earlier discussion 
on psychical interiority, that is, the internalisation of structures, has tried 
to correlate the effects of inequality and social class disadvantage and the 
resulting prevalence of a less-valued sense of self (see Section 1.5 and 
Section 2.5). Indeed, the perceptions, feelings, emotions and contexts 
discussed above and the difficulties in acquiring, retaining and building 
self-respect and emotional resilience would surely have a bearing on the 
aspirant’s level of s-e and self-regard? 
 
Moreover, as considered in Section 1.4, central to a person’s self-concept 
is the powerful nature of relationships with social ‘others’. That is, the 
importance of relations with others in terms of the apportioning, receiving 
and sharing of respect, or indeed, disrespect; the appreciation of 
competence, or the opposite and the acknowledgements of attractiveness 
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or unattractiveness, to name a few.80 The development of a critical self 
and its counterpose, an assured self, are surely the universal key to a 
sense of selfhood, irrespective of society or culture? However, as 
discussed in the earlier chapters, classed societies tend to create and 
repeatedly reinforce, divisions, differences and invidious comparisons 
which, in this context of social aspiration, are likely to contribute to inner 
conflicts and insecurities that class mobiles may struggle to resolve 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1994; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Allen 2013; Brown 
2000; Felski 2000; Ashman and Gibson 2010). 
 
From the findings of the social psychology literature I note above, there 
appears to be general agreement as to the factors pertaining to s-e. The 
first is in feeling competent, with competence being measured in an area 
where the individual seeks to demonstrate that competence. The second 
is in feeling worthy, were the individual can affirmatively ask “Am I a good 
and worthy person?” (see Mruk 2006, pp. 164-169).81 Thus, in relation to 
significant ‘others’ the individual needs to feel that any judgement of their 
competence is genuine, or authentic and in the case of worthiness, 
similarly, any praise they receive needs to be from someone whom they 
feel is being honest and genuine. Thus, false praise would not be 
satisfactory, likewise praise from someone not worthy of respect would be 
vacuous and low in value. 
 
From this we need to assess the extent to which aspirant mobiles with low 
s-e may struggle in specific ways, such as coping with criticism and praise 
and in coping with certain forms of class-oriented relationship. However, 
it is important to note that individuals possessing high levels of s-e do not 
necessarily develop good relationships with others and may become 
mindful of the disbenefits of boastfulness (see Blaine and Crocker 1993, 
 
80 See, for example, Sayer 2005, pp. 169-181, but also the social psychological 
research of Rosenberg 1981, pp. 602-606). 
 
81 It is acknowledged in some areas of psychopathology that an individual’s level 
of self-esteem is established in the psyche at an early stage in life. See for 
example, Fennell (1998, p. 298) and Kurzweil (1989, p. 262). 
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p. 76). Also, in terms of praise it is considered important to avoid 
hyperbole, that is, to avoid simplistic and inflated praise (see Baumeister 
1993, p. 209). 
 
However, it is widely argued that feelings of inadequacy or inferiority can 
begin early in life during primary socialisation. That is, such feelings can 
be internalised at the very time when humans are developing an indelible 
sense of self and place (see for example, Bourdieu 2007, pp. 133-134; 
Emler 2001, p.51; Harter 1993, p. 89). Such feelings of inadequacy in 
early childhood can leave children feeling that they don’t measure up in 
areas that their parents care about. It seems that they never get over it if 
their parents are not proud of them. 
 
Harter (1993) considered the social causes and consequences of low s-e 
in children and adolescents.82 Conceptually, she equates ‘self-esteem’ with 
‘self-worth’ and defines these as “the level of global regard that one has 
for the self as a person” (Harter 1993, p.89). Harter also notes William 
James’s assertion that for the low s-e individual there are two routes to s-
e enhancement, a) to raise one’s level of competence or b) to lower one’s 
aspirations (or expectations) (see Harter 1993, p. 88). Harter suggests 
that there are ‘natural limits’ on the possibilities for affecting competences 
in a range of important domains of life. These include scholastic, athletic, 
social, physical and behavioural domains (Harter 1993, p. 89). However, 
she asserts that standards are generally set high in these areas of life and 
are highly valued. Hence aspirations are also typically quite high in these 
domains, making it difficult for those with feelings of inadequacy to 
confidently dismiss the importance of these areas. Moreover, such 
domains are also valued by others. Examples of this would be parents who 
want their children to succeed academically, or peers who stress the 
importance of social competence or physical appearance. Thus, since it 
becomes important to the self, the lowering of one’s aspirations in these 
 
82 I am taking ‘late’ adolescents here to be considered as ‘early’ aspirants. 
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areas would be difficult to adjust (Harter 1993, p. 93. See also Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001). 
 
Harter also alludes to Cooley’s well-known mirror metaphor of the 
‘looking-glass self’ in which the self is ‘constructed’ by casting a gaze into 
the social mirror to determine the opinions of significant others towards 
the self (Harter 1993, p. 89). Cooley argued that these reflected appraisals 
by others are then incorporated into, that is, internalised by the self. The 
conclusion from this is that if others hold a particular self in high regard 
then the person’s own sense of s-e is likely to be high or raised. The 
converse is also the case. If the person is not held in high regard, then 
their s-e will tend to be lowered or threatened (Harter 1993, p. 89). 
 
Two issues seem to emerge from this. Firstly, this hinges on how the 
individual decides who the significant others are (a judgement of their 
specific value) that are making the judgement or assessment of a given 
self and their level of integrity. Secondly, there may not be any conclusive 
opinions forthcoming from significant others and thus the reflective 
appraisals by others may stall, or remain in the realm of confused 
uncertainty, which may have an equally negative bearing on the self’s level 
of s-e. Such situations may not be that uncommon (Harter 1993, p. 94). 
 
Harter supports William James’s position that relatively low s-e is reported 
by those acknowledging that they ‘lack’ competence or adequacy in 
domains for which they have ambitions (aspirations) for success. She says 
that this concurs with the conclusions of others including Rosenberg (see 
Harter, 1993, p. 91). Assuming this is the case, then what can we conclude 
with specific regard to aspirant mobiles from the working class? Perhaps 
they might self-reflexively decide to redirect their aspirations or focus at 
specific stages during their mobility trajectory in order to avoid a 
deepening sense of failure or insecurity? Or alternatively, they may adjust 
(lower) their expectations to prevent their s-e being undermined. But 
again, the context and the practical expediencies of life may show these 
strategies to be implausible or not entirely workable. Further empirical 
research might clarify these speculations. 
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Furthermore, while Harter may ultimately be right about the ‘natural 
limits’ or ceilings placed on the above-mentioned ‘domains’, there are 
perhaps some weaknesses in this line of thinking. The discussion in 
Chapter 1 relating to determinism and voluntarism shows how social 
deterministic (structural) barriers can impede the actions of aspirant 
mobiles and that they will invariably seek ways of overcoming them. For 
example, it is important to appreciate that developing levels of resilience 
and a ‘can do’ self-belief approach in many of the aforementioned domains 
cited by Harter, may bring step-changes in an aspirant’s former level of 
self-belief and thus a positive shift in the individual’s level of s-e. There 
are many examples of dogged determination and persistence being 
applied to previously perceived insurmountable challenges (see Sennett 
and Cobb 1973; Lawler 2000; Ashman and Gibson 2010; Friedman 2016; 
Wetherell 2005). This is evident at both a personal and social class level. 
But again, it is also important to be aware of the pitfalls of voluntarism 
where the individual might be deluded into thinking and feeling that there 
are no limits whatsoever in overcoming such challenges. In this sense the 
pathway to raising s-e may best be trodden by the aspirant working to 
mitigate insecurities within a range of domains, including those that Harter 
has chosen for her research. 
 
Interestingly, Harter (1993) found that s-e change is most likely to occur 
during times of transition, for example, moving from secondary school to 
college. This, she argues, is because such situations bring changes in a 
person’s perception of their competence, where new developmental tasks 
need to be mastered and where new reference groups will emerge where 
comparisons with self and others are made. Thus, the person will make 
alterations to their hierarchy of aspirations deciding which are most 
important and will become aware of the need to establish new social 
networks, which will engender sources of both approval and disapproval. 
This has obvious parallels with aspirants during their mobile trajectories 
(Friedman 2016; Reay 2013). 
 
Harter (1993, p. 92) also considers the factors militating against s-e 
increasing for adolescents. These include being disadvantaged by lack of 
 139 
natural abilities or attributes in the face of hard social comparison 
standards, or a difficult temperamental style, and/or by a social 
environment composed of significant ‘others’ who are neglecting or 
disapproving. However, while these conclusions may carry some weight 
from a detached quantitative and positivist standpoint, they are largely 
normative in tone. For example, who is deciding which ‘natural abilities’ 
are valid and how are they deemed to be lacking? Furthermore, in a 
Bourdieusian sense, who is being the judge of the ‘strength of attributes’ 
in the given field; who is ‘setting the social standards’ and determining 
what is and is not a ‘difficult temperamental style’?  
 
Some further social psychology-oriented investigations raise other issues 
relating to self-worth and s-e which I briefly include here, before 
summarising this section. According to Rosenberg and Perlin (see Gecas 
and Seff 1989, p. 253), research that has considered the unmediated, 
global relationships between s-e and social background has generally 
found weak associations and sometimes weak and inconsistent results. 
Again, this is surprising, given my earlier discussions on the insecurities, 
negative feelings and emotions that have emerged in comparative 
research on the structural inequalities of class, particularly the effects of 
class domination over the working-class. 
 
In particular, Gecas and Seff’s research sought to measure the effects of 
social class (as measured by occupational prestige and education) on self-
evaluations. They made a distinction between self-efficacy and self-worth 
as dimensions of self-evaluation, upon which s-e is largely based. 
Importantly, they considered the impacts of a) occupational conditions, 
namely, the complexity of the work undertaken, b) the amount of 
autonomy in the job and c) the extent of degrees of routinisation in the 
work, since these appear to have a significant effect on the self-
evaluations of respondents. Gecas and Seff concluded that respondents 
considered the effects of self-efficacy to be stronger on s-e than the effects 
of self-worth (or moral worth). In other words, the above three workplace 
criteria were the basis upon which respondents could derive greater or 
less value to their self-concept, depending on how efficacious or 
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competent they were considered to be (by themselves and by others), in 
the execution of their work. Indeed, as Gecas and Seff point out, it is 
possible for individuals to think of themselves as good (worthy), but at the 
same time to be incompetent persons, or as bad, but highly competent 
(Gecas and Seff, 1989, p. 356). Thus, self-efficacy and self-worth have 
different experiential meanings for individuals. 
 
Their research is relevant here with regard to the mobility trajectories of 
aspirants and how they might position and reconfigure themselves, their 
future working lives and thus their sense of general wellbeing. The self-
concept of the aspirant and by extension their level of s-e can be shown 
to have a significant bearing on their motivation and resilience in dealing 
with the challenges of mobility, particularly in the workplace examples 
alluded to in Chapter 2. As Sayer (2005) states, it is fairly certain that 
many aspirants will make an imperfect and incomplete transition into the 
middle-class (see also Friedman 2016; Mallman 2017). Many will, as it 
were, ‘fall by the wayside’ owing to their particular character attributes 
which may include a low level of resilience and a fragile self-concept owing 
to prior class ‘injuries’ such as a lack of self-efficacy and/or self-worth. 
 
However, it is important to be cautious here. Some aspects of an aspirant’s 
character may indeed impede their class transition or mobility, for 
example, in fitting into an organisation’s culture, say, in the context of a 
job application. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 there are other 
external structural factors of class that can do this, which are not of the 
aspirant’s making. It is not merely the individual characteristics of 
aspirants that can bring about an incomplete and imperfect class 
transition. 
 
Furthermore, the social motivations and early assumptions about people 
with low s-e are examined by Tice (1993). She notes that earlier research 
took the view that if those with high s-e wanted to succeed and to be liked, 
then it must be the case that those with low s-e must want to fail and be 
disliked (Tice 1993, p. 37). She notes however, that this assumption has 
now been largely discarded. Rather, ‘positive goals’ seem to be out of 
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reach of people with low s-e or are not part of their ongoing concerns. 
Their primary aim is to avoid failure, humiliation and rejection by 
deploying strategies of ‘self-protection’ so as to remedy their 
shortcomings. Furthermore, those with low s-e are thought to be more 
likely to believe failure feedback than those with high s-e since it is 
consistent with their cognitive structures and expectations. Thus, those 
with low s-e desire success but expect failure; they lack confidence in their 
abilities and struggle with accepting praise, believing criticism more than 
praise, but still preferring to receive praise. 
 
However, the discussion so far, albeit of relevance, is still some way off 
trying to determine whether the working-class have a greater 
susceptibility to low s-e. Specifically, it remains unclear whether, by logical 
extension, aspirant mobiles from the working-class experience this trait 
disadvantageously when they are in middle-class social and cultural 
settings. Again, very little evidence appears to have surfaced to draw firm 
conclusions on this matter. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is clear that 
aspirants will begin their aspirational journey for a number of reasons and 
in a variety of different contexts and with an array of critical triggers 
specific to their circumstances. Thus, to try to establish a link between the 
level of s-e as a viable precursor and necessary prerequisite to social class 
mobility will be extremely difficult. However, an attempt to do this remains 
crucial, particularly in advance of discussions in the remaining two 
chapters. These consider the classed experiences of inauthenticity 
triggered in social contexts and the anxieties and ontological insecurity 
experienced by aspirant mobiles in seeking to ‘belong’ in unfamiliar 
middle-class environments. 
 
Despite the absence of any firm empirical evidence or proof, there is still 
a possibility that a correlation exists and that there is a profound social-
psychological interplay between class, social mobility and self-esteem. 
However, this is not to say that all working-class people who are upwardly 
mobile have, or have had, issues with low s-e. As confirmed by Gecas and 
Seff (1989), to make such a claim would be bordering on ludicrous 
speculation. But from the previous discussions and cited research there 
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would seem to be, at the very least, a convincing case for the existence 
of proximal indicators. So, what might these indicators be and how might 
they be considered to be barriers to effective mobility and general 
wellbeing? Might it be more relevant to assume that they may be 
emanating specifically from class background rather than isolating some 
independent and individuated factor such as the individual’s unique 
personality or character traits? 
 
Keeping in mind the above findings of Tice (1993) she summarises these 
as follows:  
 
“People with high s-e are those who really endorse very positive 
statements about themselves, claiming to be terrific in many ways. Low s-
e, however, is not the opposite. People with low s-e do not depict 
themselves as worthless, incompetent losers. Rather, they are people who 
are essentially neutral in their self-descriptions, attributing neither 
strongly positive nor strongly negative traits to themselves” (Tice 1993, 
p. 41).  
 
It would seem that they are ‘low’ in a relative sense when compared to 
the highly flattering way that those with high s-e portray themselves. 
Rather, those with low s-e present themselves in a neutral and non-
committal way. They are considered to be those with modest means and 
limited resources who are motivated to protect their sense of self-esteem 
and behave cautiously and in a risk averse way. 
 
While not leaping to make premature conclusions or resort to simplistic 
stereotypes about the personality traits of the upwardly mobile, it is 
interesting what Tice’s own research says about those with low and high 
s-e. Considering the duality of self-protection alongside self-enhancement, 
the psychological concept of self-handicapping raises some interesting 
considerations. Thus, by putting barriers in the way of one’s own success 
it provides both a protective excuse for failure and enhances credit for 
success if, or when, it is realised (Tice 1993, p. 44). She takes two 
examples here. Firstly ‘a lack of practice in some activity’ and secondly ‘a 
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non-verbal intelligence test’. In both tests the results were the same. Low 
s-e people self-handicapped when the situation was structured so that it 
provided protection from the esteem-threatening implications of failure 
but did not enhance success. Conversely, those with high s-e were more 
likely to self-handicap if the situation was structured so that self-
handicapping enhanced credit for success but did not protect against 
failure (Tice 1993, p. 46). Tice also examines how people respond to self-
presentational demands as a function of their level of self-esteem. She 
concludes that it is relatively difficult for people with low s-e to adopt either 
a self-enhancing, or self-derogating style of presenting themselves, 
having to invest more of their cognitive resources in managing their self-
presentation. 
 
Citing Hutton, Tice argues that without a well-defined self-concept low s-
e people appear to find it more difficult to process and recall what they 
say about themselves (Tice 1993, p. 48). Tice notes that Hutton’s research 
contradicts a view of low s-e people as habitual self-derogators. She 
suggests that this supports the view that low s-e people lack a firm self-
concept and find it difficult to present themselves in either a strongly 
positive or negative fashion. Conversely, people with high s-e appear to 
be habitual self-enhancers, where boasting comes easily and natural to 
them and even modest self-derogation is apparently more difficult for 
them (Tice 1993, p. 48; Blaine and Crocker 1993, p. 76). 
 
From Trice’s research some speculative inferences might be made about 
the social capabilities of people manifesting high or low s-e. Firstly, it 
seems that in some respects high s-e people appear to be (already) ‘ahead 
of the game’ (see also Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). They think 
themselves to be good at most things; they want to be recognised by 
others for their fine qualities and want to achieve outstanding, exceptional 
things (Tice 1993, p. 50). But again, we cannot conclude from this that 
aspirant mobiles in particular have, or are deficient in, these character 
attributes and thus have high or low s-e because of these character 
dispositions. However, these conclusions by Tice do appear to resonate 
with Calarco’s observations that I discussed earlier of working-class boys 
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in the classroom not getting or gaining from the attention of their 
teacher.83 
 
On the other hand, low s-e people are neither pathetic self-haters, nor 
reckless nothing-to-lose self-enhancers. Instead they would appear to be 
cautious, uncertain people who desire success, but fear failure. The fear 
often outweighs the desire, hence the element of self-protection in their 
self-esteem profile. They tend to design coping strategies to protect 
themselves from the dangers of failure, social rejection and other 
humiliations (Tice 1993, p. 50). But again, we cannot easily determine 
from this the extent of low s-e among aspirant mobiles without 
undertaking further appropriate primary research. 
 
As shown in the previous section, some of these characteristics feature 
strongly in sociological discussions and accounts of the emotions and 
sentiments experienced by dominated groups in classed society. It is clear 
from Tice’s work and that of others cited here, that low s-e is not 
equivalent to self-loathing, rather, as indicated above, people with low s-
e can ‘manage’ such feelings, although their core self-concept may not 
embrace sufficient resilience for such ‘vulnerabilities’ to be eliminated 
totally from the psyche. Furthermore, we need to appreciate that those 
who are upwardly mobile from the working-class, while perhaps having 
low levels of self-esteem and even being deficient in other traits, such as 
self-confidence, are not without these altogether, and as such they can 
manage, with sufficient self-efficacy, to live a wholesome life. 
 
3.4 Personal vignettes 
In this section my personal accounts seek to resonate with aspirants’ 
emotional states during mobility and in the shifts in class position and 
identify. Examples of how self-esteem can be undermined or strengthened 
are provided and illustrate the significance of emotionality in working-class 
aspirational endeavour. These accounts are retrospective in recalling past 
 
83 See Calarco (2011) mentioned in the follow-on notes to my Vignette 1.2 in 
Chapter 1. Also, research by Stahl (2014, 2015); Bourdieu (2009). 
 145 
events in my life. The reader is asked to consider the spirit in which these 




This account of the last days in my primary school is poignant in 
underlining the critical impact of educational policy at the time. In the light 
of this, did I have a sense of my limitations? If so, were these likely to 
shift over time, or were they being set forever at this critical moment? 
Would this mean exclusion from material goods, others or places 
(Bourdieu 1984) as a result of the 11-plus, a watershed moment? 
 
On reflection, the 11-plus examination was a life-affecting change 
mechanism and a socio-cultural crossroads for all children at that time 
(the late 1950s). As such, it was also an arbitrary selector which, perhaps 
unwittingly, significantly tested the self-esteem of children from working-
class communities. For those who ‘passed’ this examination it was a huge 
step in their lives and a boost to their self-esteem and sense of wellbeing. 
However, for those who didn’t pass, it was, at least in own my experience, 
belittling and diminishing to one’s sense of self-worth. But I think these 
feelings were often suppressed, deflected, or hidden from view most of 
the time. You couldn’t easily, or openly broadcast sentiments of this nature 
to your peers. The street culture in my neighbourhood could be 
characterised as ‘pushy’ and loud-mouthed, so you just had to smile 
through the disappointment and feeling of failure and ‘get on with it’. 
 
Much has been written about the 11+ examination and the similar 
intelligence test, two years later, called the ‘13-plus’. As socio-political 
educational policies and devices their impact was huge. They were 
significant levellers and determinants of life chances. If you failed to pass, 
you were destined for a dump school were the underlying ethos and 
message was, in effect: “You are not considered to be intelligent. The test 
proves this. So, we will not deploy resources to help you to become so”. 
This quotation is my own and summarises my interpretation of educational 
policy and practice at the time. 
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At a neighbourhood and street level I can’t recall there being much 
competitive behaviour relating to the 11-plus results, although no doubt 
the parents of those who’d passed and those who hadn’t would have been 
thinking and talking about the consequences for their child. But at street 
level we all carried on playing in the usual ways and doing the usual 
activities. My friends and my enemies were still as before. But I think it 
must have been a process of gradual separation and distinction as we all 
set off to attend our respective schools. Our school days were spent 
differently from then on. So, when we met up in the evenings or weekends 
around the ages of 12 or 13 (in 1960) I can’t recall talking about our 
respective school time, although I’m sure we must have done. The facts 
were that those who’d passed the 11, or later 13-plus would be racing 
ahead at their Grammar or Technical schools. I, and those who hadn’t, 
were not really able to closely compare the different curricula and regimes. 
Although I’m sure the odd comment was made to demonstrate who was 
ahead and who was behind, or who was working at a higher or lower level 
or standard in the respective schools. 
 
In terms of the main discussion in this chapter, on the relationship 
between class and self-esteem, I can only speculate from a now fading 
memory. Who, among those who’d failed the 11-plus, and who already 
had low s-e, would have had this reinforced as a result? Presumably, those 
who had failed and who already had high s-e would have been negatively 
affected by this social (class) signifier? Similarly, who among those who 
had passed and had had low self-esteem were reassured by their success 
and had felt much better about themselves and experienced a lifting of 
their self-esteem? And who among those who had passed and who already 
had high self-esteem, would have had their sense of self maintained or 
raised further, even becoming more ostentatiously boastful? The empirical 
educational research of the day may well have answered such questions. 
 
But I’m sure in my case that I had internalised a sense of low self-worth, 
and my self-confidence would have remained low. At that time, I was not 
going to suffer from what Sennett refers to as ‘status anxiety’ or ‘cultural 
dislocation’ (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p.29). But perhaps some of those 
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from my neighbourhood who had passed this examination would feel this, 
once they entered the gates of the Grammar or Technical School? I cite 
and discuss examples of these anxieties from the literature later in the 
thesis (Chapter 5, Section 5.3). However, I had already internalised 
another kind of anxiety, of having been left behind in the post-war baby-
boom scramble for the best careers and jobs. 
 
This account of an emerging sense of failure and the resulting sense of 
self-value, or lack of it, speaks for itself. I therefore continue with a further 
account during a similar time period, the early 1960’s in Liverpool. 
 
Vignette 3.2 
My earliest period in the world of work was at once exciting, because it 
was new, but also a leveller, insofar as I was not really sure whether I was 
cut out for the type of work I had chosen.  
 
On leaving school with minimal academic qualifications I suppose, like 
many others, I was not really sure what I wanted to do with my life. In 
my own case, this sense of a lack of firm direction seemed to link with a 
fragile sense of self and fluctuating levels of self-esteem. This has 
continued up until the present day. My character and temperament were 
such that I always wanted to have a greater self-belief and an inner 
strength to be able to ‘take the knocks’ and to be more resilient. Becoming 
an apprentice motor mechanic thrust me into a manual trade with its 
culture of hard graft and often harsh working conditions. Like many 
manual trades this was physically demanding and employed mostly people 
from the working-class. Certainly, being able to ‘rough it’ went with the 
territory! 
 
I recall my sense of self at the time and my level of self-worth alongside 
my ability and competences in motor mechanics work. Although hardly 
representative in a research sense, this seems to validate the discussion 
relating to links between self-esteem and competence as discussed in the 
chapter. This work certainly contrasted sharply my later move into college 
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and university life and the conscious desire to ‘get on” and finding more 
fulfilling employment.  
 
My early brushes with the middle-class were similar in some ways, but in 
other ways different, to those cited in the secondary sources in the thesis. 
For example, I did have feelings of academic inadequacy and 
incompetence because I had not developed (and still don’t have) some of 
the vitally important skills needed to succeed academically, such as speed 
reading, spelling certain words and touch-typing. At various times over 
the years the lack of these skills has sparked emotions such as frustration 
and self-criticism. My reading ability has always been a handicap. I can 
recall instances where I was asked to read aloud in the junior school 
classroom. I would stumble over the words and feel the shame of this 
ineptitude, along with the playful rebuke of my classmates, and the mild 
despair of the teacher. Many years later when I was working as an 
academic in higher education I often experienced feelings of uncertainty 
and of not fulfilling my role. At times I suffered from ‘imposter syndrome’ 
and feeling out of place. But I was never criticised for my work. Very 
strange.  
 
The research I have used in the chapter forms part of an ongoing curiosity 
with the personality and how it is formed. That is, the processes of 
internalisation as discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5 and Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5. These processes would seem to start at a very early age, but 
the formulation process is complex as the discussion indicates. 
 
Vignette 3.3 
Here I recount my continuing disillusionment with working in the motor 
trade with its harsh working conditions and ‘macho’ work culture. In 
reflective hindsight these experiences proved useful, but they were 
challenging and soul-destroying at times. 
 
During the first ten years of my working life from 1963 to 1973, I 
experienced a number of humiliating moments when my self-esteem 
reached rock bottom, as the account below will reveal. I certainly harbour 
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resentments and have some buried anger about my lack of confidence, 
and about the poor direction, support and guidance I received in some of 
the garages I worked in as an apprentice. But I also recall that I struggled 
to acquire the practical know-how (savvy) that was needed to succeed in 
the motor trade. I recall the macho culture in some of the garages in which 
I’d worked and the risky environment in terms of health and safety. 
 
I recall the working conditions in one particular garage I briefly worked in 
for eight months. It was a meat haulage company in Liverpool, where the 
foreman chose to blatantly bully me. He just couldn’t take to me. I was 
working much of the time outside, sometimes in freezing temperatures 
maintaining large diesel-engined meat haulage wagons using poorly 
maintained equipment. It was near the end of my time working as a motor 
mechanic. Consequently, it was not a job I was going to be doing for long. 
By then, I knew I’d had enough, with the bullying foreman and rats 
crawling around in the wagon park looking for meat scraps! I recall on one 
occasion I was lying on my back on a flimsy-castored trolley underneath 
a wagon removing a differential gear unit, when suddenly a large rat ran 
past inches away from my face!  The work was physically demanding, and 
the atmosphere was intimidating. I was very upset with my lot at the time. 
My self-confidence had reached rock bottom and I remember thinking one 
night on my way home, that I had to move on. I would prove to myself 
that I could do better than that. Later on, I worked as an insurance agent 
where the sales staff were mostly nice middle-class people, although I’m 
not saying that’s why they were nice! 
 
So perhaps those crest-fallen moments were a test of some kind. Perhaps, 
unwittingly I was reflexively engaging with my embodied self and 
becoming increasingly determined to ‘break through’ into something 
different. Perhaps too, I was preparing to build resilience and self-reliance 
for a more certain educational environment and able to make adjustments 
or ‘habitus shifts’ in my embodied self. 
 
Retrospectively, I think this shift away from garage work into college also 
raised some social class issues and questions of selfhood which I was 
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unable to answer until later in my thirties. By this time, I was not a typical 
18+ student. I was a mature 23-year-old. Except, perhaps, I was still not 
that mature and as grounded as I perhaps might have been. However, the 
experience was that I was thrown together with similar mature students 
who had, like me, and for a number of reasons, not followed the normal 
educational pathway. Like me, many had worked in jobs that did not suit 
them and some I recall were women who had started families, perhaps 
too early, like I had done. Some people were more assured than others, 
but the mere fact we were there at all showed that we were looking for 
new directions. 
 
I recall these events vividly, even though fifty years have now passed. So 
much time, so much history, so much striving, so much buried habituated 
embodiment (habitus) has been consolidated in the construction of my 
psyche. Thinking of Bourdieu (1984), perhaps my ‘bodily hexis’ is now 
unlikely to change very much in this later stage of life. 
 
3.5 Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have discussed aspirants’ sentiments, emotions and 
perceptions of self during mobility and class transition. This provides an 
important linkage to earlier discussions on the habitus, reflexivity and the 
structural barriers to class transition that many aspirants are shown to 
encounter. Furthermore, by evoking the feelings experienced in 
challenging periods of class transition it provides an essential link to the 
emotional realm in the psychic landscape of class. Issues of habitus 
splitting, and the emotional pressures of class severance and class 
adaptation and adoption are key areas of concern which have been 
illustrated. The forthcoming chapters pursue the aspirant’s interiority 
further, in other key areas. 
 
The discussion has focused particularly on levels of self-esteem as an 
indicator of an embodied self and class identity in the context of 
aspirational endeavour and social mobility. This is principally because, as 
a key area of the aspirant’s psychical interiority it can be a measure of 
how well or badly aspirants might cope when functioning in middle-class 
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social and cultural settings. The rationale behind this approach stems from 
the research sources I have used in earlier chapters and primarily my use 
of Bourdieu’s concepts. These convincingly reveal the nature of class 
inequalities, ambivalences and contradictions during social mobility. 
However, from other secondary sources I have used in this chapter, such 
as Baumeister (1993), Harter (1993) and Tice (1993) it would appear that 
the correlation between social class, self-esteem and self-worth is weak 
and inconclusive. Furthermore, there appears to be a dearth of qualitative 
research offering firm conclusions regarding any links between the 
experiences of aspirant mobiles during class transition and their levels of 
self-worth or self-esteem. More significantly, the research focus on levels 
of self-esteem suggests that raising levels of self-esteem will not 
necessarily, of itself, ease the pathways of class transition or, more widely, 
reduce class inequalities. 
 
Nevertheless, I conclude that the research findings regarding self-worth 
do play a significant part, albeit perhaps tentative, in an understanding of 
class mobility. This is accentuated by much of the secondary citations I 
have drawn upon so far. Significantly, the work of Sennett and Cobb 
(1973), Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1994, 2009), Friedman (2016), Calarco 
(2011) and Mallman (2017) Lawler (2000) among others, help in 
confirming this position. These emphasise the insecurities and 
ambivalences that arise when subtle and nuanced forms of class 
domination are experienced by aspirant mobiles. Bourdieu’s concepts of 
misrecognition and symbolic domination further indicate how the 
aspirant’s sense of self-worth and resilience can be tested when such 
forms of class domination are experienced in middle-class social and 
cultural settings. The unprepared, conflicted and confused habitus will 
encounter assaults of this kind, manifest in shame and embarrassment for 
many working-class mobiles, and the dismissiveness and contempt, even 
disgust, from their middle-class counterparts (Lawler, 2005). The 
morphing into middle-class ways of being may require aspirants to 
contemplate the development of inner strengths in the face of cultural and 
social class nuances and refinements. These can be difficult to rationalise, 
justify and cultivate, often putting aspirant mobiles on the ‘back foot’, 
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thereby further reinforcing class differences, ambivalences and feelings of 
domination. 
 
The final section of the chapter has considered the incidence of low self-
esteem during mobility trajectories and has provided some further 
personal accounts of relevance to the thrust of the chapter. The following 
two chapters explore further an understanding of the habitus; the self-
other relationship and the impacts of mobility and class transition. Chapter 
4 examines aspirant experiences of inauthenticity and how the tendency 
to mimic the middle-class can be conceptualised as an inability to maintain 
a ‘familiar’ sense of self during the mobility trajectory. 
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Chapter 4. Aspirants’ experiences of inauthenticity, changing 
identity and ‘becoming’ middle-class.  
 
4.1 Introduction. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I show how aspirants are able to engage in class 
transition through a reflexive habitus (Bourdieu 2005; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2007; Mallman 2017; Friedman 2016, Holmes 2010; Brownlie 
2011; Burkitt 2012; Elder-Vass 2007; Sweetman 2003; Reay 2015). 
However, I also demonstrate how aspirants can psychically and 
emotionally struggle to manage and often mismanage, the ambivalences, 
contradictions and insecurities that arise within the self, as a result of 
social class mobility. Thus, in principle, this process of class transition may 
either be achievable, or it can also be shown to be ontologically and 
psychologically destabilising.84 
 
However, I want to consider class transition through the conceptual lens 
of aspirants’ feelings towards and sense of authenticity or inauthenticity. 
By this I mean that aspirant mobiles can experience and try to adopt and 
internalise middle-class mores and ways of being which can bring 
psychical challenges. The reason for taking this approach is to show that 
the phenomenon of class transition does not merely bring shifts in a sense 
of class identity and potential changes in the self. Complex though these 
are, it can also bring internal conflicts in trying to adjust the self to, for 
example, those unfamiliar social class interactions. If the aspirant is 
struggling to retain a balanced perspective in such exchanges the cultural 
gulf that is created can bring a sense of being ontologically insecure. Also, 
a sense of loss (or lack) of ‘belonging’ can emerge, thereby affecting that 
‘familiar’ sense of class and self, thus creating (and projecting) a 
potentially false, fraudulent or unreal sense of self. This sense of loss and 
an unhinging of the self was identified in Chapters 2 and 3 when discussing 
the splitting (hysteresis) of the habitus during class transition (Bourdieu 
1977, 1990, 2005; Friedman 2016, p. 132). In Chapter 5, I also examine 
 
84 I provide a critique of ontological insecurity with regard to social class transition 
in Chapter 5. 
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this sense of a conflicted self in the ontological anxieties which can be 
deeply challenging for many aspirants, thereby creating further ‘injuries’ 
within what Diane Reay refers to as the aspirant’s ‘psychic landscape of 
class’ (see Reay 2005; Allen 2013). 
 
My discussion of self-esteem and self-worth in Chapter 3, indicates how 
this process of class transition can generate insecurities through the ways 
in which aspirants are structurally determined within an ethos of 
meritocracy. In being historically class ‘placed’ and then in breaking 
through the middle-class social and cultural barrier, aspirant mobiles face 
the prospect of disruptions to their familiar selves and their ‘used-to’ ways 
of being. Unfamiliar social and cultural settings can unsettle habitual 
patterns of thinking, feeling and being (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986, 1990). 
Moreover, I argue that this sense of feeling out of place can bring an 
existential dimension. Aspirants mobiles can feel out of their comfort zone; 
a ‘fish out of water’; experiencing an ‘in-betweeness’, with a foot in both 
camps, but not fully in either; perhaps estranged from their familiar ways 
of being and practice. They are in a state of discomfiture from the 
normative expectations and practices of their newly found middle-class 
peers. This was noted in Chapter 3 in Friedman’s (2016) mention of a 
habitus clive’. Thus, aspirants are, in effect, set adrift in seeking a renewed 
sense of self and place. No longer working-class and not yet middle-class. 
 
Thus, in trying to resolve these ambivalences and tensions in the self the 
aspirant behave in an ‘unfamiliar’ fraudulent manner (see Chapman 2015; 
Knights and Clarke 2013 and Reay 2001; Sennett and Cobb 1973). This 
lapse in both a firm sense of class identity and self-concept and a variable 
disembodiment of the self can be shown to produce a self-defensive and 
protective disposition by the aspirant. Furthermore, in order to disguise 
this sense of being an emergent middle-class ‘fraud’ the aspirant’s sense 
of authenticity, or familiarity, in a range of contexts is essentially 
compromised. Such inauthentic ways of being and practice are 
understandably ‘cultivated’ in order to gain acceptance and the necessary 
class legitimacy. There is the need and pressure to have a new-found 
sense of belonging that will allow the aspirant to regain a stable identity 
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and a renewed sense of self and being. I explore this theme in this and 
the following chapter while also showing how aspirants’ often experience 
ambivalence and degrees of difficulty in retaining their working-class ties 
and embodiments. This will be brought into focus as they contemplate the 
uncertainties of class transition. I refer to this clinging to a past self as the 
ontological residues of class origins (see Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 213-
214; Friedman 2016, pp. 136-137). 
 
I also noted in the earlier chapters that this process of class transition may 
vary in form and experience. Trajectories may be temporary, prolonged, 
mild or severe. There may be peaks, troughs and plateaux along the way. 
However, as a process mobility trajectories need to be viewed as 
profoundly and ontologically complex, no matter whether the mobility 
trajectory is short or long range.85 Thus, where the self is destabilised it 
can also be shown how and why the aspirant will experience this kind of 
inauthenticity and an accompanying existential challenge to their once 
familiar sense of self. 
 
In cases and contexts where this is manifest, what forms might this sense 
of inauthenticity take? How might aspirant mobiles go about reconciling 
identity conflicts, experienced as a sense of unfamiliarity and falsehood? 
Also, how might they contend with the external perceptions and 
judgements of and by classed others? Here therefore, I want to explore 
the context and nature of feeling out of step with oneself in the specific 
field of class and the ways in which a reflexive habitus might cope with a 
destabilised identity and manage such challenges. 
 
The chapter is therefore set out in four parts. Firstly, I consider the value 
of an existential sociology perspective on the authenticity/inauthenticity 
duality in the context of class transition, class ‘belonging’ and identity. 
However, given the magnitude of literature on existentialist thought; the 
 
85 These terms ‘short’ or ‘long’-range trajectories were referenced and defined in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2. Also, in the case of short-term trajectories aspirant 
mobiles may not make the transition to a middle-class lifestyle and thus may 
retain working class social and cultural mores. 
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importance of authenticity as a prominent element of that philosophy; the 
high level of disagreement and controversy regarding the viability of 
authenticity in other branches of social theory, for example in Social 
Constructionism, I impose some necessary limitations on the discussion.86 
Secondly, I contextualise the authenticity/inauthenticity duality within the 
debate on social class, aspiration, mobility and identity. Thirdly, I show 
how a sense of fraudulence and internalised conflict is evident in the 
mobility of the aspirant. Finally, I provide some further empirical research 
examples of where aspirants experience threats to a sense of self and 
identity as a result of the duality in the context of class and in the specific 
form I am using authenticity/inauthenticity. A concluding section draws 
together and summarise these lines of exploration. 
 
4.2 An existential sociology perspective on inauthenticity in the 
context of class transition and self-identity.87 
Why might an existential sociology approach be pertinent when 
considering the experiences of aspirant mobiles? In some respects, this 
choice of approach is rather arbitrary since the authenticity/inauthenticity 
duality is in fact one of the key components of that branch of sociology 
and certainly of the philosophy itself. However, more importantly, the 
ontological theme of ‘being in the world’, or making one’s way in the world, 
particularly in this and the final chapter, lends itself to an exploration of 
the duality from such a perspective. This, in effect, is what the aspirant is 
doing in striving to be centred and to self-actualise. As I indicate earlier in 
the thesis (see Introduction), the crux of discourses on the classed self 
 
86 I am aware that some of the terms I use here are not fully formed. For example, 
the use of this duality of authenticity/inauthenticity are to be seen as 
approximations in trying to describe a sense and feel within, or as part of, an 
experience. The reader is asked to be aware of this. I do not, for example, intend 
these terms to trigger a debate within a philosophy of phenomenology, or for 
them to be treated as such. 
 
87 See the work by Douglas and Johnson (1977); Kotarba and Fontana (1984) 
and Craib (1976) as examples of this sociological approach. 
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and its mobility is in understanding the totality of experience of the 
aspirant in stepping out of one classed world and into another.88 
 
However, my argument here is that this transmutation of the self (and its 
sense of identity) is impossible to consider effectively, without 
appreciating the disruptions to the self or habitus (Bourdieu, 1994, 2005; 
Crossley 2001; Schwartz 1987; Freidman 2016). As discussed earlier, 
such ontological changes can often compound the injuries of class that the 
aspirant can experience (Sennett and Cobb 1973). Therefore, I argue that 
in relation to class, mobility is, in effect, an ontological and existential 
journey as much as it is a social and cultural shift in experiences of class 
identity (see Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 207). Class identity is brought 
into question reflexively by the aspirant within both the social and 
psychical context. The tension between a sense of ‘belonging’ and the 
endorsement or rejection by the middle-class ‘other’, can be said to be the 
aspirant’s ‘weight in the world’ (see Bourdieu, 2009). 
 
As I indicated in Section 4.1, this can leave the aspirant with indelible 
classed residues from their former socialised working-class self. These are 
shown to persist in later life and to cause ontological insecurities (Bourdieu 
1977, 1990; Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 209; Friedman 2016, p. 133). In 
this sense, the position taken here can be considered as structural 
determinist. However, this obviously does not mean that aspirants are in 
some way structurally barred from entry into the middle-class. Such an 
implication would be misleading and counterfactual. Rather, the evidence 
shown here suggests that despite and also because of, the prevailing doxa 
and ‘myth’ of meritocracy, becoming middle-class is only possible on an 
uneven playing field of class differentiation, division and disadvantage. 
Class transition and self-transmutation is likely to be an incomplete, 
conflicted and often distressing process (see Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1994; 
 
88 In this sense it can also be considered from a phenomenological standpoint. 
However, I am not choosing to formally follow this specific philosophical approach 
in the thesis. 
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Calhoun, LiPuma and Postone 1995; Friedman 2016; Savage 2005, 2015; 
Abrahams 2017; Allen 2013; Carbone 2011; Felski 2000; Lawler 2005). 
 
This transition of class boundaries and a transmutation of a classed self 
are, therefore, not without ontological and psychic barriers and difficulties. 
As I have argued in earlier chapters the very class structure ensures the 
persistence and prevalence of these issues for the aspirant self. One such 
personal obstacle is in trying to retain a sense of self that the aspirant can 
existentially and psychically feel at ease and familiar with; that does not 
turn the embodied self into a living falsification of the former self. Here I 
am referring specifically to situations when the aspirant is making 
existential adjustments in order to function and feel comfortable when 
experiencing the socio-cultural mores of the middle-class (see Ashman 
and Gibson 2010; Bourdieu 1994; Brown 2000; Collinson 2003; Knights 
and Clarke 2013). 
 
However, this approach to the idea of an authentic and classed self 
requires some further clarification. As the earlier discussion of the habitus 
shows, the self can be perceived as experientially amorphous and fluid; 
capable, within limits, of reconciling the numerous encounters of life in the 
wake of ‘other’-related influences. This view adheres to the idea of the 
individual having ‘multiple-selves’, or multiple aspects of one self. 
However, I argue that such a position can be incorporated into my 
perspective, since this discussion is not about the construction of the self 
as such, nor about questioning its existence. Such debates are long-
standing and well established in the work of James, Cooley and Mead, (see 
Harter 1993, p. 89). Rather, the focus here is in registering the ‘hidden 
injuries’ of class during transition and how these impair the embodied self 
of the aspirant. It is about examining the incongruous forms that such 
injurious feelings can take and the sense of ‘fraudulence’ that aspirants 
may struggle with, or feel coerced into, in finding a place and space in an 
unfamiliar social and cultural realm of class. 
 
However, I argue that the problem, as I have considered it, is located in 
the threat of the aforementioned psychical disruptions to the habitus, 
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which can conflict with a counter-desire to be at ease with oneself and not 
to have to contend with such pressures during mobility. Indeed, as I 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, some aspirants may question the 
whole raison d’etre of aspiration and mobility but feel caught up in the 
social imperative and dynamic that the meritocratic myth engenders. 
Thus, from this perspective the very idea of social aspiration can become 
an existential threat, if it is not carefully managed (see Sennett and Cobb 
1973). But how does this adhere to a discussion on authenticity with 
regard to upward mobility? Are not the aspirant’s intentions and ambitions 
worthy? While this may be so, it could also be argued that to strive, or to 
aspire, for some of the reasons I stated in Chapter 1, might be considered 
profoundly questionable given their ‘individualistic tenor’. Also, given the 
structural inequalities of social mobility it could be argued that it can 
always be dismissed as ineffectual (see Reay 2013). Such approaches of 
classed life could be seen as being based on somewhat futile or prosaic 
perspectives and goals. This brings to the fore the wider sense of codes 
and modes of living, which are, as I have argued, embedded in prevailing 
norms and values (see Chapter 3 and Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1990; Gillies 
2005). 
 
Therefore, in the discussions so far on upward mobility, it can be argued 
that by adopting middle-class social and cultural practices; by following 
the meritocratic ideal, aspirants are actively engaging in a form of 
contrivance, trying to be someone other than they are (or have been thus 
far). By morphing from a working-class self and its embodied ways and in 
grafting on, or assimilating middle-class ways of being, it can be argued 
that aspirants are participating in their own disingenuous metamorphosis. 
We have seen how a distancing from class origins creates ambiguities and 
that class differences create ambivalence in terms of a sense of 
‘belonging’, even if temporarily and how this might threaten to destabilise 
the psychical security of the aspirant. Essentially, aspirants are seeking a 
better, more appropriate life, in keeping with their shifting expectations. 
They are aware of how the middle-class socio-cultural landscape can offer 
them something more desirous. 
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However, I want to argue here that this kind of aspirational endeavour can 
create, potentially at least, existential insecurities, which I explore more 
fully in Chapter 5. Bourdieu shows how aspirants are striving to get on a 
par with middle-class outlooks, in terms of cultural capital, for example, 
in standards of dress, behaviour and other ‘tastes’ (see Bourdieu, 1984). 
However, does this not suggest, in an existential and sociological sense 
and within the rationale of a class society, that some form of injustice is 
being meted out? Recognising the inherent inequalities that they have 
faced in trying to redress the structural imbalance, aspirants can be shown 
to be profoundly struggling to ‘catch up’ with the middle-class. In adopting 
middle-class ‘ways’ are they also being inauthentic in terms of adhering to 
a ‘true-self’? Or is this self the same self, but with some essential, albeit 
falsely derived intentions? 
 
This line of thinking clearly raises a number of issues. For example, are 
these forms of class adaptation not justifiable given the rhetoric of seeking 
the best life (only life) possible? Why take a critical stance towards 
aspirants for social climbing, given the opportunities for making their lives 
better? The rationale here also assumes a two-class society, whereas 
there are other perspectives that would suggest other class divisions, or 
that these boundaries are in constant flux and that viewing each class as 
homogenous might be inaccurate or dated (see Savage 2015, pp. 23-53 
and Felski 2000, p. 33). 
 
These existential and sociological issues are broached in the following 
sections through a contextualisation of this theoretical discussion and will 
be illustrated with suitable examples from the literature. 
 
4.3 Contextualising ‘inauthenticity’ in class aspiration, mobility 
and identity. 
As I mentioned in Section 4.1, the concept and duality of 
authenticity/inauthenticity is hugely controversial within social theory. For 
this reason, I set boundaries for the forthcoming discussion and in so doing 
bracket out many non-relevant reference points and approaches to the 
treatment of this duality as an area of theoretical discussion. This is 
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primarily because I treat and articulate this duality in a specific theoretical 
and applied manner. 
 
In order to clarify my approach, the paper by Vannini and Franzese (2008) 
is helpful since, as I do, they selectively choose to survey the literature on 
authenticity as a social psychological phenomenon in relation to the self 
and personal identity. In so doing they exclude, as do I, the extensive 
body of literature on the authenticity of cultural objects, such as artistic 
texts and performances, as well as the literature on the authenticity of 
social and situational identity, for example, the authenticity of members 
of sub-cultural groups 89. In addition, they “privilege studies of authenticity 
that make this concept a central, rather than peripheral or accidental 
focus” (Vannini and Franzese 2008, p. 1621). Furthermore, in the 
theoretical literature they limit themselves, as do I, to covering the 
theoretical discussion that has sociological roots, or the explicit potential 
for social research and application. 
 
I also avoid consideration of branches of social theory that dismiss the 
idea of authenticity/inauthenticity as a myth such as that of post-
structuralism which considers the dualism as contingent in nature. For 
example, Lamla notes that “references to some essence of a truthful 
stance towards the subject’s inner self, one’s needs, feelings, motives and 
so on, are often criticised as false consciousness” (Lamla 2009, p. 171). 
However, despite this contention, my approach, in keeping with the 
central theme of this chapter and the thesis as a whole, recognises the 
notion of a sense of falsity or fraudulence when considered in the context 
of the aspirant seeking to re-establish a sense of class identity and 
belonging in transition to and from within the middle-class. 
 
 
89 However, in the case of class, I note that it can be conceived as a socio-cultural 
phenomenon and the distinct characteristics of the different classes, along with 
the hegemony of the middle-class, creates distinctions and differences in the 




Furthermore, as I discussed in Chapter 3, structural domination can bring 
about a sense of low self-regard through a structurally induced inferiority 
(see Section 3.3). I argue that this is based upon a deterministic social 
coercion which can also lead to emotional vulnerabilities for aspirants that 
may not have existed if it wasn’t for this class domination. Consequently, 
I contend that a structural-determinist stance is defensible (see Chapters 
1 and 2) with regard to aspiration and mobility. This will often see the 
aspirant gravitating to ‘inauthentic agency’ and practices through proximal 
relations with middle-class peers and/or superiors. However, this would 
not necessarily be deliberate or even calculated, in the sense of a 
premeditated act of falsity or fraudulence. Rather, aspirants will be largely 
influenced and formally or informally directed by the opinions of middle-
class others, especially those in authority. This raises the prospect of 
aspirants experiencing feelings of deference, awkwardness and anxiety 
and even a tendency towards ingratiation and obsequiousness, when in 
middle-class social and cultural domains (see for example, Akram 2012; 
Ashman and Gibson 2010; Bourdieu 1990, 1994; Neilson 2015). 
 
For example, in terms of a gravitation towards and adherence to the 
dominant social and cultural values and norms, the aspirational pathways 
still involve mobiles having to contend with hierarchical power relations. 
As the examples below suggest, these tend to coerce aspirants into doing 
what significant middle-class ‘others’ do. This, in turn, reinforces feelings 
and thoughts that they have to comply with the expectations of these 
assumed-to-be superior ‘others’ in accordance with those values and 
norms of accepted class practice. In this regard the Bourdieusian stance 
of aspirants having to culturally comply and integrate by learning the ‘rules 
of the game’ in the social fields of class is, again, applicable. This will see 
aspirants facing challenges in the process of ‘finding their feet’ and trying 
to establish themselves in their new middle-class environments (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1984, 1990). In critiquing how working-class cultural practices are 
exposed, these working-class ‘ways of being’ appear not to fit in well with 
middle-class cultural norms. This is highlighted in the work of Skeggs 
(2004); Savage (2015) and Jones (2011). Indeed, they are often shown 
to be embarrassingly and humiliatingly inadequate. The aspirant brings 
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these inadequacies to the table, but desperately needs to sweep them 
under it! It is through these powerful underlying signifiers and messages 
of class domination that aspirants will find class integration challenging 
and will test the strength of their previously formed self-concept (see 
Friedman 2016; Reay 1997a; Rosenberg 1981). 
 
Thus, aspirants are, in a specific sense, a special case, insofar as they may 
experience a conflicted class ambivalence in struggling to grasp these 
middle-class ways of doing and ‘being’. There are ulterior motives in 
accepting and internalising these practices, but nevertheless they need to 
tread carefully to avoid such misplaced and emotionally painful exposure. 
This ambivalence and internal pressure can be viscerally felt, particularly 
in having to reflexively jettison or mask embodied working-class ways of 
behaving and being and having to learn new middle-class ways in order 
to avoid such ontological and social class incongruences. I argue that this 
process and struggle in ‘becoming’ has existential sociological 
implications. Furthermore, the insecurity and anxiety induced by these 
experiences is worthy of further discussion and is, therefore, considered 
further in Chapter 5. 
 
Furthermore, consideration of the authenticity/inauthenticity duality 
necessitates a short discussion, or thematic approach, relating to 
existential sociology with regard to the self and identity. This will consider 
how the notion of a ‘familiar’ self is to be sustained by aspirants during 
class transition and in the transmutation of a classed self. This notion of 
an ‘authentic self’ is, therefore, perceived to be a useful anchor or compass 
in understanding how a realignment of class identity might transpire.90 
 
Furthermore, there is also scope to consider the basis upon which 
aspirants seek self-actualisation as a form of authentication of their full 
potential through upward mobility. Alternatively, there is the opportunity 
 
90 A number of arguments are posited against the idea of an authentic self. These 
prefer to perceive the self as multi-faceted or take the position that there is no 
‘core self’. Rather, the individual functions in a number of guises depending on 
the context and/or responses to the actions and views of others. 
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to widen their horizons through the realisation of hitherto inaccessible 
forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986, 1994). Through this widening of 
knowledge and experience, aspirants might expect to gain greater 
leverage and an enhanced sense of self and of higher self-esteem and 
wellbeing. In this dynamic process, a consideration of authenticity would 
also seem vital in experiencing greater resilience. Similarly, the personal 
validation emanating from, or in spite of, significant class others; the 
legitimation of practice in given social fields; a heightening of self-respect 
and sense of dignity and more respect from others, would also seem to be 
linked to an increasingly grounded and authentic self (see Abrahams 
2017; Bourdieu 2005; Collinson 2003). 
 
However, if, as the above benefits suggest, class transition and a 
transmutation of identity is perceived by aspirant mobiles to be a positive 
and wholesome process and outcome, then the question still stands as to 
how the self and a sense of identity, can be re-configured. This enables 
aspirants to feel they truly ‘belong’ in the middle-class, without this 
displacement and sense of an inauthentic self arising. Furthermore, if 
social mobiles can successfully adopt middle-class norms and practices 
and adapt their previous selves appropriately, will they not then be fully 
and truly middle-class? Or will they merely consider themselves and 
always be considered by middle-class others, to be ‘blow ins’ from another 
class? Will they not be seen as phoney copies of the middle-class; 
perceiving themselves as ‘wannabees’ perhaps, who will never be the 
genuine article? This line of reasoning goes some way to setting the 
parameters for a discussion on authenticity in the context of class 
transition (see Felski 2000; Friedman 2016; Savage 2000, 2005). 
 
The orientation here, therefore, is primarily in the context of ‘self-other’ 
class relations and how, when the discordances of class transition are 
brought to bear on the aspirant, the sense of a ‘familiar self’ is dislodged 
and/or undermined. The aspirant mobile experiences an ‘ontological 
crisis’, for want of a better phrase, through an inability to effectively adapt 
their sense of ‘being’ to the social and cultural mores of the hitherto 
unfamiliar middle-class. The ‘familiar self’, previously known in the 
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aspirant’s working-class life, faces systematic erosion to the point where 
a firm identity is no longer in place and a sense of disorientation is present 
before any re-identification can be formulated. Thus, the essential 
theoretical approach taken here is based on making sense of this idea of 
a shifting or mutable class identity (see Bourdieu 1990; McNay 1999; 
Giddens 1991; Friedman 2016, 2012; Lawler 2005; Reay, Crozier and 
Clayton 2010). 
 
However, the idea that aspirant mobiles prescriptively progress and then 
straightforwardly adapt to the values, tastes, social mores and cultural 
preferences of the middle-class is questionable. Rather, I argue that the 
forms of class transition can be piecemeal, amorphous, unfocused and 
uncertain and thus the trajectories and the attributed experiences of it 
can, at first glance, lack clarity and explanation. The processes of 
transmutation are shown to be far more self-conflicting and troublesome 
for the (dis)embodying self. It is in unpacking these experiences that I 
wish to show how the issue of inauthenticity becomes a central feature of 
identity realignment (see Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 263-271; Savage 
2015, pp. 209-217; Felski 2000; Stahl 2013). 
 
So, what does this say about the ‘true’ motives of aspirants and the nature 
of class disentanglements? In what ways and to what extent, do they 
actually lose, in an ontological sense, the embodied sense of a working-
class self and ‘become’ middle-class in the sense of a new identity? Can 
they in fact develop such a new identity and completely shed their 
working-class ways of being? What are the implications for the self if they 
cannot? What does the empirical research literature reveal about the ways 
in which aspirants describe their sense of self in experiencing class 
transition and a change of class identity? How ‘real’ and ‘true’ and 
complete does this experience feel to them? What are the sociological, 
psychological, emotional and ontological implications for this 
transmutation of the self in class terms? 
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, aspirants in class transition will attempt 
to reflexively make sense of disruptions to their embodied self and, in so 
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doing, seek some form of class re-identification and realignment to 
middle-class mores. Thus, my focus here specifically relates to this in 
terms of the social psychological and psychic tensions that can arise for 
mobiles. The ways in which the aspirant’s durable embodied self might be 
coerced into becoming reflexively adaptive is key here. Moreover, in 
attempting to resolve the ambivalences and the emotional and psychic 
discomforts that may ensue, the ‘social other’ will invariably raise issues 
of authenticity/inauthenticity (see Bourdieu 1977, 1990; also, Archer 
2010; Brownlie 2011; Carbone 2011; Lamla 2009; Reay 2013; Skeggs 
2004; Four thought 2017). 
 
Similarly, as I discussed in Chapter 3, for the purposes of this approach I 
am treating social mobility as a classed phenomenon made up, as it were, 
of a number of quantum steps, stages or events within which questions 
pertaining to this inauthenticity issue come into view 91. For example, I 
am interested in the ways in which the aspirant mobile’s emergent links, 
or proximity with middle-class social and cultural mores might develop or 
stumble in relation to a sense of self. Also, it is important to examine the 
extent to which aspirants are able to move on from, reconcile or perhaps 
abandon, prior working-class practices and mores and how they might 
translate these as a loss of a ‘familiar’ self, but nonetheless, a self that the 
aspirant could still feel at ease with. This would be seen to vary according 
to the aspirant’s particular classed history, habitus and mobility trajectory 
(see Sennett and Cobb 1973; Bourdieu 2007; Lawler 1999; Friedman 
2016). 
 
However, as I mentioned earlier, the reference point here is in 
understanding how aspirants psychically and emotionally experience and 
react to these encounters and how they respond to the ways in which their 
thoughts, feelings and practice are received in the range of middle-class 
 
91 Similarly, according to Bourdieu (see Mallman 2017, p. 21) in his analysis of 
how the habitus might change in early life, the break away from class origins 
(which results from inculcation in formal education) is: ‘simply the last of a long 
series of infinitesimal breaks, the culmination of innumerable differential 
deviations that, in the end, constitute the great shifts in social trajectories’. 
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contexts. As I noted earlier (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3), Cooley showed 
in his account of the ‘looking glass self’ (see Harter 1993, pp. 88-89 and 
p. 99) that our identity is moulded through a ‘mirror of how we see others 
seeing us’. For example, we can ask how the uncertainties and discomforts 
of feeling like a ‘fish out of water’ are experienced. Or, more positively, 
we can consider how the affirmations and reassurances of feeling like a 
‘fish in water’; of ‘belonging’ are experienced in class terms and how they 
might create and reinforce an authentic, or inauthentic sense of being. 
 
For example, Kuhn (2002, p. 117) poses a somewhat extreme existential 
case of this by saying 
 
“if you know that you are in the ‘wrong’ class, you know that therefore you 
are a worthless person”. 
 
However, this is not to argue that it is only class-related contexts where 
such inauthentic sentiments and insecurities can emerge. The implications 
of this were discussed in Chapter 3, with examples of how the threats to 
self-worth and self-esteem are potentially diminishing at the core of one’s 
being. However, as I allude to in my Vignette 3.3, power relations and 
workplace hierarchies can be shown to distort the classed basis of such 
forms of domination. Thus, conveying or displaying the symbolic artefacts 
of class in the wrong setting can not only evoke shame and 
embarrassment, but can also bring a sense of being out of sorts and out 
of place; of feeling unaccepted, unwanted and ultimately, in such settings 
and practice, socially and psychically disoriented. On top of this, there can 
be evidence of the misrecognition and symbolic violence I referred to in 
Chapters 1 and 2 (see Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1994, 2007). This may also 
contribute to a lack of a strong self-concept in selfhood and an 
ontologically troubled sense of reality for the mobile aspirant. The 
important aspect here then, is to consider the factors inducing such 




4.4 Aspirants’ experiences of fraudulence, the ‘imposter 
syndrome’, ‘lack of fit’ and internalised structures. 
In this section I show how the ambivalence and insecurities of class 
transition, discussed so far, affect the responses of aspirants in attempting 
to conform to meritocratic norms. The examples chosen here illustrate and 
expose how and why feelings of social and cultural incongruity can 
emerge. Here, I am not directly concerned with the moral or ethical 
considerations of class inequality, although, of course, these are a crucial 
part of such severances within the self and the hysteresis effect that 
Bourdieu has emphasised (see Friedman 2016, p. 132; also, Sayer 2005). 
Rather, my purpose is to expose and highlight the structural and 
existential consequences of this conformity to meritocracy that social 
mobility discourses often sidestep. I am more concerned here with how 
the underlying feelings of class illegitimacy are reinforced through the 
confused messages conveyed by dominant class signifiers and the 
prevailing doxa (Savage 2015, p.209; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1991). 
 
The following examples are from the education sector. While this has no 
specific significance, it is indicative of a significant portion of qualitative 
research on social mobility emanating from academia. The aspirant’s 
feelings of fraudulence, and thus implicitly a sense of inauthenticity, are 
detected, sometimes indirectly, in discussions of shifting class identities. 
For example, Stanley (see Morley 1997, p. 114) reminds us of the class 
system within academia where working-class students in elite institutions 
evoke ‘hidden injuries’ of class in the form of the most painful and powerful 
feelings of inadequacy and failure (see also Reay 1997b, 2001; Reay and 
Ball 1997; Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2009; Reay Crozier and Clayton 
2010; Lawler 2000). 
 
Morley suggests that such residue(s) of self-doubt and self-blame can lead 
to a belief in one’s own inferiority, worthlessness and powerlessness (See 
also Elder-Vass 2007, p. 334). I would also argue that, in the context of 
upward mobility, such threats to self-affirmation are ontologically 
challenging. Such sentiments have resonance in an existential sociology 
of selfhood that I outline in the thesis Introduction and explore further in 
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Chapter 5. However, I show how such privileges as access to education 
and the cultural and symbolic capital that it requires and promises, have 
been used to divide, isolate and confuse the sense of identity and the 
sense of worth and confident groundedness of many aspirant mobiles. 
 
The assertion here is that class domination is ‘kept alive’ by ensuring social 
distinctions and divisions through a hierarchy of values and, as Trevithick 
states (see Morley 1997, pp. 114-115), the differing class perceptions of 
these, which have become embedded in the aspirant’s consciousness. But 
more specifically, McIntosh uses the concept of ‘feeling like a fraud’ (see 
Morley 1997, p. 115). In this, she argues that hierarchical structures and 
class stratifications inevitably breed feelings of fraudulence and a sense of 
being an imposter in the hallowed halls of the academy. The point here is 
that prevailing academic structures tend to reinforce social class 
hierarchies which, in turn, can evoke potent feelings of self-doubt and the 
fear that someone will discover that “you do not belong” or “you are out 
of your depth” (see also Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Lucey, Melody and 
Walkerdine 2003; Knights and Clarke 2013; Chapman 2015; Loveday 
2015; Reay 1997b). 
 
However, such an awareness of a threat of fraudulence does not 
necessarily, or by default, link the aspirant to feelings or actions that might 
be conceived of as inauthentic. For example, McIntosh suggests that there 
can also be a refusal on the part of the aspirant to collude in such a 
pretence (see Morley 1997, p. 115). Such a refusal would appear to 
expose a kind of ‘self-preservation disguise’ in the upholding of these 
hierarchies and social divisions. It would seem to show the aspirant 
adopting an adherence to an authentic self; a more honourable and ‘true’ 
position. I would also argue that such forms of ‘resistance’ to a sense of 
becoming inauthentic, shows a self that is gravitating to a position of 
integrity and is trying to maintain congruency with its own true self and 
those values.92 Thus, we might conclude here that despite the feelings of 
 
92 Examples showing tensions in this form are provided in the last section of the 
chapter. 
 170 
academic illegitimacy and inadequacy, the working aspirant’s sense of 
feeling like a ‘fish out of water’ is actually shown to be a fish more than 
capable of swimming with, or against, the strongest of tides. 
 
Abrahams’s (2017) research also shows resonances with the above 
examples. Her research of working-class graduate students shows how 
and why they express different sentiments, value interpretations and 
ethical positions in their approach to securing work experience placements 
and future employment when compared to their middle-class graduate 
peers (Abrahams 2017, p. 628). We might conclude from her paper that 
working-class graduates adopted a more honourable and fair-handed 
approach to career progression. However, it also points to issues of 
‘fraudulence’ in the face of unfair disadvantage. Her work examines the 
way in which the middle-class graduates used their parents’ social 
networks as leverage to network more effectively than their peers from 
less affluent backgrounds. However, we can also ask whether the 
approach taken by the working-class graduates was not simply naïve in 
expecting their degree status alone to be enough to move their careers 
forward. Abrahams also indicates that graduates from both social classes 
acknowledged that using outside connections was a kind of ‘cheating’ and 
that it was probably wrong for the middle-class graduates to avail 
themselves of this class advantage to secure work experience placements 
employment. However, the question here is whether the ‘expedient’ 
approach adopted by the more privileged middle-class graduates was 
actually dishonourable or in any way fraudulent. 
 
Abrahams argues that the middle-class within academia set the rules in 
this social and cultural field (Abrahams 2017, p. 631; see also Bourdieu 
1977, 1986, 1990; Loveday 2015; Reay 2001; Reay, Crozier and Clayton 
2010; Stahl 2013, 2016). Therefore, she argues, middle-class students 
are likely to possess a greater awareness of the subtlety of these rules; to 
keep up with the changing nature and nuanced interpretation of these 
rules and to more effectively use this cultural capital. Also, they can take 
as given the cultural advantage that can be gained by such agency. Thus, 
while the working-class students in the sample might have been thinking 
 171 
“I don’t really belong here”, or more relevantly, “I don’t possess these 
kinds of social connections”, their sense is of a world not made for them 
(Abrahams 2017, p. 632). 
 
Meanwhile, the middle-class graduates whose parents are ‘well connected’ 
might argue that such ‘tactical nepotism’ is merely an expression of 
legitimately ‘playing the game’ and is not really cheating as such (see 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007, pp. 98 and 118). The fact that the working-
class graduates’ responses suggest that they wanted to feel they achieved 
a degree ‘on their own merits’ says much about their sense of an authentic 
selfhood. Of course, the middle-class students have also graduated. 
However, Abrahams concludes that the working-class graduate had a 
stronger need to ‘prove it’ to themselves and that accepting help from 
wherever or whoever, in climbing the occupational ladder, would ‘devalue’ 
them and their achievements. This eagerness to prove their worthiness 
and honour relates to a cultivated disposition, an inscribed embodiment of 
entitlement, in the schemes of thought, as indicated by Bourdieu (1977, 
p. 15; Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 25-30). 
 
However, attempts by these working-class graduates to understand and 
use a system ‘not of their making’ brings issues of authenticity and the 
sense-of-self to the fore in the field of class. Here, honour and integrity 
might be interpreted as naïve foolhardiness where, somehow, they have 
not grasped, or at least not appreciated enough, the full extent of their 
relative class disadvantage and how they can become the butt, or the 
victims of systemic inequality. Abrahams’s use of the term ‘honour’ counts 
for little when pitted against this middle-class expediency and access to 
greater degrees of symbolic capital. It shows how middle-class graduates 
have the inside track in the race to the top, in employment prospects. It 
also shows how any justification they have for their pragmatism offers 
greater cache than the (academic) integrity shown by the working-class 
graduates (cf. Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 79-90; Reay 2013). 
 
For surely, as Jones argues, the working-class is repeatedly shown to 
struggle in a ‘rigged society’ where you can only aspire to something if 
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you know it and fully understand its nuances (Jones 2011, p. 175). 
Retaining a sense of a solid, grounded and secure self-identity is clearly 
difficult when things don’t feel genuinely accessible or fairly offered. A 
persistent sense of an ‘unequal reality’ about or around oneself, in terms 
of place and social field, can create anxieties for aspirants which I consider 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Abrahams questions further why her working-class graduates find this 
‘elitist’ networking by their middle-class counterparts so dishonourable. 
She suggests that this is because they “have more to loose and have 
further to fall” (Abrahams 2017, p. 633) and that they do not feel a sense 
of entitlement in being able to exist and compete in the middle-class field 
that they were venturing into (Abrahams 2017, p. 632). Furthermore, she 
suggests that they feel their success in the labour market must be 
attributable to their own work ethic and commitment; that they have had 
to fight harder than middle-class students to get where they are. However, 
paradoxically, she concludes that they also need to believe in the construct 
of meritocracy and the worthiness of striving, in order to believe in 
themselves, that they can ‘make it’ in the educational system (Abrahams 
2017, p. 633; Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 27-28). 
 
Again, the inculcation of meritocratic sentiments by the working-class 
graduates can be contrasted with those of the middle-class, who believe 
they have already proved themselves by going to university and are 
functioning on the basis of a more confident ‘sense of entitlement’. Even 
though they don’t wish to gloat about the benefits that their parent’s 
contacts can bring, they do appear to have an awareness of their class 
advantage. They argue this on the basis of the social reality that they find 
themselves in. They recognise that having a degree is no longer enough 
to secure access to the best jobs. They just need a ‘foot in the door’ with 
an influential ‘other’ to contact, since, “if you don’t know anyone then 
there is not much to distinguish you” (Abrahams 2017, p. 634). 
 
This awareness of their class differential and advantage is alarmingly 
transparent in many respects. Thus, while Abrahams’s orientation in her 
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paper is to focus on Bourdieu’s use of the durable habitus, it can also be 
shown how a middle-class habitus “can confidently move in a world where 
the habitus experiences ease, recognition and familiarity” (Abrahams 
2017, p. 634). Compared to the working-class graduate the socialising of 
the middle-class self is a different experience in terms of a taken-for-
granted (doxic) way of being and of making their way in the world.93 Their 
sense of legitimate belonging and an entitled place in orienting the self 
appears to have different parameters, social signifiers and class privileges. 
Thus, by effectively ‘playing the game’ the middle- class habitus can be 
said to be authentic ‘in its own skin’ and it’s being. Given the rationale and 
normative boundaries of the context, is it not therefore, in comparable 
terms at least, being true to itself? 
 
By contrast, working-class graduates are less familiar with the middle-
class social space that characterises, indeed epitomises, academia. It 
would seem that their habitus is not yet fully adapted and that they are 
more insecure about their worthiness to exist in this social field. They are 
also less attuned to the changing nature of ‘the game’. Stretching this 
point further, it could be said that, in a naively tragic way, they see their 
degree status as occupying a bigger space in shaping their opportunities. 
It appears tragic since, by already achieving a degree they have, of course, 
proven themselves. However, the important point here is that in a 
profound sense, and in existential sociology terms, they do not ‘feel’ it, in 
the sense of them being comfortable with their own familiar self-worth and 
being.94 In an ontological sense they already possess an unreal and 
undeserving sense of self. They find themselves, as Abrahams suggests, 
in a different mental area, but they do not appear to fully realise it 
(Abrahams, 2017, p. 633). This is a central part of the working-class 
aspirant’s reality, which I explore further in Chapter 5. 
 
 
93 I use the phrase ‘being in the world’ as a reference point here and particularly 
in Chapter 5, since it is useful in discussing the class ontology of the aspirant. 
 




I continue the discussion a little further here by considering Abrahams’s 
findings and conclusions. This helps in unpacking a number of concerns 
regarding class mobility and inauthenticity in the way I am using the term 
here. Primarily, the working-class graduates in her sample appear to be 
clinging to the ‘falsity’ of meritocratic values which they want to believe 
in. In the respondents’ accounts it is not always clear whether they are 
fully aware of this, or whether there is a kind of double take. That is, they 
recognise this falsification, but choose to, as it were, bury their heads in 
the sand, or rather, turn their heads the other way. It would seem that 
they are adopting a moral stance on the basis of integrity (Abrahams 
2017, p. 633-634). They also appear to be misrecognising their relative 
class position with regard to symbolic capital. However, I must emphasise 
that Abrahams does not actually state this point. I am only inferring this 
conclusion from the accounts of respondents in her paper. But surely, as 
successful working-class graduates, they would be aware of the criticality 
of mobilising whatever capitals they might have at their disposal? 
 
However, Abrahams wonders whether her working-class respondents are 
refusing to accept how social capital is accessed, constructed and 
maintained through mutual exchange and mutual recognition. She argues 
that this is because they seem to intuitively know that they have nothing 
(else) to offer other than their degrees; that they have limited, or no 
exchange power or value; that they are not owed any favours which might 
help them climb the career ladder (Abrahams 2017, p. 632). Furthermore, 
Abrahams suggests that by overriding the nepotism and social (symbolic) 
capital that is accessible to their middle-class counterparts they are 
showing, as noted by Bradley and Ingram, the resilience that they have 
had to demonstrate throughout their lives as they fight to be recognised 
as worthy in society (see Abrahams 2017, p. 636). Their sense of honour 
is part of their class habitus, developed from a dominated position which 
relates to feeling devalued (Skeggs and Loveday 2012) and to whether 
they “feel pride, shame, envy or contentment” (Sayer 2005, p. 22). 
 
This would seem to register the ‘double-bind’ of class aspiration. That is, 
managing a conscious sense of disadvantage juxtaposed to the struggle 
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for recognition, respect, and for a strong sense of self-concept, dignity and 
identity. The fact that some of Abrahams’s middle-class respondents 
indicate that they are only too aware of the advantage their connectedness 
brings, and that some even admit to feeling guilty about it, is doubly 
alarming (Abrahams 2017, p. 630). 
 
However, in terms of who is more authentic in this clamber for further 
capital and job security, perhaps the difference is marginal rather than 
marked? Both groups of graduates are using the resources and talents at 
their disposal. A ‘foot in the door’ as opposed to ‘making it by themselves’ 
shows a tragic realism which seems to airbrush out the question of honour 
or fair play. The sense of an authentic self, based on honour, can be 
attributed to this kind of ‘unassisted self-actualisation’ in meritocratic 
terms. While this would seem undeniably laudable, it would surely only 
bring dividends if they were able to secure comparably favourable forms 
of work experience and later employment, without the ‘connections’ that 
the middle-class graduates had? This is the most compelling aspect of 
class disadvantage. It is infuriating; it generates anger and frustration at 
the glaring and profound injustice of the situation; it makes transparent 
the symbolic domination at play. Again, the working-class graduates’ 
position of disadvantage is misrecognised in the field of play (Bourdieu 
1986, 1990, 1994; also, Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2010; Lawler 2014, p. 
711). 
 
A further example is useful in showing how feelings of fraudulence can 
emerge in the context of shifting class identities. Allen’s (2013) research 
in a highly sought-after performing arts school compares the different pre-
conceived ideas of pupils from different backgrounds. Allen references 
Reay’s work on the ‘psychic landscape of class’ (Allen 2013, p. 764). Reay 
engages with the entanglement of social and psychic practices through 
which class is lived and felt, with particular reference to working-class 
children, who are educationally ‘successful’ or surrounded by generational 
desires for class mobility where failure and judgement looms large (Reay 
2005, p. 917). Allen notes that because of the visual nature of 
performance arts, the idea of ‘fame’ operates as a powerful symbol of 
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success. In this she references Walkerdine with regard to the emerging 
cultural orientation of working-class children and their desire to become 
rich and famous (see Allen 2013, p. 768). Walkerdine says that  
 
“the lure of fame …offers working-class girls the possibility of a talent from 
which they have not automatically been excluded by virtue of their 
supposed lack of intelligence or culture” (see Allen 2013, p. 768). 
 
However, Allen’s respondents felt that the performing arts school’s ethos 
disapproved of such ‘famed-based’ aspirations because it revealed that 
pupils’ who held these aspirations showed a weak ‘feel for the game’. 
Working-class pupils reported that they were being pushed towards more 
esoteric careers, associated with high-cultural genres. They were being 
forced away from naïve thoughts of ‘dream-like’ jobs. Allen speculates as 
to whether the School knew that the girls would not secure such unrealistic 
job goals, but also that these girls were already preconditioned to fail. 
Thus, the pupils’ naivety may show an honest aspirational desire, and of 
the possibilities for their future working life, but that it also marks them 
out as ill-equipped to succeed. The students themselves, even confessed 
to having ‘false illusions’ and were apparently aware of how pretentious 
this ‘lust for fame’ was. One of the girls remarked that “It makes you look 
really shallow” (Allen 2013, p. 769). 
 
Furthermore, according to Burke and McManus (see Allen 2013, p. 769) 
the interview questions put to candidates applying to elite art schools 
reflected a middle-class habitus and cultural capital, and that the 
knowledge of popular culture among working-class applicants was 
misrecognised as ‘lacking’ and improper, resulting in these applicants 
being judged as ‘unsuitable’ (Allen 2013, p. 769). Also, according to 
Flemmin (see Allen 2013, p. 769) it appears necessary to abide by the 
rules of a particular field in order to partake in the practice going on in 




Thus class becomes a matter of ‘getting it right’ in terms of cultural 
knowledge (see Skeggs 2004, p. 54); to show a willingness to transform 
yourself; to be willing and able to play, and live (become immersed in) the 
game; to become a viable, legitimate player; to be willing to reject the 
codified class signifiers misrecognised in the aspirations that were deemed 
to be naïve and fanciful. However, Allen rightly notes that in this ‘showing 
willing’ and recognising the judgements of ‘others’ it is possible to see 
moments of disorientation that characterise the habitus clive’. The entry 
into an unfamiliar field can leave the aspirant uneasily positioned between 
two ways of being and thereby self-questioning the habitus (Allen 2013, 
p. 770). At these moments, ways of being-in-the-world are no longer 
effective. There is a clear ‘lack of fit’, and, I would argue, a sense of a 
‘fraudulent-self’ is evoked where a ‘familiar’ identity is challenged. 
 
As well as raising matters of genuineness and fraudulence with regard to 
identity, these also indicate existential issues for aspirants of all ages and 
across genders which, it is hoped, they would come to recognise through 
self-monitoring and reflexivity. Allen’s study concludes that pupils’ 
aspirations for fame tend to remain and that they are painful and 
incomplete. Thus, the performing art school’s elitist ethos and practices 
produced uncertainty and anxieties for these working-class aspirants with 
regard to how they should exist in the world. These anxieties will be more 
widely considered in the next chapter (see also Reay 2001, 2012; Reay, 
Crozier and Clayton 2009, 2010). 
 
As I showed in Chapter 3, much of classed life for the working-class is a 
search for dignity and respect. This is shown to be constantly under threat 
with the unequal distribution of social and cultural capital which 
symbolically signifies and reinforces social place and position. 
Furthermore, this is shown to affect the individual’s sense of self-worth 
and the desire for an unequivocal sense of belonging. Sennett and Cobb 
(1973, p.58) coin the phrase ‘badges of ability’ noting the conflicting 
effects on the sense of self when their respondents consider what they 
really want to do with their lives. In this the authors adopt an existential 
line of enquiry (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 201 and p. 207). In terms of 
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what might bring aspirant mobiles a better life, they suggest that the 
innermost desires of respondents can be shown to be in conflict with those 
held by their family and peers, or with the wider social or economic 
constraints and normative imperatives. Thus, the ideas of aspiration and 
mobility as a means of escaping from one’s class of origin, may raise other 
issues such as the desire to live a life that was truer to their own sense of 
a worthwhile existence (see Lawler 1999). By being drawn towards, or tied 
to, the expectations of ‘others’ and often ambivalently aligning with the 
wider socio-cultural norms, the self’s sense-of-being can be compromised, 
and inauthentic in conforming to such agency and practice. This is of 
critical importance in terms of an existential sociology stance with regard 
to the wellbeing of the aspirant self. Interestingly, it can also be argued 
that to be effective, class aspiration needs to be focused and goal driven. 
But wanting to better one’s circumstances without actually know how to 
bring this about, and without a valid set of reasons, would appear to be 
one of many reasons why such upward mobility might fail, or remain 
incomplete (see Friedman 2016, p. 140; Mallman 2017, p. 20). 
 
I now move on to cite further examples that help to illustrate the 
significance of this sense of inauthenticity in mobility trajectories. The 
tension-bound situations in which aspirant mobiles might struggle to re-
affirm their identity and to survive and progress in middle-class contexts, 
often brings such questions of selfhood to bear. 
 
4.5 Further critiques of aspirants’ experiences of ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘inauthenticity’. 
A very telling expression of striving to adopt the mores of the middle-
class, while at the same time trying to retain a strong sense of self and 
self-worth, can be shown in the daily lives of aspirant families. This has 
been graphically shown in many accounts in the media, some humorous, 
others less so; some even to the point of being tragic. Some of these 
portrayals show suburban life in the form of ‘keeping up appearances’ in 
displaying (often mistakenly), the perceived middle-class norms of cultural 
practice. These can be shown to be excruciatingly absurd and often 
detrimental to the psyches and lives of those family members trapped in 
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this struggle to be one thing rather than another. In what we might term 
the ‘inauthenticity of style and taste’ the family life of the upwardly mobile 
shows many instances of misplaced adherence to supposedly middle-class 
ways of living (see Savage 2015, p. 210 and Felski 2000). 
 
For example, in keeping with the sentiments of discussed by Felski (2000), 
I suggest that many aspirant parents are under self-imposed pressure and 
often ignore their psychical and emotional needs and those of their 
children. Similarly, they are often shown to be withholding forms of 
affection, and imposing controlling conditions on their children’s freedom. 
These parents appear to be misguidedly fearful of stepping out of the 
perceived and expected norms of practice. They are seen to display 
characteristics of pretentiousness, artificiality and snobbery which, among 
other things, compromises and undermines the possibilities for them to 
demonstrate unconditional love for their offspring (see Felski 2000, p. 37; 
Kuhn 2002). Significantly, such inauthentic displays of class are, 
paradoxically, administered in the name of an authentic middle-class 
lifestyle. 
 
For example, parents may prevent their children from getting dirty in play, 
unless they are involved in ‘legitimate’ leisure pursuits such as rugby, a 
seemingly middle-class sport. These presumed signifiers of middle-class 
modes of practice, such as ensuring that their children are tastefully 
dressed, show the tensions in day-to-day practice in not having the 
necessary economic and cultural capital to actually ‘pull this off’. The 
aspirant family can be shown to be constantly on its guard against putting 
a foot wrong and exposing their ‘true’ working-class identities.95 However, 
as I have argued, such ill-advised cultural practice is structural in form, 
but is also a product of an aspirational clamour, within the rhetoric of 
Individualism and meritocracy. Notwithstanding, it is presented as a 
 
95 For example, in Chapter 3, I cite Felski (2000) in her accounts of the impacts 
of shame in attempting to ‘keep up appearances’ among the lower-middle-class. 
Here, I would suggest that such practices might also be displayed among sections 
of the aspirant working-class. 
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personal, family choice matter, highlighting the embarrassment, 
humiliation and misplaced search for class identity that can spring from it. 
Invariably, the social context is critical in ascertaining the degree of 
latitude for the aspirant in being authentic at any time. For example, 
though strident attempts may be made to disguise the fact, the practice 
of middle-class compliance, or mimicry, can be deeply troubling for the 
reflexive aspirant mobile (Bourdieu 1984, 1994; Allen 2013). This can be 
especially troublesome in the workplace, where not ‘rocking the boat’ 
might be doubled-edged in its consequences. On the one hand, compliance 
and conformity can bring the assurance of acceptance from senior (middle 
class) colleagues. However, such compliance may undermine the aspirant 
mobile’s sense of autonomy and may test the latitude for being able to 
disagree or contest workplace ideas, perspectives or practice, which may, 
or may not be encouraged in a given organisational culture. There are also 
contractual constraints to consider. For example, by ‘speaking their mind’ 
aspirants would need to reflect on the consequences, and much would 
depend on the culture and the structure of the organisation. Egalitarian 
workplace cultures, for example, may not see an individual’s social class 
background as an issue, and transparency in this regard may be liberating 
for the aspirant mobile. Thus, the possibilities for acceptance and a sense 
of belonging will be contingent on the context, and largely on testing the 
water to assess the degree of disadvantage that one’s class background 
might bring (see Ashton and Gibson 2010). 
 
It is also important to note that, historically, the struggles of the working-
class have been proudly fought and achieved much in winning the right to 
vote and to organise for improved working and living conditions. Moreover, 
the idea of social mobility and of becoming middle-class can be seen as a 
‘default process of expediency’ on the basis of securing a ‘better life’ rather 
than having the desire to be ‘classed’ differently. Indeed, it would appear 
that the class system has not been that responsive to the aspirations of 
the upwardly mobile (see Savage 2015, p. 216; Sennett and Cobb 1973; 
Friedman 2016). Such research shows aspirant mobiles frequently 
experiencing a kind of class guilt because had they not played along with 
the meritocratic myth, it would have been problematic for them to 
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rationalise the travails of class transition. As my earlier examples show, 
mobiles can resent themselves in the striving and clamber of social 
climbing. Thus, there is psychical element at play, or at least an effect on 
identity and emotional security, thereby making the process of self-re-
identification potentially challenging. 
 
Other research sources are also relevant here. For example, Savage 
(2005) revisits the Affluent Worker Study by Goldthorpe et al (1969) in 
order to re-analyse working-class identities as they were depicted in that 
original landmark research. Savage’s conclusions are useful here in 
showing the underlying issues of authenticity, or class identity, by focusing 
on what he terms the ‘ordinary’. He suggests that two key processes were 
at work which may not have been emphasised enough by Goldthorpe’s 
researchers at the time. Firstly, during that decade (1960s) of rising 
individualism the working-class respondents in Goldthorpe’s study were 
concerned to define themselves as ‘ordinary’ when comparing themselves 
with what they termed an ‘upper class’. They understood themselves to 
be ‘ordinary’ because they had to ‘make their own living’.96 Second, there 
was a relational contrast being made between the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’. 
The view of many of Goldthorpe’s respondents was that those who did not 
act ‘naturally’ but acted out of ‘social’ considerations were disdained. In 
this, Savage suggests that Goldthorpe’s respondents may have been 
referring to the middle-class. However, it is more likely that they were 
referring to those who act out of ‘false’ or affected social motives. Savage 
argues, that by contrasting themselves in this way, the respondents could 
feel better about their individuality because of its contrast with the actions 
of ‘snobs’ or ‘social climbers’ (see Savage 2005, p. 943). 
 
 
96 The assumption here is that Goldthorpe’s respondents saw these classed 
‘others’ as members of the ‘upper class’ because they did not work, as such and 
thus were not forced to earn a living. Savage could be suggesting here that 
Goldthorpe’s respondents were adopting a ‘workerist’ position in asserting their 
working-class identity. However, it is not entirely clear from Savage’s revisit to 
the Affluent Worker Study that the respondents carried such views in a conscious, 
politicised sense. 
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In another example, Friedman’s respondents intonated issues of 
authenticity in some of their responses regarding their mobility 
trajectories and the reflexive improvisations of their habitus. For example, 
Friedman interviewed the banker James, who accounted for his ‘long-
range’ and smooth trajectory and the extreme scale of this. This 
culminated in him being given a senior management position at the 
backend of his career (Friedman 2016, p. 135). However, Friedman notes 
that James thought that because he knew his institution thoroughly this 
allowed him to maintain a coherent sense of identity while successfully 
adapting to the changing conditions in his occupational field. James 
commented that his colleagues would be likely to regard to him as a 
‘professional Yorkshireman’. This was because he never pretended he was 
anything that he wasn’t. James remarked that even though he had risen 
to a senior position from working-class origins, he was always open about 
his background; he didn’t change his regional accent; he didn’t develop 
any airs or graces or adopt other elitist or classed mannerisms. 
 
While some of these points were inconclusive from Friedman’s first-person 
interview text, the intimation is that in these ways James felt that he had 
retained his authentic, ‘familiar’ classed self. Furthermore, Friedman 
suggests from this extreme, and perhaps very rare example of long-range 
social mobility, that James did not, in fact, break with his earlier classed 
habitus since his slow and steady progress allowed him to gradually ‘get 
a feel for the game’ as he arrived at, and went through, each stage of his 
trajectory. Thus, his primary socialisation and experiences of class were 
retained or ‘held’, and he was able to preserve an authentic sense of his 
background as a working-class Yorkshireman (Friedman 2016, p. 135).97 
 
However, this begs a number of questions in terms of the earlier discussion 
on internalisation and the habitus (Sections 1.5 and 2.5). Why do some 
working-class mobiles change their ‘ways of being’ and identity in class 
transition, while others do not, or not in the same way, or to the same 
 




degree? Again, there can be numerous early life experiences and nuanced 
instances within the individual aspirant’s trajectory that will affect their 
sense of, and reaction to, a changing sense of self. Moreover, when we 
say, ‘ways of being’, this may also mean a number of things. It may be 
because of subtle changes that are made from the influences of significant 
‘others’. For example, in one’s mannerisms, or use of language and local 
dialect, or the development of one’s vocabulary, which are internalised in 
various forms, in the embodied self (habitus). These can be said to occur 
at different rates and degrees over time, depending on the range of the 
mobility trajectory and any interruptions to, dips or peaks, in this 
transformation of selfhood (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007; Bourdieu 
1990).98  
 
However, this says little about other changes in the embodied self, such 
as social, cultural and political attitudes, or attitudes towards the views 
and behaviours of classed others; the changes in one’s temperament as 
middle-class influences begin to sink in (see Vignette 2.1), and old class 
sentiments begin to be questioned or stridently retained on grounds of old 
class loyalties. Thus, when we ask whether we have changed as a result 
of class transition, we can also ask whether we have become less or more 
inclined to retain an authentic, ‘familiar’ sense of self. In which 
‘compartments’ of, or contexts of the self or life have we reflexively 
questioned when and where this authenticity has been abandoned, or 
where it has been fought for and retained, and at what cost? (see for 
example Ashman and Gibson 2010; Bourdieu 2005). 
 
 
98 On a personal note, my local dialect changed (virtually disappeared) or 
dissolved markedly during my class transition. I have no conscious recollection as 
to how or why this happened. However, some of my early life peers made similar 
significant shifts in class mobility but seemed to retain their local dialects. That 
has always been a mystery to me. 
 
However, strangely, when I return to my original home place, my local dialect 
tends to re-emerge within hours! As one of Friedman’s respondents articulated, 
because of this, I could be seem as being inauthentic in trying to give the 
impression (artificially) of being someone I used to be but am not any longer. But 
such an assertion would warrant further investigation. 
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Numerous contextual examples of tests or threats to the ‘familiar’ abound. 
For example, as I discussed in Sections 1.3 and 4.3, aspirants might feel 
inclined to ingratiate themselves in the company of their boss and to curry 
favour; to seek career progression by behaving in a toady manner. But 
another part of them may be saying 
 
“No! You know you shouldn’t be doing that! You are showing a lack of 
integrity and your boss will not respect you for it! You must strive to be 
recognised for your talents, abilities, efforts, commitments, loyalties. 
These will show your true self and self-respect. Remember Cooley’s 
“looking glass” or mirroring effect and reflect on how you need to see how 
others see you”.99 
 
Of course, the aspirant may wait a long time for workplace recognition and 
career progression, or repeatedly fail to understand the subtleties of 
coping and managing in the field of organisational culture and in 
manipulating the ‘rules of the game’. Furthermore, the aspirant’s 
workplace may not be geared to being effective and transparent in 
monitoring and appraising the progress of its employees, and so aspirants 
may find themselves in a career progression stalemate. Thus, behavioural 
responses and outcomes of a classed self-transformation can come in 
many forms. Forms that show, or react to, the unsavoury aspects of 
human nature such as the distancing; the competitiveness; the snobbery 
and condescension; the general demonization of the working-class which 
the aspirant will need to manage effectively (see Jones 2011; Bradley and 
Devadason 2008). Those dispositional traits cited above such as a toady, 
obsequious, ingratiating manner might be attributed to aspirants seeking 
to overcome or disguise their insecurity and their need for acceptance in 
the workplace cultures of the middle-class. Hence once again, the social 
and cultural need for acceptance and recognition can bring inauthentic 
actions and responses to challenges which may be ‘forced’ rather than 
‘natural’ to the character of the aspirant. But then again, as Abrahams 
(2017) shows (see Section 4.4), some will try to stay true to themselves 
 
99 This quotation is a fabrication and my own words entirely. 
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despite the opportunity, albeit limited, of adopting alternative human 
behaviours and strategies. 
 
Friedman (2016) cites a number of further cases which illustrate the 
authenticity issue. For example, his respondent Lee, was from the 
working-class, but had experienced a short-range mobility trajectory. Lee 
also mentioned the term ‘professional’. But unlike the banker James (see 
earlier in this section) he used the term to draw a symbolic boundary 
between himself and other aspirant mobiles whom, he argued, had 
effectively abandoned their ‘roots’ but, significantly, had still tried to 
demonstrate their working-class identity by over-emphasising their local 
accent and local knowledge (Friedman 2016, p. 137). Friedman concludes 
that interviewees like Lee viewed these exaggerated performances of class 
identity as fundamentally inauthentic, and as phoney examples of ‘over-
identification’. They were careful to distance themselves from such 
behaviours, demonstrating how the habitus of such short-range mobility 
carefully guarded against any identity mutation (Friedman 2016, p. 137). 
 
Other cases cited by Friedman show aspirants ‘holding true’ to their class 
origins and upbringing, even to the extent of actively stunting their own 
upward trajectory, often when they had been formally offered career 
enhancement. The discomforts of associating with the snobbery and lack 
of ‘common manners’ of their senior colleagues appeared to be too much 
to accept. Friedman concludes from these examples that the habitus 
functions to protect, psychologically, from the potential dislocation of 
social mobility (Friedman 2016, p. 137). 
 
Such issues of ‘internal conflict’, ambivalence and identity can also emerge 
where, for example, chosen modes of dress may be subtlety judged to be 
inappropriate by one’s middle-class seniors in the workplace or other 
socio-cultural contexts. This is evident in Waskul’s, account of being 
unable to resolve the dilemma of sincere (others’ expectations) and 
authentic (own preferred self-image) (Waskul 2009, p. 53). Getting it 
wrong can be to the detriment of the aspirant’s chances of career 
progression. Such compromising, in being unable to choose what to wear, 
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may be interpreted as either a trivial or fundamental issue in an aspirant’s 
daily life. The compromise and the painful contradiction of betrayal of what 
is thought to be the more authentic person are again evident (see also 
Friedman 2016, p. 140). Here too, the external impact of the threat of 
inauthenticity can be compared with the internal feelings of self-doubt. As 
discussed earlier (see Sections 1.7, 2.8 and 3.3), the suspicion of ‘not 
being good enough’; of ‘not meeting the requirements and expectations 
of others’; of ‘not matching up’ reaches deeply and indelibly into the 
aspirant’s psyche. Again, Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic domination holds 
true in these examples and contexts where taste and belonging are 
prevalent (see Bourdieu 1977, 1984 and also Bourdieu and Eagleton 
1992). 
 
In this way, Skeggs (2004) also considers how the ‘entitlement’ of the 
middle-class self is derived in considering the dominating ways in which 
taste is legitimised. Acknowledging Bourdieu (1984) she argues that the 
requisite knowledge is not only about knowing a set of rules but also in 
possessing the logic in order to reproduce them. However, she argues, 
what this assumes is that one group (the middle-class) already has the 
‘right’ culture and that others (the working-class) need to learn it. For 
example, she stresses that it is not just a question of what clothes are to 
be worn, but how they are worn (Skeggs 2004, p. 136). Interestingly, 
Skeggs points out that ‘imposters’ can be spotted because, as the ‘newly 
arrived’, they will unavoidably give away signs of the burden of, or ‘lack 
of’, attainment and incompleteness of their cultural competence (Skeggs 
2004, p. 136). 100  
 
While Skeggs is actually focusing on the Nouveau-riche here, it is not that 
far removed from my concern with upwardly mobile aspirants who will face 
similar scrutiny and, as Skeggs points out, the new arrivals may not yet 
have been able to embody the required and assumed ‘superior’ 
disposition. They do not [yet] know how to ‘get it right’ and are opening 
up a gap between representation and disposition. Furthermore, the accrual 
 
100 I use quotation marks here for emphasis and they are not in the original text. 
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of cultural capital needs to be in the right composition, of the right volume, 
with the right knowledge in the right way (Skeggs 2004, p. 136). Thus, 
there are obvious parallels between Skeggs’s analysis of the ‘aesthetic self’ 
and the authentic, or ‘familiar’ aspirant self that I am considering here. 
 
4.6 Conclusion. 
My focus on the authenticity/inauthenticity duality here is deliberately 
narrow. Its application is used to address the problem of the mobile 
aspirant experiencing ontologically challenging social and cultural 
encounters in middle-class terrains. My reason for using this duality is that 
authenticity in the context of shifting forms of identity, is a major 
component of existential thought, and, as such, an existential sociology 
approach is deemed essential in supporting my argument in such matters 
of the self. A sense of inauthenticity in practice is likely to occur in the 
experiences of aspirant mobiles entering and ‘being in the world’ of the 
middle-class. In Chapter 1, I noted how such experiences are inherent 
within the rationale of mobility, in a meritocratic-oriented class society. 
This approach is in tandem with earlier discussions on class transition and 
how the structural determinants of class can inhibit aspirational goals. 
 
My purpose here is to use the main threads of existential sociology to point 
out how aspirant mobiles’ lives are ontologically challenged in specific 
encounters with the middle-class. Their socialisation through a durable 
habitus, despite reflexive adjustments, often puts them at odds with 
middle-class mores which makes such ‘ways of being’ difficult to 
internalise in attempts to build a sense of classed ‘belonging’. I have 
sought to illustrate therefore, the ontological, psychical and emotional 
costs to aspirants in attempting to, experientially, make sense of these 
inauthentic and ‘unfamiliar’ encounters and to highlight the difficulties 
involved in addressing this ontological instability. 
 
Furthermore, I argue that, given the structural-determinist coercions of 
class differentiation, and the aspirant’s urgency for a re-stabilisation of 
class identity, such inauthenticity is actually defensible on social-structural 
and social-psychological grounds. Such acts of ‘fraudulence’ are shown to 
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arise from inter-class discomforts and anxieties, and an inability to 
contend with the nuanced nature of the ‘rules of the game’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2007). These rules of the cultural field of class are considered 
by Bourdieu as the manifestation of middle-class domination. Owing to the 
pressures imposed on the aspirant to seek both a better (classed) life in 
existential terms and in complying with the prevailing norm of a 
meritocracy, the aspirant is shown to be conflicted by the resulting 
ambivalence, yet is responding rationally, given the inherent structural 
rationale of classed society. 
 
The final chapter considers further the ontological challenges facing 
aspirants by exploring further the concept of ontological insecurity. Thus, 
the working-class aspirant’s experience of the anxieties of selfhood 
requires consideration as a separate topic in the thesis. These are to be 
seen alongside the previous discussions on low self-esteem and the value 
of self, the fracturing of habitus, and the challenges of an inauthentic 
selfhood, as discussed in this, and earlier chapters. 
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Chapter 5. Working-class aspirants’ experiences of ontological 
insecurity and the anxieties of selfhood during class transition. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Aspirational striving for acceptance and belonging can be conceptualised 
as one whereby defence strategies may be adopted by aspirants as a 
protection against emerging class unfamiliarity and vulnerability. As the 
previous chapters have pinpointed, aspirants’ experiences of class 
transition can be shown in terms of threats to the habitus and self, 
particularly in displays of class-related fraudulence and inauthenticity. The 
so called ‘imposter syndrome’ can arise during aspirants’ attempts at 
‘becoming’, and belonging to, or feeling at ease with, the middle-class 
(Chapman 2015). These experiences can also be shown to intensify 
feelings of inadequacy and insecurity which are often disguised by a 
‘masking’ of these feelings in social situations. Thus, in order to avoid 
being exposed and ‘found out’ and in displaying a ‘lack of fit’, inadequacy 
or incompetence, aspirants can develop such coping strategies when 
interacting in middle-class social and cultural contexts. 
 
This can often be seen as requiring the adoption of falsities of selfhood 
and by a ‘splitting’ or a form of compromising of the ‘familiar self’. 
However, this, in turn, can indicate a confused sense of self and class 
identity, with such inner tensions remaining unresolved in the mobility 
trajectory and in the aftermath of the class transition process. These 
psychic effects on the aspirant’s sense of feeling like a ‘fish out of water’ 
have been considered in various interpretations of ontological security and 
insecurity by, among others, Bourdieu (1977, 1984); Friedman (2016), 
Ashman and Gibson (2010); Allen (2013), Holmes (2010); Sennett and 
Cobb (1973) and Skeggs (1997). 
 
These psychical concerns are explored further in this chapter, offering 
evidence of a persistent sense of a ‘conflicted’ self. That is, of feeling a 
sense of an incomplete and/or fragmented social and cultural existence. 
In such class conflicting encounters the aspirant’s sense of place and space 
can be shown to be profoundly unsettled when experiencing this form of 
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transformation; a morphing of the working-class habitus, into a middle-
class self, within a prevailing middle-class social and cultural orthodoxy 
(see Bourdieu 1984, 1990, 1994, 2005; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007). 
This conflicted and disoriented sense of being can be shown to challenge 
not only the aspirant’s continuous sense of an affirmed existence; of a 
social presence from others that avows belonging, but also the difficulties 
in managing the anxieties that can be experienced and which disrupt the 
psyche of the aspirant. There is also evidence to show that such anxieties 
can persist throughout the aspirational process and beyond; which can 
figure strongly in the aftermath of class transitional life. Conceptually, this 
presents the idea of a troubled psychical legacy of aspiration triggered by 
the ‘normative’ nature of mobility. 
 
What is of interest here is how aspirants cope with these anxieties and the 
existential challenges that Lawler (1999 and 2000) refers to as ‘getting 
out and getting away’ and the tensions and psychical imperative that this 
generates.101 We could also add the notion of ‘getting on and up’ as part 
of the class dynamics of this social climbing and striving for betterment. 
This effectively embraces the search for a better life-course, albeit within 
a middle-class orthodoxy, and taken together, forms the basis of 
discussion in this, the final chapter. 
 
In Chapter 4, I discussed the specific challenges involved in a changing 
sense of self and class identity resulting from mobility and class transition. 
I also framed much of that discussion within an existential sociology 
perspective to further explore these challenges. I continue that approach 
here by unpicking the kinds and causes of anxiety that aspirants can be 
shown to experience. In the chapter’s final section, I recall some of my 
own experiences of class-related anxiety that surfaced during my mobility 
trajectory and I attempt to make sense of these experiences by applying 
threads from the theoretical discussion developed in the chapter. Thus, 
this theoretical discussion will focus primarily on ontological insecurity and 
 
101 See also Vignette 3.4. 
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‘existential angst’ as framing concepts, while also bringing into 
consideration the emotionality underpinning these class tensions that can 
arise during such mobility trajectories.102 
 
Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, I take the term ‘ontological’ to 
mean the ‘sense of being’ experienced by working-class aspirants, or the 
emerging ways of being and ‘becoming’, in the specific context of class 
transition. Furthermore, I use ontological insecurity to describe how 
aspirants struggle to make sense of the significant personal and social 
changes of class transition, when contending with a reflexive habitus, and 
how they grapple with the consequent psychical, social and cultural shifts 
in their classed lives. 
 
The chapter is therefore, formed of three main sections. Firstly, I explore 
the sociological and existential relevance of ontological insecurity and the 
contexts in which it can be experienced by working-class aspirants. This 
approach links with the discussions in Chapter 1 on structural inhibitors, 
and shows how, from a selection of specific standpoints, they are linked 
to this existential sociology approach.103 Secondly, I critically identify the 
root causes of class-related anxieties prior to, during and following class 
transition. I show that such class ‘anxieties’ are effectively evaluated using 
an existential sociological approach to such psychical disruptions. Thirdly, 
I provide a selection of relevant examples of aspirants’ experiences of 
anxiety and ontological insecurity and include a selection of personal 
vignettes that illustrate and amplify such experiences. I do not include 
these to claim generalisability or universality of the experiences discussed. 
 
102 In Chapter 3 I chart the experiences of self-esteem and self-worth among 
aspirants. This provides a critique of emotionality and working-class aspirants’ 
perceptions of self and value. 
 
103 In particular, in Chapter 1, I charted the ways in which aspirants struggle 
against the imposing structures of class society; the ways in which such structures 
inhibit opportunities for self-enhancement and thus the realisation of aspirational 
goals. Similarly, the discussion on emotionality, self-esteem and shame in 
Chapter 3, and the classed experiences of fraudulence and inauthenticity in 
Chapter 4, each, in their different ways, illustrates the challenges to the classed 
self that raise profound ontological and existential issues of ‘being’ and ‘striving’ 
in a classed society. 
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Rather, I use them to show that there are a number of notable cases and 
contexts were such experiences can take place. I then summarise the key 
points and reiterate the significance of the discussion. 
 
5.2 Experiences of ontological insecurity and existential angst 
during class transition. 
This section considers an existential sociology perspective on aspirants’ 
experiences of ontological insecurity in the context of class transition. It 
also provides a theoretical backdrop to the more applied, contextual and 
personal examples illustrated later in the chapter. By arguing from an 
existential sociology position, I show how the tensions, anxieties, 
contradictions and expressions of insecurity can emerge and persist during 
and after class transition. However, by considering these psychical 
expressions of insecurity and anxiety, I avoid consideration of mental 
states such as psychosis and other areas of mental illness diagnosed in 
the field of psychiatry, which are outside the current focus.104 Rather, the 
focus here is primarily sociological, while using selected tenets of 
existential thought and social psychology, in an attempt to develop a 
broader account of aspirants’ insecurities and to open up the social and 
cultural contexts of social mobility where these tend to occur. It is not, 
therefore, the intention to consider these issues through a theoretical 
exposition of Existentialism as a philosophy, nor through specific branches 
of Psychology, Psychiatry or Psychotherapy.105 
 
For reasons of brevity therefore, I take the existential sociology view that 
the self is, in and of itself, a ‘becoming’ or continuously emergent entity.106 
 
104 However, see for example, Schwartz (1987); Laing (1974, 1990a, 1990b); for 
a consideration of these central aspects of psychiatry and their social implications. 
 
105 However, see Craib (1976), for example, in linking the disciplines of Sociology 
and Existentialism from the work of Sartre, and from Laing (1990a) in the field of 
existential psychiatry. 
 
106 Here I want to be clear about my use of the concept of ‘becoming’. It is not 
my intention to engage in the established philosophical literature on the ‘self’ and 
‘being’. That would take the discussion outside of the scope of work. But I quote 
Charles Guignon here, who cites Heidegger on the nature of ‘self as: “an unfolding 
‘event’ or ‘happening’ that is so thoroughly enmeshed in a shared lifeworld that 
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Thus a shifting and transforming self is deemed to be an existential reality 
exemplified in the quest to ‘become’ a changed self in realising a better 
existence and life experience than hitherto. Accordingly, aspirants, in 
seeking to be socially mobile, are doing so in the only life that they will 
have and are thus able to live. This, I argue, underlines the imperative of 
many aspirant mobiles as a social group and is the basis of the rationale 
for upward mobility as both an individual and a social enterprise (see 
Knights and Clarke 2013; Ashman and Gibson 2010). 
 
This allows me to argue that the limits of life, the life chances and life 
choices can be shown to be ever present in the aspirant’s psyche (Sennett 
and Cobb 1973, p. 95). For the aspirant this can be seen as the 
experiential and existential basis and momentum at the heart of being 
socially mobile. It also amplifies the urgency underlying the limited 
timescales of a finite life. As a cornerstone of existential thought, it is this 
awareness of finitude that can be shown to trigger a profound exigency 
among many aspirant mobiles to achieve this better life while time 
remains; before it is too late. Indeed, it can be seen as an urgency in 
facing the aforementioned structural barriers, both internal and social, 
that can generate such angst before age and other constraining human 
factors inevitably come into play.107  
 
Earlier chapters of the thesis have considered a number of class-inhibiting 
and structural constraints on aspirational endeavour and mobility.108 
However, from a theoretical standpoint the aspirant’s perceived mind-set 
and sense of a changing identity and existence can be shown to have a 
direct bearing on their intended and actual mobility trajectories. Here, I 
 
there is no way to draw a sharp line between either self and world or self and 
others” (Guignon 2004, p. 120). 
 
107 This position certainly resonates with my life, where I have felt a perpetual 
anxiety of trailing behind and needing to ‘catch up’ with many of my peers who, 
for reasons such as a better start in the education system, appear to have 
progressed sooner in aspects of their lives. 
 
108 See Chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion on structural class barriers and the 
impacts on agency and aspiration. 
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consider the ways in which aspirants react to and feel their way through 
what might be described as an ontological minefield of class transition 
experiences and self-induced change. This is shown in varying degrees of 
resistance, or forms of denial, in the transformation of the aspirant’s being 
and, in the realignment, or re-building of identity. Again, this discussion 
supports my central argument relating to a lingering and embodied 
interiority of self-limiting class disadvantage (see Bourdieu 1994; Sennett 
and Cobb 1973; Abrahams 2017; Allen 2015; Stahl 2014; Lawler 1999; 
Brown 2000; Friedman 2016; Harter 1993). 
 
Evidence also shows how aspirants can display naïve yet honourable 
behaviours in social fields such as higher education, where the dominant 
social and cultural norms and practices of the middle-class are ascendant. 
For example, as I discuss in Chapter 4, Abrahams (2017) reveals how 
working-class graduates found themselves in uncomfortable and 
compromising states of being in recognising the injustice, class advantage 
and the questionable tactics of their middle-class peers in order to secure 
appropriate career opportunities.109 The working-class graduates sensed 
the unfairness in which their middle-class peers could access ‘cultural 
capital’. However, they had no effective means of resolving this class-
related injustice. These aspirants were not only ‘playing the game’ by an 
unrealistic set of rules. They were also experiencing this discomfort, 
despite their academic legitimacy and entitlement to exist and survive on 
equal grounds. However, Abrahams argued that they were choosing 
avoidance or self-protective strategies because their sense of self was 
undermined by a habitus that had grown to recognise a lack of self-worth 
and of feeling vulnerable and thus devalued (see Harter 1993; Tice 1993; 
Baumeister 1993). 
 
This form of social bind is well documented by Sennett and Cobb (1973, 
p. 37) where they show how mobiles were inclined to blame themselves 
for circumstances clearly not of their making. As discussed at length in 
Chapter 2, this is also central to Bourdieu’s emphasis on the reflexive 
 
109 See Section 4.4. 
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alignment of habitus and field and the practice emerging from class 
domination (Bourdieu 1977, 1984). The anxieties and ambivalence 
underpinning this feeling of misplaced identity, detachment and 
disconnect are the focal points of the aspirant’s shifting sense of existence 
during their attempts to undertake class transition or to emulate the ‘ways 
of being’ of the middle-class. As such, the psychical and emotional states 
that accompany these anxieties are worthy of further and deeper 
exploration. 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, one of the key contentions in the thesis 
is that aspirant mobiles are psychically constrained in their opportunities 
for personal development in a classed society (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu 
and Eagleton 1991). As such I am not saying that they are always 
consciously ‘choosing’ to become ‘middle-class’. Indeed, there are 
numerous examples of working-class solidarity, valorisation, honour and 
defences of working-class culture, that would contradict this claim. For 
example, the positive expressions of working-class identities found in 
industrial action, in working-class protest movements and trade unionism 
(see also Section 4.5). Rather, I am saying that the means and ends 
whereby aspirant mobiles can successfully steer this, albeit reflexive 
course of social and cultural betterment, will find them challenged in 
adopting other options that enable them to avoid the norms, values 
nuanced ‘ways of being’ that are representative of middle-class life. 
 
Furthermore, there will be exceptions to this tendency, where an 
aspirant’s class identity and habitus is not necessarily affected so markedly 
(see Friedman 2016; Bradley and Devadason 2008). However, while I 
ignore such anomalies, they may provide a basis for future research. 
Uncontrovertibly, each case of mobility can be said to have unique facets 
in the retaining or shedding of working-class traits and an awareness of 
what can be gained and what can be lost by such a psychical 
transformation (see Section 1.2). 
 
However, I now return to the earlier discussion. From the particular 
examples I have used and in developing an existential sociology 
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perspective to account for the anxieties of mobility, aspirants are likely to 
ask pointed questions of themselves. For example, they may ask: “Who 
was I prior to becoming socially mobile?” or “How have I changed as a 
result of making these adjustments in my life?” That is, “Who have I 
become”. “How will my circumstances change as a result of pursuing these 
life-enhancing challenges?” (see Sennett and Cobb 1973). These 
profoundly reflexive and existential questions illustrate the instinctual and 
perhaps courageous nature of an aspirational self in class transition; a 
transforming self that is contemplating deeply uncertain times, where the 
actions and life decisions being undertaken are shown to be precarious, 
often psychically unconscious and invariably ambivalent (see Savage 
2015, pp. 187-217). The discussions in Chapters 1 and 2 considered these 
experiences, focusing on the imposition of structural constraints on agency 
through internalised adherence to dominant social norms. In parallel with 
these earlier discussions therefore, an ontological account of class mobility 
and transition is also necessary here, to take these internal and 
structural/social limits of freedom into account.110 
 
Such inward-facing questions of an existential and ontological nature, 
pinpoint the uncertainties and confusion of such a self-enhancement 
‘project’ for the aspirant.111 The anxieties surrounding the value attached 
to identity, in terms of its stability, indicate where and how individuals are 
caught up in a structural web of aspirational striving. The essential point I 
make here is that this striving to aspire is often undertaken in a normative 
fashion, as a ‘life-affirming project’ but often without realising the class-
 
110 This use of the concept of freedom is a central feature of existential thought 
(see for example Wartenberg 2013, pp. 31-36 and p. 128). This is so since it is 
said that a major source of anxiety is the challenge of deciding how to live one’s 
life when confronted by an infinite number of choices. 
 
111 The use of the term ‘project’ is pertinent in considering social aspiration from 
an existential sociological perspective. For example, according to Sartre, life “is 
something we have, whether we like it or not, it is what we do with what we have 
been given, with the materials with which we are provided at the start of our lives, 
and which we turn into something else in the course of our lives...and that the 
important issue is whether we can go beyond what we are given to start with, 
and produce something new” (see Craib 1997, p. 165). 
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bounded obstacles and the extent of the domination of a middle-class 
orthodoxy. 
 
Closely linked to such reflexive questioning, Neilson (2015) seeks to show 
how differing class experiences of increased ‘precarity’ underpin a 
subjective shift from ontological ‘security’ towards ‘existential anxiety’.112 
He argues that existential anxiety is to be understood as a mental unease 
induced by the self-reflexive perception of life’s precarious character and 
is intensified by the reality of deepening social and material precarity. He 
considers ontological security to be the everyday trust in the continuity of 
life, encouraged by circumstantial security (Neilson 2015, p. 184). 
Presumably then, he would consider ontological insecurity to be a lack of 
trust in the continuity of life that is brought about by circumstances, both 
social and material, that are insufficient to sustain both the bodily and 
psychical reassurance necessary for physical and mental wellbeing? 
 
Neilson elaborates further on an understanding of this existential anxiety, 
referring to it as 
 
“an overwhelming and physically manifesting state of fear, distress, 
loathing and dread which derives from the human awareness of the 
transient and fragile nature of life” (Neilson, 2015, p. 185). 
 
While this definition of the ‘angst about being’ might appear acutely 
pessimistic and even overly dramatic, it is nonetheless valid here in 
contextualising such painful psychical experiences as similar to aspirants’ 
sense of a shifting social reality. I argue that this is because of the risks 
and uncertainties experienced in the mobility process and the frequent 
encounters of instability that can be experienced in many aspirants’ 
mobility trajectories. 
 
112 ‘Precarity’ refers to the widespread condition of temporary, flexible, 
contingent, casual, intermittent work in post-industrial societies, brought about 
by the neo-liberal labour market reforms that have strengthened management 
and weakened the bargaining power of employees since the late 1970s. See also 
Savage (2015, p. 333-358). 
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Tillich, for example (see Neilson 2015) makes use of the term ‘anxiety 
fate’, which refers to the fears derived from the precarity of our contingent 
circumstances. Thus, he argues, in everyday practice, existential anxiety 
is inversely related to the experience and perception of an everyday 
predictability, stability and continuity of life, or ontological ‘security’ 
(Neilson 2015, p. 185). Presumably then, we should conclude from this 
that an absence of these assurances engenders the insecurities that 
accompany much of the fluidity of classed life for the aspirant mobile. 
While predictability and stability are not guaranteed for anyone, 
irrespective of social class, the aspirant can have the additional 
aforementioned issues of a conflicted psychical interiority to contend with, 
which require reflexive resolution (see Chapters 2 and 3). In contrast to 
this view, others such as Giddens (1991) present a somewhat more 
neutral or non-class perspective on ontological security and reflexivity 
(see Section 2.3). Giddens specifically refers to the everyday experiences 
of personal safety, security, friendliness and a viable self-image that 
allows us to continue to pursue life despite these ontological threats and 
risks to our state of being (see also Beck 1992). 
 
Importantly however, Neilson, asserts that people respond to anxiety 
induced by changes to their circumstances in complex and differing ways 
(Neilson 2015, p. 185). As I show later in the chapter, class mobility can 
be ontologically overwhelming to the aspirant in a psychical sense. This is 
particularly the case when self-conscious moments are mixed with a 
fragility founded upon ill-preparedness for class transition and there is a 
lack of awareness of the nuanced nature of middle-class practices. Indeed, 
on the face of it, the aspirant’s skills and abilities may not be in question, 
or a problem to them. These may be confidently managed using what we 
might call the ‘externalities of practice’ and the use of ‘masking’ to hide 
the vulnerable working-class self by conveying the ‘performative’ image 
of self. However, it is this vulnerability that stems from the unfamiliarity 
and discomfort of moments of hysteresis that can arouse the innermost 
form of insecurity in the self (Friedman 2016, p. 131; Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1977). It is this that is central to my use of ontological insecurity 
as a framing concept. 
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However, it is also the expectations and judgements of others that can 
reach into the interior of the self and can be most injurious. As I indicated 
in Chapters 3 and 4, a lack of resilience and one’s perceived sense of 
ineptitude; self-doubt and threatened self-esteem are all manifestations 
of class insecurities. When such sentiments are sparked, they often result 
in profound embarrassments, leaving indelible anxieties that can sit at the 
core of aspirant’s being, to be re-triggered when experiencing symbolic 
violence and domination. The everyday trust in the continuity of everyday 
life (Neilson 2015, p. 185) and that existential assurance may be brought 
into question, with shame erupting and contributing to an undermining of 
the self. 
 
Other characterisations of existential angst linked to social aspiration can 
be usefully added to Neilson’s explanation. For example, Knights and 
Clarke (2013) say that this ontological insecurity is about the questioning 
of the self over concerns of time, destiny and the meaning attached to our 
actions.113 Furthermore, according to Fineman, work provides an illusion 
of realness and permanence in the face of the unconscious fear that 
everything is fleeting, fragile and meaningless (see Knights and Clarke 
2013, p. 16). Also, Sennett and Cobb (1973, p. 91) refer to the fear of 
being powerless and about “falling into nothingness” when reporting the 
sentiments of their respondents’ interpretation of what they see as 
happening to the social fabric. Specifically, they note the sense of 
inadequacy that some of their respondents feel in their new-found position 
of workplace responsibility. From this they identify a feeling of dependence 
on those for whom they are responsible, but do not respect, which leads 
to a lack of respect for the self. 
 
Knights and Clarke (2013) also suggest that an increasing tension exists 
between trying to fulfil career aspirations and finding meaning from work 
itself.114 This seems to emphasise a further ontological double bind. 
 
113 This point is attributed to Sartre (see Knights and Clarke 2013, p. 16)  
 
114 See Section 5.3 for accounts of ontological insecurity and Section 5.5 for 
vignettes that elaborate on this line of thinking. 
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However, this potential contradiction is necessarily avoided or suppressed 
by the illusion and rationalisation bound up in the normative rhetoric, 
suggesting there are great benefits that can be derived from this striving 
and becoming socially mobile. Such instances of potential alienation and 
existential anxieties are cited in other contexts later in this section (see 
Section 5.3 and 5.5). However, it becomes clear that the paradox of 
aspirational striving for recognition in these ways is perpetually 
overshadowed by the ontological threat that human life might be 
potentially reducible to trivial or pointless objectives. However, I note the 
inherent nihilism in this line of thinking. 
 
The existential sociology argument here suggests that individuals living in 
modern contemporary, individualistic and materialistic classed societies 
are intuitively striving for increased wellbeing in terms of a stronger sense 
of purpose in life. Moreover, it can often be hard to justify the futile, 
meaningless and absurd nature of social and occupational life in such an 
epoch (see Fromm 2007). Consequently, it would seem necessary for 
aspirants to reflect on why and how striving can often be so challenging 
in their anxious clamour for betterment. For as long as they face such 
existential and structural class barriers, working-class aspirants would 
appear to have few options other than locking onto this intensive work 
ethic and normative practice. 
 
However, this needs to be balanced alongside broader working-class social 
and cultural expressions of solidarity. For example, in seeking a better life, 
the working-class identities of aspirants may be retained, preserved and 
valorised in a collectivist sense. Such an apparent contradiction and 
opposing stance here, only serves to emphasise the existence and nature 
of a wider class struggle where far less appreciation of, and attention to, 
individualistic meritocratic approaches is given greater ascendency. 
 
Thus, at certain points in their endeavours and trajectories, aspirants may 
sense a futility in their striving. This would seem to bring the whole 
aspirational project into question, especially were matters of identity, 
respect, legitimation, entitlement, recognition and acceptance are 
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contextualised in terms of class domination. The reflexive moments of 
‘stepping back’ may bring a realisation that there is a kind of absurdity 
attached to this clamour in the name of a consolidation of self-worth and 
self-actualisation. That acceptance from middle-class others, either by 
those in superior positions in the workplace, or in other cultural spaces 
may, ultimately, have a hollowness about it. As Sennett notes, in much of 
his research, these sensibilities surrounding such a predicament may have 
much to do with the aforementioned interiority of ‘lack’ and low levels of 
self-belief that many aspirants are shown to experience (Sennett 1999 
and 2004). However, as indicated in Chapters 1 and 2, such realisations 
may also be over-shadowed, or be in tension with, structural norms that 
reinforce the immediate reality of classed life and the ontological urgency, 
indeed imperative, of striving within specific constraints, for a better 
existence. 
 
So, from these existential stands of thought, it would seem that anxiety 
can be aligned with ontological insecurity since, as Neilson points out, the 
material and social aspects of people’s circumstances can be distinguished 
according to whether or not they promote ontological security or 
existential anxiety (Neilson 2015, p. 185). Favourable material conditions 
such as stable employment and a regular income would seem to be 
contingent on the aspirant’s ability to manoeuvre within and between 
economic and structural class relations. Furthermore, the optimal 
conditions for ontological security would seem to derive, therefore, as 
much from the means to secure solidarity, mutual unity and inter-
dependency and collective responsibility. Inversely however, existential 
anxiety and/or ontological insecurity would be triggered where division, 
difference, competition and individualism prevail (Neilson 2015, p. 185). 
 
However, as Neilson also states, people’s (aspirants’) responses to anxiety 
can vary in complexity and form according to the range and gravity of 
changes in their circumstances. As I have shown, working class aspirant 
mobiles can face considerable challenges and disruptions to the format 
and stability of their lives. The lack of pre-requisite knowledge or ‘savvy’; 
the limited access to the capitals necessary to legitimately ‘play the game’; 
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the unfamiliarity with contextual rules and refinements that would enable 
a stability to materialise; a lack of the self-assuredness and inner-strength 
to develop, often without a strong self-concept when socialising within a 
potentially hostile and alien class, all take their toll in an ontological sense 
(Friedman 2016, p. 139). 
 
Thus, there can potentially be limited trust in the continuity of life since 
this lack of familiarity with new class experiences might leave the aspirant 
existentially exposed and psychically vulnerable to the social refinements 
of day-to-day middle-class practice. Of course, the extent of this 
vulnerability would depend on the extent of mobility and class transition 
(see Friedman 2016, p. 138).115 For example, aspirants experiencing 
abrupt, long-range mobility trajectories that may take them beyond their 
familiar occupational or cultural realm and social class stratum, may feel 
this vulnerability more intensely than those making marginal and gradual 
social class adjustments.116 Then again, making long-range changes over 
a long period of time may mean that the aspirant has a greater opportunity 
to make adjustments to the habitus (see Section 4.5, in the case of the 
banker James in Friedman 2016). Thus, the uniqueness of the individual’s 
aspirational journey will determine the extent of existential angst and 
ontological insecurity experienced and the degree to which this does, or 
does not, have long term effects on the psyche. 
 
Furthermore, in citing and quoting the psychiatrist R. D. Laing (1990a, pp. 
39-61) and his existential analysis of schizophrenia, personal alienation 
and ontological insecurity, Sennett and Cobb take his definition of the 
 
115 I suggest that this can be perceived by the range (the extent to which a middle-
class lifestyle is successfully adopted; the frequency (the number of changes, 
steps or leaps taken to achieve this, or not) and the temporal (the time taken to 
make these changes or transitions. So, the aspirant may experience short, abrupt 
changes; short, marginal changes; prolonged, significant changes, or long 
gradual changes. 
 
116 It is possible, of course, for the aspirant to experience short-range mobility 
and, in terms of occupation and class culture, to not actually merge into the 
professional or middle-class. But since the thrust of the thesis is concerning ‘class 
transition’, I am largely citing examples were aspirants do in fact enter the world 
of the middle-class. 
 
 203 
latter to be a feeling that the self can survive whatever it encounters in 
the world. Thus, such a self is open to new, disruptive, even painful 
experience and has achieved the strength to be vulnerable (Sennett and 
Cobb 1973, p. 201). However, they argue that from a sociological 
standpoint, that is, looking at people from the outside in (from the social 
to the self), rather than the psychological approach, of looking from the 
inside out, (from the self to the social), it is important to appreciate that 
society imposes the necessity for defensiveness in human socialisation and 
thus prepares the psyche for dangers that may arise in psycho-social 
human relations (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 202).117 
 
Again, this alludes to the ‘masking’ effect referred earlier in this section. 
For example, in focusing on newly appointed or promoted employees in 
hierarchical organisations, their findings suggest that such aspirant 
mobiles can, in an existential sense, leave themselves open to new 
experiences and to risk being ‘wiped out or lost’ (Sennett and Cobb 1973, 
p. 202).118 Thus, the ability to get by from day-to-day is something that 
we need to trust. But, they argue, there are organisational limitations on 
this, insofar as the organisation’s culture and regulatory constraints 
require the employee to be guarded and to possess and cultivate a self-
protective frame of mind. This is what their respondents have done. There 
is a sense in which the employee needs to avoid getting hurt so that 
if/when things go wrong, such as the threat of losing one’s job; of being 
reprimanded; of being passed over for promotion, or having to cope with 
power plays and dismissive behaviour, they are able to put a distance 
between their (protected) inner self by displaying the (masked) self that 
is seen by others. 
 
 
117 As I had indicated elsewhere, the approach here is social psychological as well 
as sociological, forging and affirming the overlaps between the two academic 
disciplines. Research on the self and on society makes this link incontrovertible. 
 
118 I suggest here that Sennett and Cobb’s reference to being ‘wiped out and lost’ 
is psychoanalytical parlance for the individual being, as it were, psychically 
‘annihilated’. 
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Such masking and a detachment and managed psychical splitting of the 
self may be seen as necessary, in an existential sense, in order to hide 
one’s true feelings and to enable social and cultural survival. In a 
pragmatic vein this would enable the aspirant to fulfil the professionalism 
necessary within the logic of a business culture. From this, Sennett and 
Cobb ask whether this protective defence; this splitting of the ‘real’ person 
from the ‘performing’ individual is a form of social schizophrenia similar to 
the patients treated by Laing (1990a) and what he termed the ‘divided 
self’ (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 206). 
 
However, they also then question the relevance and validity of 
‘schizophrenic social structures’ (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 206), a 
concept that was considered plausible and given that label at the time 
when Laing was practicing. This was given credence in accounting for 
divisions of the self over the whole of society, rather than being limited to 
the few psychotic individuals studied and treated by existential 
psychiatrists, such as Laing (1990a; see also Laing and Esterson 1974). 
Sennett and Cobb consider this concept to be sensible to a point. This is 
so, since the inter-class organisational dynamics of praising and selecting 
people for promotion and career enhancement necessitates people 
compartmentalising themselves. They argue that the endemic and default 
‘rules of selection’ in workplace hierarchies do not let all people have a 
‘distinctive character’; that not everyone is singled out for attention, 
praise, reward and respect. Thus, although it can be assumed that 
‘masking’ of the self is common practice to a greater or lesser extent, the 
response of individuals affected by this ‘unfairness’ within the hierarchy, 
is to engage in a defensive and protective splitting of the character 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 206; also, Knights and Wilmott 1983; 
Friedman 2016; Allen 2013).119  
 
However, following in the shadow of Laing, Sennett and Cobb have some 
further concerns about this concept of ‘schizophrenic social structures’, 
 
119 My quotation marks in this paragraph are used merely for emphasis. 
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arguing that it washes over important social differences. Thus, for 
example, if someone who, in conventional terms, is labelled ‘insane’, it 
may just be because they are in fact simply more sensitive to the 
contradictions of the social order. But the authors then ask, if this were 
the case, what makes the mass of people, deemed to be sane, 
‘insensitive’? Furthermore, they ask whether this mass of people is all 
insensitive in the same way? Sennett and Cobb argue that a division of 
the self in a social sense, is different from the case where people are 
diagnosed as psychotic or schizophrenic by psychiatrists (Sennett and 
Cobb 1973, p. 207).120 
 
Sennett and Cobb argue that such psychical ‘splits’ are obviously very 
different in form and process to those in a psychiatric context. In the case 
of Laing’s patients, the inner feelings and disconnected language of the 
individual shows the pain of a human being that is being psychically pulled 
apart. However, some of Sennett and Cobb’s respondents act as though 
their work situation has nothing to do with the ‘real’ self. Thus, their ‘inner’ 
self is separate from their competence–based outer self, giving them 
boundaries within which they can feel a sense of freedom and without 
responsibility for their social position. This, the authors argue, defends 
them against the pain a person would otherwise feel if they had to submit 
the ‘whole of themselves’ to society which makes their position a 
vulnerable and anxiety-based one (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 208). Thus, 
they argue that this dividing of the self in terms of a ‘real’ self and a 
‘performing’ self, is not the same as the severe traumas that diagnosed 
schizophrenics experience (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 208). 
 
Importantly, Sennett and Cobb also wish to underline a structural issue 
here. They cite research on the language used by people with 
schizophrenia suggests that the sense of a ‘divided self’, or the 
contradictory modes of self, occurs because the individual is caught in a 
 
120 For example, the authors cite the cases of religious conversion (dividing the 
sacred from the profane) and political conversion (where the individual tolerates 




‘double bind’. They define this as a set of mutually contradictory 
commands, which has the person trying to obey these commands in 
situations that are often emotionally charged and anxiety-inducing. 
However, this anxiety arises because such commands are conflicting and 
irrational and impossible to complete simultaneously (Sennett and Cobb 
1973, p. 208).121 
 
Initially, the authors see this description of a double bind as valid, given 
the authority relations practiced within their respondents’ workplaces. 
They provide the example of responsibilities being given by a boss to a 
newly promoted and competent employee as a mark of respect. But this 
then raises the risk of the employee’s existing bonds with workplace peers 
conflicting with those of the boss. This sets up a complex tension by 
measuring the command-reward relationship against the feelings of 
fraternity and sensitivity to others (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 209). The 
employee (aspirant mobile) feels this conflict and is potentially able to see 
beyond the institutional demands but is pitting the obligations to the boss 
against a set of humane values. This is a familiar workplace context where 
a promoted aspirant is forced to choose between their own career 
enhancement and their solidarity with workplace peers. 
 
However, Sennett and Cobb argue that this is not quite the same form of 
‘double bind’ as that cited earlier in the case of a ‘divided self’. It is not an 
irrational impossibility of two simultaneous opposing actions. The 
appointed individual can undertake the task, but they can also detach 
themselves from it. Although this is a contradiction in the face of taking 
orders within the authority relations of organisational hierarchies, they can 
in fact alienate themselves in order to ward off the pain that the 
contradiction threatens to cause (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 210). But 
the value of this splitting and detachment may not, of course, be 
appreciated by the peers over whom the newly promoted aspirant now 
has authority. Thus, by unpicking these double binds and contradictory 
 
121 The authors note the work of Gregory Bateson and his team for this research 
(see Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 208). 
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tensions in the aspirant’s life we can see how an ontological insecurity can 
emerge. In this example, the aspirant is torn by irreconcilable class 
tensions; seeking to progress in life but trapped in a moral bind of loyalties 
to fellow workers and to the obligations that comes with the new workplace 
appointment. 
 
There are similar tensions in the case of family loved ones, who know the 
mobile aspirant as their former classed self. They and the aspirant may 
sense the emergence of a mutual rift and a distancing with regard to 
earlier family ties, behaviours and values. This may, as a consequence, 
potentially engender painful decisions about the newly forming direction 
of the aspirant’s life (see Vignette 1.3 and Friedman 2016, pp. 140-141). 
 
Clearly, these internal and social conflicts and contradictions are not 
merely to do with inter-class dynamics and a duality of 
dominant/dominated power relations. They also have an ontological and 
existential form and thus have important implications. They profoundly 
affect the nature of and set limits on freedom and inhibit the means to 
make life more fulfilling. I argue therefore, that this act of the self 
‘becoming’ or morphing into another self to reach a higher level of 
wellbeing can, currently, only take place within the context and restraining 
boundaries of existing class society (see Allen 2013; Skeggs 1997; Reay 
2005; Gillies 2005;). For example, Allen (2013) notes how her working-
class student respondents experienced a jarring and discomfort which 
demanded a realignment of dispositions and aspirations. These students 
expressed a constant state of disorientation about their place in the world, 
revealing the deep ontological insecurity of entering fields in which they 
were not the natural inhabitants. They revealed a continuous sense of 
‘lack’ and fragility and it was clear that they had years of knowledge and 
experience to make up for, before they would be on a par with their 
middle-class peers (Allen 2013, p. 776). 
 
Other workplace examples include the research by Brown (2000) which 
considered the prevalence of technology in business organisations and 
how employees seek the protection of the self, in order to preserve their 
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ontological security. Moreover, Ashman and Gibson, (2010) consider the 
ethical aspects of organisational policies and practices by focusing on 
mental health in the workplace. As with the aforementioned authors, they 
seek to show how approaches such as organisational development, 
surveillance and monitoring represent direct and often deliberate attacks 
on the individual employee’s sense of identity, which can result in serious 
mental health conditions. Collinson (2003) meanwhile, examines how 
forms of insecurity can overlap and intersect in the formation of workplace 
selves and organisation power relations. He also argues that attempts to 
overcome these insecurities can have contradictory outcomes. 
‘Conformist’, ‘dramaturgical’ and ‘reformist’ selves may be reproduced in 
organisations where surveillance is prevalent. He argues that a greater 
appreciation of the insecurities generated in such organisations can 
enhance an understanding of the ways in which power relations are 
reproduced, rationalised, resisted and sometimes transformed (Collinson 
2003, p. 536-541). 
 
In summarising this section from an existential sociology perspective, it 
would seem that there are distinct constraints in the forms of social 
mobility, class transition and transformation of the self and identity 
available to working class aspirants in the mainstream of modern class 
society. These ontological, social and cultural boundaries and parameters 
of aspiration and mobility are shown to create significant anxieties and 
insecurities. Indeed, an existential sociological perspective might locate 
social aspiration as a central feature of human existence (see for example, 
Douglas and Johnson 1977; van Deurzen and Arnold-Baker 2005). Also, it 
might appear uncontroversial to assert that all human life involves periods 
of personal and social struggle. Furthermore, questions such as “How can 
I live a better life?” may be predicated on other questions such as “What 
should I do with my life” and “What might I realistically achieve and 
become?”. Such existential questions would seem to acknowledge the two 
aspects of social theory cited in Chapter 1, namely determinism and 
voluntarism. These might enable the aspirant to consider the parameters 
and limitations of time as a resource. Humans act, in the first instance, in 
order to maintain and continue their survival and with an urgency to 
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thrive, since our finitude is ultimately a primary constraining feature of 
our existence (Wartenberg, 2013). 
 
The above discussion should clarify how the aspirant’s conflicted feelings; 
ontological insecurities or anxieties, are directly related to the structural 
forces and relations that have brought them about. The following sections 
elaborate further on how these life and class anxieties play out in psychical 
and ontological degree for working-class aspirants. Furthermore, the 
personal vignettes in the final section further underline the contradictions, 
both psychical and existential, facing working-class aspirants, while noting 
that both the working-class and indeed the middle-class are bound, in 
different ways and degrees, to an existential challenge, given that they 
are conjoined by a classed society. 
 
5.3 The roots of class anxieties and internalised histories in the 
context of mobility and class transition. 
In Section 5.2, I considered the relevance and value derived from adopting 
an existential sociology approach in interpreting the experiences of the 
aspirant mobiles when undergoing class transition. Such an approach 
focuses on how aspirants experience moments and periods of existential 
crisis in the form of an ontological insecurity (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 
201; Laing 1990a, p.39; Skeggs 1997; Knights and Clarke 2013; Allen 
2013; Neilson 2015; Reay 2005; Friedman 2016; Bourdieu 1984). 
 
These psychic problems of instability and anxiety may, in varying degrees, 
manifest in a ‘conflicted self’ when the aspirant is struggling to manage 
internalised tensions and contradictions. These psychic and existential life-
questioning experiences are akin to those discussed by Friedman (2016). 
Friedman (2016) citing Bourdieu (2004), uses the term habitus clive’ to 
account for these disruptions and hysteresis, which can lead to what he 
then terms the unsettling of the ‘ontological coherence of the self’ 
(Friedman 2016, p. 129 and 138-139). Similarly, Reay (2005, p. 911) 
considers the ‘psychic landscape of class’ while Allen (2013) also notes 
this and how, in ‘doing aspiration’ it is lived and managed in a class-
inflected social space. 
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Other research has addressed class-related anxieties, where such 
existential challenges are contextualised in specific social and cultural 
settings. One notable example of research related to social class, 
meritocracy and mobility focuses on gender differences in the educational 
sector and specifically on the barriers and opportunities of educational 
achievement. This research identifies anxieties in both the working-class 
and middle-class and how they are differently managed in each case. In 
the secondary school sector, class-oriented anxieties are experienced by 
parents and their children, again with marked class differences, but also 
in terms of gender, where the class impacts appear to differ between girls 
and boys (Gillies 2005; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001; Lucey, 
Melody and Walkerdine 2003; Allen 2013; Reay 1997b, 2001, 2013). In 
higher education much of the research addresses issues such as the 
classed differences of students in their attainment levels and the 
approaches of graduates in furthering their future careers (see Abrahams 
2017; Morley 1997; Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2009). Knights and Clarke 
(2013) however, consider the anxieties experienced by academic staff in 
universities. They focus on the stress levels and the ontological insecurities 
relating to perceived self-worth; to research output, academic prowess 
and the ambivalence about the respect they felt they deserved, but did 
not receive, for their hard work. 
 
The workplace generally is an obvious breeding ground for anxiety. 
Tensions can be generated in relation to ‘status acquisition’ and career 
enhancement, as noted by Sennett and Cobb (1973).122 Also, in Chapter 
3, I showed how the aspirant’s habitus, in undergoing reflexive self-
examination, is trying to make sense of the psychic and emotional changes 
being experienced in the social and cultural space during class transition. 
I noted how and why these psychic tensions and feelings of ambivalence 
can emerge and how they are compounded by a persistent anxiety-based 
sense of confused class identity, insecurity and feelings of a lack of 
entitlement and belonging. The reflexive splitting of the psyche 
 
122 As a cornerstone piece of research Sennett and Cobb’s findings and 
observations are considered later in this section. 
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(hysteresis), considered in the previous section is paralleled, in a different 
sense, by a splitting of class identity as the aspirant struggles to adjust to 
class mores, values and practice (see Mallman 2017, p. 20). 
 
However, here I emphasise that such anxieties of class transition often 
spring from the imposition and proximity of the classed ‘other’, whereby 
the aspirant can be made to feel ‘all at sea’ in matters of social and cultural 
inclusion, cohesion and ontological security. In this, the very essence of 
the aspirant’s being is of feeling unsettled, both consciously and 
unconsciously, especially when their own expectations are not felt to be 
matched by the norms of engagement within a newly experienced middle-
class social reality. The disappointment that can arise is often visceral 
when attempts at mobility and class transition falter or are challenged; 
when the aspirant’s powers of adaptation are found wanting or fall short 
of the expectations of their middle-class peers. 
 
As I have noted throughout the thesis, this can leave aspirants with a 
profound sense of hysteresis, that is, feelings of displacement, exclusion 
and abandonment, often inducing self-criticism or even self-loathing. It 
can also trigger rationalisations in the form of self-deceptions in an 
attempt to excuse the aspirant’s own inadequacies or shortcomings. Such 
psychological and ontological stratagems can be seen as forms of defence 
introduced in order to manage these personalised crises that are a product 
of the structural constraints of social mobility (see Sennett and Cobb, 
1973, p. 157). Anxiety resulting from frustration and anger can also arise 
when feeling trapped in a working-class environment, yet feeling the 
ambivalence, guilt or shame for seeking to ‘rise above one’s station’ and 
wishing to move out and up in society (see Lawler 1999; Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001; Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine 2003; Reay 2001; 
Reay and Ball 1997). 
 
Moreover, since education attainment is a critical point of origin for 
aspiration and mobility, it is also important to note how anxieties surface 
and are expressed in an ontological sense in this socio-cultural field. In 
particular, the research by Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody (2001) is useful, 
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with their focus on educationally successful working-class schoolgirls and 
the psychical factors that come into play in managing school and later 
university life. The authors provide a rich picture of comparable home 
lives, highlighting the dispositions of the schoolgirls in their respective 
educational endeavours and the different class-related ways in which 
anxieties and emotions are managed within the girls’ families. They argue 
that conceptualisations of anxiety are largely built around various forms 
of conflict and suggest that at the conscious level, anxieties may be named 
and talked about. However, at the unconscious level anxieties continue to 
be powerful even when they are beyond the rational influence of language 
and that this is often ignored in many sociological discourses (Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001, pp. 89-90). 
 
Furthermore, the authors reveal the depth of concern parents’ have over 
their children’s schooling and why this provokes such intense disquiet. 
They argue that social reproduction issues are at the heart of parent’s 
experiences and that anxieties are primarily to do with the fear of their 
children failing. This in itself is significant since it indicates that the parents 
have already anticipated an uphill struggle to survive and compete in an 
unfamiliar/unequal cultural space. It shows that the parents have almost 
instinctively internalised a ‘shame-related embodiment of disadvantage’ 
and inferiority as class identity indicators or expressions of low self-worth. 
Once again, we see how a sense of ‘lack’; of insufficiency, of inadequacy 
and of a lagging behind, or, of always trying to catch up, are shown to be 
class-related in the socialisation of many in working-class families. 
However, I argue that these are not simply emotion-inducing sentiments. 
Rather, they are ontological insecurities with attributed anxieties that can 
make for a stress-induced debilitating lifestyle for these parents and their 
offspring. 
 
However, in a separate paper, the same authors caution against an 
inadvertent pathologising of working-class life (Lucey, Melody and 
Walkerdine 2003, p. 289). They suggest that such a ‘deficit model’ tends 
to underline popular (mis)conceptions of working-class families. This 
model tends to inaccurately emphasise that working-class families 
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somehow lack that which ensures success for schoolgirls from middle-class 
families. Moreover, this kind of research does seem to dwell on middle-
class parenting practices that appear to reproduce structurally 
advantageous life chances (see research by Lareau in Mallman 2017, p. 
20). This creates a blurring of the causes of structural inequality and 
simplistically shows working-class backgrounds as ‘something to escape 
from’ in the name of meritocracy (see Lawler 1999). Once again, such 
individualising and personalising of ‘lack’ disguises the structural and 
nuanced disadvantages endured by many working-class families and by 
the aspirants from whence they emerge. As I have illustrated so far, in 
some of the critiques of the mobility literature and in some of my personal 
vignettes, the historical importance and complexity of family class origins 
are a central feature and ever-present backdrop in the changing lives of 
aspirant mobiles. These ontological insecurities and their attributed 
anxieties are carried by aspirants as they make their way, in an existential 
sense, through their mobile trajectories and their attempts to sidestep the 
structural barriers of class. 
 
Furthermore, Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody (2001) show that the power 
to succeed is implicated not simply in the possession of various capitals 
(in a Bourdieusian sense), but in the actual self-formation of the individual 
subject. They argue that for all working-class young women, the fact that 
they are engaged in a process of transformation, of ‘becoming’ different 
from their families; by producing a different and ‘hybrid subjectivity’, it 
impacts powerfully on their conscious and unconscious lives (Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 142).123 However, this psycho-social landscape 
of class and educational success can bring as many fears and anxieties as 
those felt by educational failure. Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody’s research 
 
123 These are my quotation marks here with regard to ‘becoming’. Also, by 
suggesting that ‘all’ working-class young women are engaged in a process of 
social (or class) transformation is unclear here. Firstly, not all working-class 
schoolgirls will be educationally equipped to be as successful as those in 
Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody’s sample. Secondly, not all working-class girls will 
be socially and culturally predisposed or willing to aspire to be upwardly mobile 
like some the schoolgirls in their sample. The cases the authors analyse show 
differing degrees of preparedness, even though these schoolgirls demonstrate 
high educational ability and achievement. 
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is also revealing in making sense of the complex emotionality that is bound 
up in the depiction of being successful or of being or feeling a failure. It 
also shows the roots of the anxieties among working-class schoolgirls and 
their families. They conclude that while there is in fact no less anxiety 
among middle-class schoolgirls and their families than among working-
class families, the anxiety is clearly read and managed differently. 
 
Much of the focus of their research is on the parenting, particularly the 
mothering practices and how these also differ in class terms (Walkerdine, 
Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 108). When anxiety-related problems emerge, 
these are often interpreted, and often dismissed, by school staff and the 
education system at large, as a lack of ability, confidence and worth. 
Moreover, the parents’ behaviour is often dismissed as being ‘too 
sensitive’. Yet the authors’ research sample consists of working-class 
schoolgirls who are showing academic potential and proving their ability, 
despite these pathologising preconceptions. Furthermore, the research 
reveals how, historically, failure in education is often the norm for the 
schoolgirls’ parents, particularly the mothers. Many of the anxieties, 
frustrations and the sense of powerlessness they express are shown to 
have deep and profound roots. When dealing with school practices they 
have to negotiate difficult issues of difference. Issues that middle-class 
mothers do not have to go through (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody, 2001, 
p. 126). 
 
The authors note that a sense of inferiority and impotence keeps the 
working-class parents at a safe and generally passive distance from the 
affairs of school and university. Thus, when issues do arise parents feel 
unable to challenge the decisions and views of school staff in an 
‘appropriate’ manner, harbouring as they do, these feelings of inferiority 
and deference. They do not tend to negotiate and to overcome the 
emotional barriers that their own poor experiences of school life had 
helped to construct. However, when they do make attempts to challenge 
what they consider to be injustices, they are seen as stroppy, aggressive 
and inept, often causing great embarrassment for their daughters, thus 
undermining the respectability of the family (Walkerdine, Lucey and 
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Melody 2001; Skeggs 1997). Also, according Reay working class mothers 
tend to lack the certainty and self-representation of ‘entitlement’ that 
middle-class mothers have (see Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 
128). 
 
Furthermore, in their interactions with teachers these working class 
parents show a lack of conviction about their point of view and knowledge 
of the education system; of how it works, and how they might work it to 
their advantage.124 Thus they are vulnerable and at risk of being 
patronised, fobbed off and infantilised, which also contributes considerably 
to their frustration. Such misrecognition and symbolic violence were 
discussed at length in Chapter 2 and in this section and is clearly shown 
to be anxiety-inducing. 
 
Thus, anxieties abound in this classed arena based on other emotions such 
as shame (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2) that is lived psychically but is 
produced socially and should therefore be understood as psycho-social in 
nature (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody et al 2001, p. 145). But again, I 
would also argue that these anxieties are manifestations of an ontological 
and existential-oriented predicament since they reach the very foundation 
of being and show an urgency that rails against such profound injustices 
in these parents’ classed lives. 
 
Importantly, the working-class parents in Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody’s 
sample have above-average educated girls, but they often experience 
economic deprivation, denying themselves their family needs so that their 
daughters might successfully aspire as individuals. Yet, because of this 
some of the daughters are shown to hide significant psychic defences and 
guilt. This is evident when the daughters avoid making a fuss or avoid 
seeking help when it is clearly needed; in being anxious to dispel the 
notion that university is ‘real’ work, compared to the working lives that 
 
124 Once again this alludes to Bourdieu’s ‘feel of the game’ (noted in Chapters 2 
and 3), in knowing and confidently using the symbolic capital which plays such a 
significant part in acceptance, recognition, entitlement and belonging in the social 
space (Bourdieu 1990). 
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their parents and relatives have endured, but then harbouring self-doubt 
and wondering whether this might actually be true. They grow to realise 
that their path to their goal is a lonely one and that psychical or economic 
help will be limited (see also Mallman 2017, p. 20). Furthermore, they 
tend to detect the intense anxiety their parents experience in managing 
home and work life and in being able to effectively support them in their 
school life. The authors emphasise how this kind of painful separation 
shows a denial of anger about their parents having little to give, but with 
the underlying belief that if their parents had the resources, they would 
surely give a great deal. In one case, the schoolgirl shows an ‘outer 
armour’ that is displayed to disguise a fear that there is little contingency 
to prevent things falling apart (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 
142-146). Yet, counter-intuitively they suggest that these defences were 
ensuring the girl’s success at university. The ‘double bind’ is that while this 
disguise may be emotionally harmful, it is essential in a pragmatic and 
survivalist sense. 
 
The authors speculatively suggest that this kind of disassociation, splitting 
and fragmenting of subjectivity is experienced in order to succeed and to 
be able to cross the class divide. It can be seen as a way of coping with 
the terrifying differences in practices, subject positions, modes of 
discourse, performance and a double-edged regulation that the two worlds 
of home life and school/university life provide (Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody 2001, p. 146). Bounded as they are by class difference, these 
differences are repeatedly misrecognised in the social reproduction of a 
self-reinforcing and ruling doxa (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Deer 
2012, p. 120). 
 
In addition, I argue that these accounts of aspirant student anxieties 
contain existential considerations, largely as a consequence of the 
structural class barriers that I critiqued in Chapter 1. These very able 
working-class schoolgirls are experiencing a complex ontological double 
bind. They don’t want to pressure their parents for help, and appreciate 
they are sacrificing so much for them already. However, at the same time, 
they feel unable to turn to them when they really need to, because they 
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know that they, the parents, may be intellectually, academically and 
culturally ill-equipped or powerless to help. The authors argue that such 
distancing or splitting from their parents is likely to engender feelings of 
hopelessness, or despondency in the schoolgirls (Walkerdine, Lucey and 
Melody, 2001, p. 152). 
 
It would seem that something is happening to deflate the determination 
of these girls and hinder their progress. The authors suggest this is 
because there are no structural reasons why they ‘should’ succeed, and 
that they have to rely on their own inner resources; in an existential sense 
they have to take on huge responsibility for themselves and their parents 
in ‘going it alone’ (see also Friedman 2016, p. 145). Their hopes and 
aspirations, and those of their parents, tend to become intertwined with 
the pain of separation and the anxiety of becoming a different person 
through a loss or shift in identity (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 
163). 
 
This threat of losing and changing one’s class identity is one that only 
appears to affect working-class pupils in this context. Of course, middle-
class schoolgirls also have to strive to succeed, but they are shown to have 
a more in–tune interiority that aligns better with the culture and ethos of 
school and university. Unequivocally, working-class girls are under such 
pressure to make something of themselves as autonomous, reflexive 
beings and to go through such a profound ontological transformation to 
do it successfully in a prevailing middle-class academic world. 
 
At such critical moments in their lives it is these crucial aspects of their 
interiority; their self-destructiveness; of allowing themselves to ‘give up’ 
despite their proven academic ability, that provides ontological clues to 
this existential angst and an ontology of classed disadvantage. This, the 
authors argue, needs to be understood and managed, in order for a 
complete ontological separation from their parent’s ways and sentiments 
(their embodied, historical selves) to occur. This is necessary, if a 
complete ‘hybridisation’ of the self is to occur in what they term a ‘psychic 
economy’, and to make a complete class transition (Walkerdine, Lucey and 
 218 
Melody 2001, p. 163; Bradford and Hey 2007). Thus, taking this research 
as a whole it would seem that the central message is clearly one of a 
psycho-social struggles of profound separation and loss for working-class 
parents and their children. This is particularly the case for female students 
going away to university, where ‘localism’ is often considered an option, 
in order for parents to keep them close by and for the bonds of family 
relationships to remain intact (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001, p. 
153). 
 
Michael Merrick also suggests another aspect of this story of separation 
(Four Thought 2017). He says that to walk away from who we are, and 
where we are from, raises issues, not just about a change in identity, but 
also about virtue and morality. He concludes that the recipients of a good 
education needed to heed a warning. That while they might consider 
themselves virtuous and intellectually ‘better’ compared to, say, their 
parents and less educated peers, it might be unwise to pit ‘home 
background’ against ‘academic’ in the context of wellbeing and self-
actualisation. Those who refuse to shed their heritage may have valid 
reasons for this. Aspirants often struggle to manage this ontological 
insecurity when they end up with a foot in both camps, thereby inheriting 
an ‘outsider’ status, an ambivalent sense of selfhood, and leaving a 
cultural chasm in between (see also Friedman 2016, p. 142). 
 
I now want to complete this section by revisiting some of Sennett and 
Cobb’s (1973) respondents’ accounts of the anxieties they experienced 
during mobility and class transition. Among the many ‘hidden injuries’ of 
class that Sennett and Cobb identify, ‘existential angst’ is shown to be 
present in many of these accounts of confused identity and insecurity. As 
noted in Section 3.2, the authors use the terms ‘status incongruity’ and 
‘status anxiety’ in helping to understand the psychic confusions and 
existential disquiet that was expressed by the blurring and weakening of 
class loyalties and identities (Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 27 and 29). 
Their respondents appeared to be uncertain of their sense of place in a 
shifting classed society, and the authors (and many of the respondents) 
sought to establish a logical rationale that might explain the basis for this 
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ambivalence and ontological detachment. Was it their respondents’ fault 
that they felt this way? How could they account for these experiences and 
sentiments in relation to these new and unfamiliar class positions, which 
were expressed in existential terms? 
 
The authors show that in some cases, respondents felt defensive about 
their sense of honour and dignity. They secretly feared that because 
middle-class others, who they had contact with, were better ‘armed’ with, 
among other things, a greater self-assuredness, people did not respect 
them enough for their efforts in bettering themselves and the lives of their 
families (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 19). The authors were made aware 
of the compelling nature of dignity as a human need. That in being socially 
mobile, these respondents seem to be cast into ‘limbo’ where there was 
never enough dignity, and what dignity there was appeared to be of a 
wounded form (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 191-214). 
 
In trying to unpack Sennett and Cobb’s use of ‘dignity’ and ‘honour’, it is 
not clear whether they are using them in a general sense, or as over-
arching terms for a number of other sentiments that were expressed in 
their research interviews. As I discussed in earlier chapters (particularly 
Chapter 3), this threat to the aspirant’s dignity is actually a triggering of 
feelings of, or threats to, self-worth or self-esteem and a pricking of the 
pride that would be expected to be felt by successfully achieving a ‘better’ 
lifestyle; of following the meritocratic ideal. 
 
In deciphering their respondents’ narratives, we can sense that the agency 
and the process of social mobility create anxiety in a number of ways 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 29). The authors ask, “What is it about the 
prevailing culture that is structured such that the more it gives the more 
it makes the socially mobile feel vulnerable?” (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 
30). Also, what is occurring when the tools of freedom, such as the 
knowledge acquired through formal education, that enables social 
enhancement, become sources of indignity? In this, Sennett and Cobb 
speculate that if the leaps of change of class position are so viciously 
destructive perhaps people might be happier if they did not try to push 
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themselves so much and to strive in this way. They suggest that no matter 
how it works psychologically, perhaps morphing into the middle-class is 
not what people from the working-class should be doing with their lives 
(Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 31). 
 
Of course, the problem with choosing to be non-aspirational, which is the 
authors’ inference here, is that the same issues of a need for an 
‘affirmation of dignity’ alongside the invocation of feelings of inferiority 
and low self-regard will be present and may also persist among a ‘non-
aspirant’ working-class. After all, it is this internalising of the markers of 
class and the pathologising of the working-class that is so well documented 
in the work of Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2007; 
Skeggs 2004; Jones 2011; Savage 2005, 2015; Reay 1997b, 2012; Sayer 
2005 and Lawler 1999, 2000. This would seem therefore, to add weight 
and value to the idea of escaping one’s class origins; in grasping the future 
benefits that mobility can supposedly bring, if and when, or irrespective 
of whether such anxieties can be overcome. 
 
However, as I noted in Sections 4.5 and 5.2, it is important to mention 
that large numbers of people in Western class societies choose to remain 
true to their working-class identities and to feel proud of their class roots. 
They consciously decide to avoid getting swept along by the aspirational 
and social mobility rhetoric. However, there are also examples that show 
forms of ‘hybridisation’ in this regard. Some individuals appear to be able 
to progress in their careers and reach ‘high status’ positions while choosing 
not to express deference. They are able to retain a positive cultural stance 
and expression of their working-class identity (see Friedman 2016, p. 
135). However, given the weight of middle-class cultural influence and 
dominance, this admixture of class loyalty alongside significant career 
progression would seem a hard balance to achieve and maintain. 
 
This, I argue is at the heart of the puzzle and struggle for self-actualisation 
for working-class aspirants. It is a kind of existential trap which sets up 
the dilemma of whether to stay or go; whether to strive irrespective of the 
symbolic violence and domination and misrecognition; whether to face up 
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to, and grapple with the anxieties of mobility; or whether to accept the 
weight of structural determinants and be resigned to a position of classed 
domination (Bourdieu 2009; Sennett and Cobb 1973; Felski 2000; 
Friedman 2016; Ingram 2009; Loveday 2015). 
 
From their research findings Sennett and Cobb suggest that existential 
anxieties emerge in the form of self-blaming as a result of failures in life 
and unexpected misfortunes. These might come from losing one’s job and 
not having the wherewithal to prevent such occurrences, or to pursue 
viable alternative pathways (see also Sennett 1999, 2004). Furthermore, 
anxiety can stem from being blamed for failing others, such as family 
members, which can generate feelings of inadequacy, shame and guilt. 
However, the authors show that these feelings of inadequacy can be 
‘masked’ to give the impression of being in control of things, but they 
suggest that such forms of self-protection, perhaps in the form of denial, 
might only intensify the initial anxiety experienced (Sennett and Cobb 
1973, p. 34). 
 
As I also noted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6), there are tensions and anxieties 
that can arise in families were aspirants seek to distance themselves from 
the economic limitations of their class and community. Rather than remain 
integrated and to work to support their working-class communities, they 
may, perhaps, desire to distance themselves from the limited resources 
experienced by parents, siblings and earlier social networks. As I showed 
in Chapter 4, aspirants who become educationally successful may secure 
an occupational status that significantly improves their income, material 
life and wellbeing, giving them wider future options. However, this too can 
create tensions and distancing from the original family and friends. Or, 
they may feel trapped and unfulfilled in the generic family, if this appears 
socially and culturally constraining or uninspiring (see Friedman 2016, p. 
142). 
 
For these reasons aspirants can be drawn into the meritocratic trap and 
normative drive to be socially mobile. There is also the now universal 
expectation that families will form, grow and ultimately separate. For 
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example, there is the adolescent identity-based anxiety of simply feeling 
the need to be different from their parents and to seek an independent 
life. Perhaps the latent frustration of needing to ‘fly the nest’ is a 
predictable outcome, but one which has different class implications for the 
young of working and middle-class households (see for example, Lawler 
1999, 2000; Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001). Also, there is the 
inherent unease attached to doing things that might be enjoyable, but the 
fear that one would be inept in doing them; of being ‘nothing special’, or 
no better than others; (Sennett and Cobb 1973, pp. 63-64).125 While 
Sennett and Cobb do not elaborate too far or deeply in discussion on such 
matters, it is perhaps possible to speculate from their interviews that their 
mobile working-class respondents have at various times undergone class 
and family-related anxieties of this form. 
 
Sennett and Cobb also cite numerous examples were feelings of 
powerlessness, and in some cases profound despair are manifest even 
among respondents, who have successfully transcended their class origins 
in pursuit of more comfortable lives. For example, despite their mobility, 
the authors note how respondents do not feel in control, and that their 
class position appears to have little to do with, for example, their improved 
earnings. Respondents felt it had more to do with the power ‘inside’ the 
person (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 36). The authors conclude from this 
that class and self are conjoined by states of existential angst. Aspirants 
feel this powerlessness along with ambivalence and vulnerability even 
when they have proven, unequivocally, to be successful in their working 
life. This is evident in the case of school life (Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 
2001) or in the experiences of university students (Reay, Crozier and 
Clayton 2009) or graduates (Abrahams 2017). They are in effect holding 
themselves responsible for the anxiety that springs from these 
 
125 See also Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst (2001) who discuss the double-edged 
sentiments surrounding ‘ordinariness’. There is the security and comfort of feeling 
and being like others, yet also an insecurity attached to being ordinary and not 
wanting to ‘stand out’ from the crowd. By avoiding being different or ‘noticed’ it 
can be appreciated how this might be an ill-advised mechanism, since it could be 
a barrier preventing self-actualisation that might only transpire through some 
form of upward mobility. 
 
 223 
sentiments. Sennett and Cobb suggest that something hidden and 
perverse is at play, such that aspirant mobiles lose the conviction of their 
dignity when they try to take responsibility for either an increase or 
reduction in their freedom (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 37). As I noted in 
Section 5.2, this repeated reference to freedom and the anxiety that is 
induced in relation to it, is a central feature of existential sociology when 
examining experiences of ontological insecurity and the plight of working-
class aspirants. 
 
Furthermore, when aspirational endeavour plays out in the workplace, it 
is often conveyed and interpreted by others as individualistic, seeking to 
impress for personal advancement. But this would surely be a rational 
response, given the prevailing culture which is shown to have 
individualism and enlightened self-interest at the core of most 
organisational cultures? However, Sennett and Cobb argue that in trying 
to prove themselves as worthy, mobiles are often displaying hidden 
feelings of self-doubt while attempting to assert their essential worth and 
worthiness. Moreover, the authors suggest that such acts of self-
validation, if not carefully managed, can be seen as overly self-absorbing, 
obsequious and thus counterproductive. It would seem to put the 
uninitiated aspirant at odds with the acceptable cultural boundaries of 
practice; failing to recognise the subtler ways of ‘playing the game’ by the 
ineffective use of an established, yet seemingly unwritten set of rules 
(Bourdieu 1977, 1990). This would appear to be one of the most difficult 
aspects of class disadvantage and obstacles to class transition. It is 
difficult to qualify the nuanced nature of cultural norms and practice that 
are conformed to and are, as it were, under the surface, coded, and not 
obvious or transparent. 
 
Indeed, one of the unsavoury psychological and contradictory spin-offs of 
this is where Sennett and Cobb’s respondents’ express resentment of the 
fact that society has created a split between the many, who are just 
‘ordinary’ workers, and the few individuals who are members of the 
professional and upper middle-class (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 73). Yet, 
despite this resentment, respondents thought of themselves as lost among 
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the ‘many’. They were afraid that there may be some truth in this image 
and were thus inheriting and harbouring the burden of self-doubt and 
shame at not striving harder to succeed. This again shows the doubly 
induced anxiety of rejection, which can trigger self-criticism to the point 
of self-condemnation. In this way, the authors demonstrate how the 
burden of class is contradictorily rationalised, whereby the upwardly 
mobile internalise this rationality and the way it impacts on those who lose 
the most by being classified as such (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 76). 
 
For the upwardly mobile of the working-class to aspire in the ways 
described here, means a degree of abandonment of or severance from the 
communities of their childhood and class roots, which can in turn engender 
a range of alien, existential and psychic upheavals (see Friedman, 2016, 
p. 139). This is as much to do with experiencing a range of cultural 
incongruities, were the aspirant doesn’t yet know the nuanced rules and 
practices of their new position and thus find themselves temporarily 
caught between two different cultural worlds during class transition. They 
feel something is wrong in terms of their sense of self, identity and place, 
which they struggle to understand and rectify. Indeed, as was noted in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, both Bourdieu and Sennett and Cobb have observed 
how misrecognition, symbolic violence, and status incongruity, can create 
a loss of a grounded, familiar, authentic self and the essential dignity that 
accompanies it. These forms of displacement of the self are shown to 
emanate from social class domination. They are transmitted through the 
reinforcement of orthodoxies internalised in the self, but also through 
contradictory residues, which the aspirant may carry in an existential and 
historical narrative on a day-to-day basis. Thus, this personalisation of 
structural conflict often leads aspirants to unjustifiably blame themselves 
for their uncomfortable predicament, while the social structures that 
reinforce these dominating processes remain hidden from view (Bourdieu 





5.4 Reflections of ontological insecurity from an existential 
sociology standpoint. 
In summarising the discussion so far, the remaining two sections of this 
final chapter identify and contextualise ontological insecurity, from an 
existential sociology perspective and through personal vignettes. These 
accounts will underline the tensions experienced during class transition. I 
suggest that such ontological tensions and preconditions of anxiety are 
centred in relation to society generally, but also to class, and are shown 
to emerge early in life and to continue throughout adulthood life. In this, 
I concur with Bourdieu (1977, 1994, 2005, 2009 and Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 2007) in that these residues of the working-class self can never 
be completely silenced or eliminated despite the aspirant’s strenuous 
efforts to assimilate into the middle-class. These residues can often leave 
an indelible mark on the aspirant’s sense of self and identity and show the 
difficulties experienced in morphing into a middle-class self. 
 
Here, the psychical tensions, ontological insecurities, and anxieties of 
upward mobility can be aligned with one of the cornerstones of existential 
sociology, that aspirants take responsibility for their actions. Crucially, this 
is predicated on the finitude and other constraints of their existence. Thus, 
in defining their changing identity aspirants may come to recognise the 
social limitations of freedom within which they choose to live. In the quest 
to flourish, the angst that can underpin social striving and the imperative 
of this life equates to the reality that, despite contending with the 
structural barriers and the individual and social limitations of class, their 
lives are finite. Within the constraints of class, it is a life that is chosen to 
be lived, with the growing awareness of time and resource constraints, 
within which aspirational potentialities can be considered and the means 
by which these may be progressed. This recognises that they have just 
this life to live and that they must strive to make it as wholesome and 
fulfilling as possible, despite the psychical tensions and ontological 
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insecurities of class that they experience. This has profound implications 
for the aspirant’s social and psychical self-management.126 
 
5.5 Personal vignettes. 
The following personal vignettes contain reflections of experiences of 
ontological insecurity and existential anxiety in my life. I use them to add 
colour to the research cited and critiqued throughout this chapter. As is 
often the case in using such examples, there is the assumption that the 
writer is attempting to ground such illustrations as representations and 
generalisations from the theoretical perspectives provided. However, it is 
not my intention to claim that these accounts are in any way 
representative of some broader pattern of mobility experience. I add them 
in support of the general thrust of the thesis discussions. I have merely 
sought to emphasise the interplay between the ‘uniqueness’ of individual 
aspirational pathways and trajectories of mobility, and the processes 
underpinning these life journeys that potentially show similarities of form 
because they are structural in nature. Thus, I wish to emphasise that in 
the absence of a formal empirical research exercise, these personal 
accounts, while offering a flavour of particularity, hopefully encourage 




Here, I consider the roots of my own class anxieties by drawing on relevant 
secondary sources used so far. Some of my conclusions certainly require 
further examination. However, the discussion in the chapter will hopefully 
have addressed these sufficiently. 
 
Where did my particular class anxieties originate? If they were (are) 
particular to me then why were they, and how were they manifest? 
Mallman contends that life trajectories of the upwardly mobile tend to 
germinate in early experiences of family and community, and that these 
 
126 Useful accounts on the constraints of freedom can be found in a number of 
texts with an existentialist focus. For example, Wartenberg 2013, p. 31; Fromm 
2007, pp. 88-109. 
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make a significant contribution to class mobility as well as class 
reproduction. Also, he argues, when class mobility is experienced it often 
involves an embodiment of the conflicts of class (Mallman 2017, p. 19-
21). 
 
I do not recall experiencing a conscious or positive sense of, or desire for 
aspiration in my early, formative years. However, this is not so surprising 
nor does it, in my view, contradict Mallman’s point. Intentions and desires 
emerging from the early life experiences in one’s home and social life can 
be reflexively ponderable and developmental, whether they be positive or 
negative, including those of a direct class-related nature. These can as it 
were, lie dormant and can re-surface later, when accumulated experiences 
and decision points arise at specific stages later in life. 
 
I noted in the thesis Introduction how I experienced a paucity of 
intellectual engagement and guided curiosity in my early home life, with 
very limited learning resources available beyond practical craftwork tools 
and an encyclopaedia! My parents had received a very limited formal 
education in their day, so their perceptions of its value were undoubtedly 
influenced by their own specific experiences of it. Although they wanted 
the best for me, in terms of school work, I recall that there was little direct 
on-task guidance or support from them, in terms of developing my 
application and concentration skills and knowing what was required from 
the school regime (see Walkerdine, Lucey and Melody 2001; Friedman 
2016; Allen 2013). Rather, I recall that I experienced the day-to-day 
excitement of much unmonitored and generally unstructured street-play, 
which was perhaps valuable in developing social bonds, but insufficient in 
preparing me for the rigors and demands of school life. 
 
However, there were issues that I began to experience relating to my dad, 
who was very insecure as an individual. This was partly due to his brutal 
experiences of life in the Royal Navy during WW2, which I think left him 
traumatised. So, I contend that he had little choice but to make the best 
of things, like many others of his class. But he would oscillate in his moods 
so markedly that I was often unable to gauge where I stood with him, and 
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how he was going to respond to me when he returned from work each 
day. Sometimes, he would be engaging and considerate, while other times 
he would ignore me and leave me feeling that I had done something 
wrong; leaving me bewildered as to what I might have done. On other 
occasions he would be very frustrated and flare up in anger and hit me or 
verbally abuse me. This was in the early to mid-1950s in post-war 
Liverpool, where scarcity and poverty was widespread among the working-
class. 
 
I recall that as I approached my teen years it seemed that my parents’ 
class-limiting horizons inhibited any chance for them to consider what 
future they might prepare for me. Moreover, it was as though the whole 
local community was feeling its way on a day-by-day basis as best it could. 
The immediate economic pressures of finding and securing work; of 
bringing a wage home; of trying to make a living, and to make a 
comfortable home in post-war Britain presented considerable challenges 
within my working-class community. Trying to overcome the constraints 
of limited social and cultural capital can be seen as a breeding ground for 
family tensions and anxieties affecting peoples’ day-to-day wellbeing and 
future prospects. 
 
This retrospective and reflexive probing of my early life in 1950s Liverpool 
leaves me to conclude that my primary socialisation, disposition, and class 
ontology was formed during such familial and social struggles. It was a 
kind of ‘microcosmic’ world so contained and ‘localised’ that in some ways 
an ‘external’ world did not exist, or could not be perceived to exist.127 I 
think these social and psychological tensions were, in many cases, 
managed by repressing or ‘masking’ the reality through behaviour such as 
humour, as people seemed to carry hope for a better future in their heads 
and hearts. The overt signs of an epoch of Individualism had not really 
arrived at this time in my community. 
 
127 As I indicated above Walkerdine et al (2001, p. 153), the anxieties experienced 
by many working-class parents is also manifest in the ‘localism’ shown in the pull 
and bonding of the ‘familiar’ in working-class communities and their desire for 
their children to stay local and their fear of them commuting long distances when 
entering Higher Education. 
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Given my parents’ personalities and the class constraints of the day, it is 
difficult to separate out, or distinguish between the psychic tensions and 
the emotional tapestry that I was developing and that I ‘held within me’. 
However, later I did develop anxieties which have persisted to this day. I 
would say that at that time, any thought of a better life, or of more hopeful 
horizons would have been in the realms of fantasy and dreams. It was as 
though these were somehow being blocked out, with my social reality 
being one of day-to-day routine and spontaneous street-level survival, 
within an unrefined and ‘culturally limited’ existence. However, my parents 
were intent on providing a comfortable home, although it was a great 
struggle for them with the threat of poverty and insufficiency being ever-
present. 
 
It is only by reflecting on these circumstances decades later, that I realise 
that I did not get a good start. For example, I was a poor reader, without 
ever knowing why, and I still find it difficult to speed or scan read. I tend 
to get by through determination rather than by skill or innate ability. It 
seemed I was destined for mediocrity and my educational experience at 
primary school and up to age eleven (in 1958) was, from memory, no 
more than satisfactory. I certainly didn’t stand out or shine in any subject 
and I think I was intuitively aware of my limitations. These academic 
strengths and weaknesses were evident from my end-of-year school 
reports which often concluded that: 
 
“He shows some promise, but he could do a lot better”! 
 
However, I was somehow keen to do well, but by the age of eleven, I had 
an instinctive feeling that I was going to fail in some way. It was just an 
embodied state of being that was present within me. So, I went to a 
secondary modern ‘dump’ school, which set me back for many years. It 
triggered a feeling of forever trying to catch up and trying to make things 
right by trying to fulfil my potential, while not knowing the limits of what 
that might be. So this, in effect, is or was at the time, my class ontology, 
and I carry the scars of that past life to this day. However, by contrast, 
there were at the time kids in my street who went to grammar schools as 
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a result of their efforts in the 11 and 13-plus national selection exercise. I 
recall how their pathways were being forged in distinctly different 
directions to mine, as a result of their educational experience. 
 
It could be said, that I was conflicted by uncertainty and insecurity and 
this, I feel, was the root of my anxiety, which I believe I internalised early 
on. I often experienced shame, rejection and loneliness. However, this 
was strange, given that in street play I was gregarious and sociable. But 
perhaps it was a coping mechanism, enabling me to ‘mask’ my 
vulnerability, and to carry a certain ‘inner will’ to ‘get on with it’. By coping 
in that world of my childhood, it might suggest the idea that one would 
get toughened up and be able to build resilience. But it didn’t happen for 
me. I was not particularly assertive and certainly not ‘alpha-male’. Nor 
was I a leader, and I recall that I lacked a sense of direction most of the 
time. Rather, there was a distinct sense of ‘muddling through’. I also 
developed a sensitivity which showed me to be vulnerable later, when in 
the company of others. So, this strange combination of sentiments and 
moods was being cultivated, but it would be difficult now to ascertain with 
any clarity how my particular ‘self’ was being formed. These are merely 
fragmented reflections of my formative years which perhaps others 
reading this may be able to recall in a similar way? 
 
As ‘homemakers’ it could be said that my parents were ‘distantly’ 
aspirational, at least in that regard; implicitly seeking to ‘keep up 
appearances’ and seeking respect from, and friendship with, neighbours. 
I think my father sought the respect from those of higher rank in his place 
of work. But he was angry with himself for not being more skilled, which 
I feel brought him his insecurities, and which I think I inherited back then. 
 
His predicament is certainly resonated in some of Sennett and Cobb’s 
(1973) respondents. As I mentioned earlier, my father would oscillate in 
his moods from intense anger and frustration at the way society was 
treating people like him, and then he would switch and appear resigned to 
his fate and become a more considerate and supportive dad to me by 
trying to make the best of a bad lot! This would have certainly rubbed off 
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on me when looking for grounded role models and not really establishing 
them from any viable source. 
 
Ontologically, I was unable, with any clear vision, to step outside of that 
environment as a confident individual. My plans were locked in fantasy 
and dreams rather than any coherent set of steps that would ‘take me 
somewhere meaningful’. Yet despite the knocks and bruises encountered 
at home, in the street and at school the overriding feeling was that ‘we 
were all in the same boat’. But of course, the social structures of the day 
had ways of contradicting this notion. It was a kind of downward facing 
solidarity. And this boat was not, at least in my personal case, destined 
for anywhere magical in terms of a future of prosperity. 
 
I have struggled many times with resilience and thoughts that my life is 
going nowhere. This to me is an existential issue as much as it is social or 
cultural, and which underpins a ‘class fatalism’ shown by many in the 
secondary sources I have cited. 
 
Here, I am mindful of Sennett and Cobb’s observations of fifth and sixth 
grade pupils in their chapter “Sources of injury”, and of Calarco’s 
observations of working-class pupils not getting the attention of their 
middle-class teacher. This shows how teachers tend to act on their 
expectations of the children in their care, in such a way, as to make the 
expectations become a reality (Sennett and Cobb 1973, p. 81; Calarco 
2011). Pupils that meet the teacher’s expectations tend to be singled out 
in subtle ways, while the ‘other’ children pick up the teacher’s hidden cues 
that their performance and level of ability would not be greeted with as 
much enthusiasm. From these research examples the ‘ordinary’ boys in 
class acted as though they were serving time, as though schoolwork and 
classes had become something to wait out; a ‘blank space’ in their lives 
that they hope to survive and fill in other ways. Even though it was noted 





However, as Sennett and Cobb note 
 
“It is as though they have lost any expectation that the school would help 
them, that this experience would change them or help them grow as 
human beings.” (Sennett and Cobb, 1973, pp. 82-83). 
 
Vignette 5.2. 
Here, I reflect further on life after school (1963) and after my time as a 
so-called ‘grease-monkey’ (1969). 
 
Despite my accounts of feeling despondent about my future in my early 
teens, I think by my late teens and early twenties things began to change. 
Much of my aspirational zeal and developing journey was made up of a 
strangely deep-rooted belief that I was actually capable of doing things 
other than those I had been doing previously. This was due, in large part 
to the middle-class social contacts I mentioned in the opening section of 
the thesis Introduction. Prior to embarking on further and then higher 
education, I began to perceive my earlier types of work as variously tiring, 
tiresome, testing, stressful, demeaning, boring and alienating. All really 
positive and life-affirming then! 
 
These experiences and sense of my predicament were countered by more 
positive periods of personal development and fulfilment, and a sense of 
achievement and pride. But I often thought that I was somehow needing 
to ‘catch up’ with what I assumed others had already achieved. This 
internalised urge to strive was, therefore, coloured by an unwanted 
competitiveness that was, in effect, a stressful, destructive driver that 
carried elements of despair for me. Perhaps these thoughts were merely 
the projections of a restless and conflicted self? But I also think it was a 
realisation of my limitations, conflicting with my ill-conceived belief that I 
could improve myself and my life and eventually ‘catch up’ with others in 
those areas of life I sought to develop. I had known many who appeared 
to demonstrate a more rapid and acute upward trajectory. However, this 
underlying preoccupation with the actions of others has been a constant 
irritation and frustration for me. Thus, while I consciously hated the 
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internalised, psychical effects of being competitive, I was often 
unconsciously and tragically drawn into encounters involving this ‘social 
deficit’ approach, which I found to be profoundly debilitating on a personal 
level. I conclude, therefore, that this uncomfortable competitivity arose 
primarily from the structural distinction and differentiation of class which 
seemed to propagate social difference and discord. 
 
In terms of this Chapter’s content much of these reflections have obvious 
relevance and hopefully resonate with the reader where applicable. I now 
offer one final recollection in the vignette series. 
 
Vignette 5.3 
I conclude these reflections on class anxieties with an account which 
essentially brings me and the reader to the present day. A final opportunity 
here to look back at a life journey with only time and room to consider a 
meaningful future and a body of, hopefully valuable experiences to pass 
on. 
 
So, what anxieties have I experienced in relation to class transition? How 
have these developed and been managed? How can I describe and critique 
them? My classed experiences of higher education followed a decade or 
more of working in various semi-skilled jobs. But I think by my early 
twenties (circa 1967) I was conscious of seeking something better. As 
indicated in Vignette 5.2, I had begun fraternising with educated, middle-
class lovers of folk music and conversing with them regarding life 
prospects. Their demeanour and their measured confidence inspired me. 
In persuasive and supportive ways, they were convincing me of my 
untapped potential. Although, from their own, more elevated, class 
situation they could not possibly have fully understood mine. 
 
However, slowly, through these interactions I began to realise that I was 
not merely a victim of some preordained (class) destiny. I could do 
something concrete and constructive about my predicament, and 
consciously focus on my emerging aspirations. I began reading books with 
an energy that I did not have previously. I met my first wife who had been 
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to a grammar school and had her sights on university. She was grounded 
and not condescending. She introduced me to learned things. I was on my 
way. 
 
So, many years, indeed, decades later (2020) I now have an opportunity 
to further reflect on how my life has developed. Of course, I still carry the 
scars (hidden injuries) of my class origins deep inside, but there are other 
parts of my former self and identity that have changed, indeed, developed. 
I have a different sense of my abilities which allows me to feel more 
confident where hitherto I would not have been. I am not as deferential 
to the middle-class ‘other’ as I once was. But I still carry a ‘chip on my 
shoulder’ from feeling diminished and having had a less than satisfactory 
education early in life. Since I was (am) a late developer I still don’t know 
when I will have caught up! But in an existential sense I know that, within 
the prescribed limits of finitude, it is in my hands, and always will be. 
 
I will, of course, continue to reflect further on these past events. But with 
that urgency of finitude I will embrace the future in the belief that my 
inner conflicts can be ‘worked through’ and there will be smoother and 




This chapter has explored some of the contexts and root causes of 
anxieties experienced by mobile aspirants undergoing class transition. By 
adopting an existential sociology perspective, the discussion has focused 
on the concept of ontological insecurity and the shifting class-related 
contexts within which this impacts on the psyche of the aspirant. In so 
doing, I have sought to make a contribution to existing discourses on the 
‘psychic landscapes of class’. In particular, I have explored the nature of 
the struggles that aspirants encounter in trying to make these psychical 
adjustments. Furthermore, I have assessed the extent to which aspirants 
are able to surpass the structural determinants of class that they face 
during social mobility and class transition. 
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Such an ontological approach has taken account of class divisions, 
structural differentiation and the existential effects that these have on 
working-class aspirants’ experiences as members of the dominated class. 
In addition, these divisions and forms of disadvantage can be shown to be 
fluid and variable in degree and over time. However, I have argued that 
persistent patterns and structures limit the opportunities for working-class 
aspirants to reflexively unpick, and make sense of their circumstances, 
and to take positive action to overcome the tensions and anxieties that 
they can harbour during the course of their classed lives. I have argued 
that each working-class aspirant can be said to have a uniquely nuanced 
set of thoughts and feelings about their past. These can be seen as 
historical residues relating to their current circumstances and to their 
sense of social place and future desires; in short, to a sense of their own 
destiny and how they can take responsibility for it. 
 
A number of assertions are therefore tested in this chapter. First, by 
adopting and embracing the prevailing values, manifest in the culture and 
practice of the middle-class, working-class aspirants are likely to face 
ontological challenges and insecurities. These emerge and form part of the 
psychical structures that inhibit the very processes of class transition, self-
transformation and identity indicative of such upwardly mobility. As has 
been discussed, aspirants are likely to become psychically unsettled in this 
breaking away from their working-class origins and this can be seen as a 
painful and existentially fraught process of reflexive disembodiment and 
re-embodiment of the self. This is what Bourdieu (1994, 2005, 2007) 
refers to as the hysteresis of the habitus. Furthermore, each agent’s 
disposition and character will have a bearing on the extent to which they 
embrace or struggle with these ontological challenges. Thus, in a 
theoretical discussion of structural determinants (see Chapters 1 and 2), 
it is important to avoid reductionist conclusions or to generalise about the 
aspirant’s experiences of class transition. The impact of such psychical 
deterministic structures will present in uniquely different ways and 
contexts to each aspirant, depending on the course of their classed life. 
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Secondly, in experiencing these ontological schisms in class transition the 
discussion suggests that aspirants often adopt ambivalent patterns of 
thought and forms of action. By being exposed to misconceptions of what 
‘more attractive’ middle-class social and cultural mores might be, aspirant 
mobiles may continue to harbour anxieties of dislocation from their 
familiar family, group and working-class origins. Such perspectives may 
result in a ‘politics of envy’ (see for example Friedman 2016, p. 138), 
owing to the inherent anger, embarrassment and emotional discomfort 
that come from aspirants mixing in unfamiliar social and cultural circles. 
This can also reduce a sense of wellbeing and flourishing, at least initially, 
by wanting to ‘belong’; to be accepted, and to integrate into a new socio-
cultural environment. However, importantly, this can also manifest in 
aspirants seeking to retain loyalty to their working-class social networks 
and communities. This sense of seeking class assimilation can, therefore, 
bring insecurities, inducing aspirants to construct, perhaps falsely, a new 
social reality, a new ‘self’ and identity and set of behaviour patterns. These 
can be shown to emerge in order to avoid feeling existentially detached or 
abandoned; of being exposed; or of standing out as someone ‘different’ 
and thus feeling out of place (Skeggs 2004; Jones 2011; Savage 2015; 
Friedman 2016). The frequent use of ‘masking’ was discussed in this 
regard. 
 
Thirdly, by recounting, and harbouring their previous, and now shifting life 
narratives, or what Archer (2003) terms internal conversations, aspirants 
can be shown to existentially reflect of their classed past and future 
prospects. This sense of shifting selfhood and identity is a complex area 
of enquiry, and again, is considered unique to each aspirant. By asking 
“Who have I been, who am I now, and who am I becoming?” there is a 
growing issue of where and how the aspirant’s past is brought into sharp 
focus by the class transformations and mutations taking place. 
 
As Sennett (2004) argues, individuals can develop with the conscious 
awareness of doing something well for its own sake. But this is not simply 
a question of personal ambition; rather it provides the individual with a 
sense of self-respect through a becoming from within the self. Thus, there 
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is the implicit suggestion that the roots of aspiration and wellbeing may 
not be directly or obviously linked to the externalities of action, or an 
accumulation of aptitudes. Rather, that there is an ontological thread, 
which forms a bridge to the possibilities of greater self-enhancement. 
 
As an approach, existential sociology usefully questions the motivations 
underpinning human aspiration and personal striving. Indeed, the act of 
striving itself and the effort required in this, implies the emergence of 
stresses and the need for coping strategies, in order to manage the 
sociological and psychical challenges that aspirants face (see Friedman 
2016, p. 145). One of most important ontological facts about human 
beings is that they inherently demand that things make sense, in terms 
that can be understood and that their world is therefore deemed to be 
rational (Wartenberg, 2013, p. 114). However, by extension, the 
construction or evolution of class societies as rational entities would seem 




The reader should recall the central theme of this thesis. This has been to 
undertake a critique of the ways in which socially mobile working-class 
aspirants experience structural, emotional, ontological and existential 
barriers and anxieties when attempting to build a better life and to 
integrate into the middle-class. I have focused on the structural 
determinants of class and how these are internalised and thus impact on 
the ‘psychical interiority’ of aspirants. These determinants are shown to 
affect aspirants’ sense of class identity which can be said to shift during 
their mobility trajectories. In so doing, this can create psychical conflicts 
within the embodied self or habitus (Bourdieu 1977). This exploration has 
necessitated an examination of relevant secondary research sources on 
class, social mobility, class transition; the embodied dispositional self, 
reflexivity and existential sociology. 
 
As a core theme, I have critiqued the experiential effects of aspirants 
striving to feel at one with themselves while functioning in middle-class 
environments and I have framed these struggles as ‘hidden injuries’ taken 
from the seminal text by Sennett and Cobb (1973). This has provided a 
good basis, alongside Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, upon which to 
explore particular class-related issues in the mobility of aspirants, which I 
have examined in separate chapters. 
 
In the Introduction and in Chapter 1, I provided some essential definitions 
of social mobility and outlined the different forms this can take. I briefly 
evaluated Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, capital, doxa, 
misrecognition and symbolic violence and domination. This enabled a 
critique of the structural determinants of class as barriers to mobility. 
Chapter 2 focused on Bourdieu’s most familiar concepts of habitus and 
field in the form of a selection of critiques from his adherents and critics 
and considered the extent of determinism in the habitus. The essential 
point was to show how the internalisation and the embodied self (habitus) 
of the aspirant might reflexively transcend the structural determinants of 
class. Chapter 3 attempted to link the challenges to aspirants of low self-
esteem that may be encountered when experiencing middle-class 
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domination in various settings. Other emotions were evaluated that could 
be triggered in such situations and how these too might have a bearing on 
the changes in selfhood and identity resulting from social class mobility. 
In Chapter 4, I explored the ways in which aspirants can experience 
‘inauthenticity’ and a loss of the ‘familiar’ self in middle-class settings. I 
showed how aspirant mobiles often experience the ‘imposter syndrome’ 
and feel out of their depth and in the wrong social place and space. 
Chapter 4 also introduced an existential sociology approach drawing out 
the main tenets of such an approach. Finally, in Chapter 5, I considered 
the ontological challenges involved in reflexively managing these psychical 
states in everyday life, which is the central theme of the thesis. I argued 
that this sense of the ‘unfamiliar’, and ontological insecurity can induce 
existential anxieties which are difficult to resolve within the mobility 
trajectory of the aspirant. 
 
Throughout the thesis I have taken a ‘theory-only’, that is, a non-empirical 
approach in addressing the central area of study. Consequently, in the 
absence of primary data, I have drawn upon secondary sources from 
sociology, social psychology and, to a limited degree, existential sociology, 
to critique these theoretical perspectives. I have used Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1990, 2007) and applied it 
in the area of working-class aspiration and class transition. To complement 
and to form a bridge between these theoretical critiques, I have compiled 
a number of historical accounts as vignettes of my own experiences of 
aspiration and class transition. In these I have also expressed the class-
related difficulties I experienced when trying to move out and away from 
my original class circumstances and in seeking a place of ‘belonging’ and 
a stronger self-concept to more effectively facilitate my mobility 
trajectory. The challenges discussed in these personal accounts are 
intended to resonate with the secondary sources used. I have therefore, 
used these accounts as an illustrative device for the reader, emphasising 




However, I have also included these accounts to emphasise my view that 
in each case of mobility, aspirants can present with uniquely nuanced 
characteristics and circumstances. Nevertheless, there may be similar and 
shared experiences and patterns of aspiration and mobility among aspirant 
mobiles from across the working-class. However, it has not been my 
intention to assert that these might exist as broad generalisations. The 
research outcomes, therefore, provide a summation of the experiences 
and the impacts of class division and inequality on aspirant mobiles from 
the selected secondary sources; their reactions to these, and the 
strategies they adopt to resolve the resulting inner tensions. Moreover, in 
so doing I have not side-stepped the need to register these sentiments 
and the psychical conflicts that these experiences have brought. 
 
My early point was to assert that while the class structure persists and is 
retained in the psychical interiority of aspirants, the terrain of class is 
continually being realigned and reshaped in Westernised classed societies 
through the struggles between classes. I have asserted that the place of 
aspirant mobiles in these struggles is a feature of the ‘meritocratic 
imperative’. I have argued that this is a rhetorical and doxic device 
designed to ensure the continuing clamber and striving for a better life. 
Perhaps contentiously, I have argued that this is falsely portrayed as a 
wholesome entity (see Sennett and Cobb, 1973, p. 170; Allen, 2013, p. 
761; Reay 1997b; Skeggs 2004). 
 
I began the thesis by defining the framing concepts of social aspiration 
and social mobility and followed this by considering the complex interplay 
between determinism and voluntarism in the way aspirants inwardly 
negotiate their aspirational pathway. I also briefly discussed the familiar 
duality of structure and agency, but stressed that I didn’t want to delve 
into this debate since it would detract from the main theme of the thesis, 
that is, the ways in which aspirants experience mobility and how the 
embodied self is affected in this process. However, despite the need to 
marginalise the structure/agency discussion, I considered there to be an 
inescapable value in exploring the processes of internalisation and the 
social/cultural worlds of the aspirant by considering Bourdieu’s habitus as 
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‘history, forgotten as history’ and in locating his use of this in the conscious 
and unconscious interplay of habituated practice and the aspirant’s 
struggle with the endemic inequalities of classed society. 
 
I also didn’t want to lose focus by getting distracted in a protracted 
discussion on the prevailing social value of individualism although, from 
the research undertaken, this did appear to underpin the rationale behind, 
and practice of, social class mobility. The opportunities for class transition 
in a class society are there for working-class mobiles if they choose to 
strive to become middle-class as a perceived pathway in securing a better 
life. However, I have reinforced the key point that this is not the only 
option open to them, although this is the central message within a given 
‘rhetoric of meritocracy’. However, while aspirant mobiles may have some 
latitude in transforming and elevating their social and cultural status and 
wellbeing, the thesis argues that this remains, for the most part, 
inaccessible to the majority of working-class citizens largely due to the 
lack of various forms of (symbolic) capital (Bourdieu, 1986). However, for 
brevity and focus I have made brief mention of these discussions. 
 
In critiquing the barriers to aspiration, mobility and class transition the 
main thrust of the exploration has been in understanding how these 
psychic vulnerabilities are experienced by aspirants. Also, why and how 
aspirants’ experiences of mobility can often profoundly affect their sense 
of worth and belonging in their transition to the middle-class. I have 
argued that it is this problem of an often ‘conflicted interiority’ and of a 
reflexive embodied self, or habitus that is at the centre of this enquiry. 
This has been considered alongside the externalities of social and cultural 
tastes and other signifiers of class (Bourdieu 1984). When coupled 
together these two major forces, the internalisation of norms and the 
impact of shifting class signifiers, are shown to reinforce the structural 
determinants of class disadvantage and to be burdensome to many 
aspirants in their assimilating into a middle-class life. 
 
Furthermore, it has been the contention that because of this ‘conflicted 
structural interiority’ (process of internalisation) many aspirants are 
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unlikely to fully achieve class transition and personal self-actualisation in 
a harmonious fashion, without sufficient access to, or possession of, the 
necessary social, cultural, symbolic and emotional capital. There is, I 
argue, scope for looking further at internalisation, and towards a social 
psychology that examines further the hidden injuries of class and selfhood 
across a wider research population. 
 
However, as implied here, some forms of class mobility do not result in 
class transition. That is, some working-class aspirants undertake short-
range trajectories and make quite limited advancements in their social, 
cultural and occupational lives without actually leaving the working-class. 
Thus, while my focus has been towards those aspirants whose trajectories 
have taken them into the socio-cultural world of the middle-class it is 
important to appreciate that many encounter psychical disruption and 
other forms of hysteresis even though they do not experience such a 
complete form of class transition.128 Further research on these ‘marginal’ 
mobiles would seem to be worthwhile. 
 
Primarily, the thesis has encapsulated critiques and arguments about the 
extent to which aspirants are able to manage and transcend such 
internalised or habituated psychical class barriers which are shown to 
reinforce and compliment the ‘external’ structurally determinant forces of 
class. The psychical nature of reflexivity for the aspirant has necessitated 
a critique of selected conceptual mechanisms principally applied from the 
work of Bourdieu, and particularly in relation to his use of the reflexive 
habitus (the embodied, dispositional self). I have used this framing 
concept to consider the ways in which aspirants might adjust to a shifting, 
transitional and post-transitional class identity and existence. 
 
 
128 I reiterate here that Friedman argues that this runs counter to the positions of 
others such as Goldthorpe (1980) who argue that aspirant mobiles are 
overwhelmingly content with the progress of their lives and are rarely plagued by 
any cultural or emotional disequilibrium (see Friedman 2016, p. 133). 
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However, as I showed in Chapter 2, the strength of this reflexive capability 
and agency has raised concerns regarding the extent of determinism in 
Bourdieu’s use of the habitus. In turn, this has brought into focus 
questions about the strength of evidence supporting the idea of working-
class aspirants having sufficient agency to be able to make such a class 
transition and to fully adapt to middle-class ways of being, and socio-
cultural life. I have noted that Archer (2003) among others, has been 
instrumental in critiquing Bourdieu’s determinism in the habitus, where 
she argues that agency is strong enough to transcend these structural 
constraints through managing and formulating appropriate internal 
conversations. However, she did not discuss ‘class’ aspirants as such. 
 
I have argued, with the support of others such as Crossley (2001) and 
Chandler (2013) that there is both a danger of voluntarism in positions 
such as Archer’s, and in the context of this thesis an underestimating of 
the impact and struggle by some aspirants, in transcending habitual 
thinking and feelings of embodied selfhood which Bourdieu highlighted. 
Thus, I have argued that while a reflexive habitus might bring specific 
challenges for working-class aspirants, that is, in harbouring a ‘conflicted 
classed self’ as a barrier to an effective self-examination, it would seem to 
provide a good basis for internally reconciling and managing class 
transition. In this way the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2 were important 
in conveying a structural-determinist bias towards an ‘ingrained’ habitus. 
In the context of aspiration, mobility and class transition, this is important 
in recognising the limits to reflexivity, as Bourdieu’s interpretations of the 
habitus were positioned. I have also discussed the limits of reflexivity 
when using sociological and social psychological lenses. I also noted that 
in his early career Bourdieu dismissed psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapeutic methods as a viable approach to reconciling and 
transcending structural barriers. However, later he appeared to appreciate 
the value and benefits of these and developed a similar nomenclature 
(Steinmetz 2006, p. 450, Fourny 2000; Bourdieu 1977, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, the discussion on the habitus was to show it to be a useful 
framing concept for speculatively understanding the interiority of the 
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aspirational self. This was so since its internal structure offered both the 
potential for self-generated change, through its reflexive capacity, and 
limitation, through its determinism, in the form of normative compliance 
and its history of internalised embodiment and disposition, for a range of 
possible mobility trajectories. For the aspirant, the chosen trajectory 
would thus be contingent on both psychical and social ‘other’-related 
possibilities. 
 
In setting out my argument for a broader and deeper understanding of 
the structural limitations of working-class mobility, I have also integrated 
other key Bourdieusian concepts into the thesis, such as misrecognition 
and symbolic violence and provided contextual illustrations. Similarly, in 
what Bourdieu calls doxa, I have showed how such powerful concepts of 
class domination can tend to go unspoken because ‘it goes without saying’ 
how social class reality and practice is perceived and received (Bourdieu 
1977). This was done in order to develop the argument that the social field 
of class is shown, paradoxically and contradictorily, to limit the personal 
trajectories of many working-class mobiles. 
 
This has led me to critique the work of Sennett and Cobb (1973) and the 
‘hidden injuries of class’. The authors elicited numerous accounts of 
respondents struggling to rationalise their experiences of their own 
mobility trajectories and the psychical, ontological and existential fallout 
from such experiences. This examination revealed concerns about the 
anxieties that lay behind their sense of self and identity as a result of shifts 
in class status, and how these did, or did not, resonate with my own 
psychical uneasiness or those of other mobiles that I had examined in the 
secondary sources. In particular, the authors’ interpretations of such 
ontological insecurity pinpointed the contradictory patterns of the 
respondents’ thoughts and feelings. These were showing higher than 
expected levels of self-effacement and lack of dignity and self-worth, even 
when it was unequivocally evident that they had worked hard and 
‘deserved’, that is, were ‘entitled’ to the respect that they were unable to 
embody. This for me (and for the authors) was a major trigger and 
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suspicion that something very odd was happening in the worlds of these 
respondents. 
 
However, it wasn’t simply that Sennett and Cobb’s respondents carried 
insecurities in their mobility trajectories. Rather, it was that it was much 
more a part of their being; their existential reality, that was for them an 
abiding ontological disempowerment that it seemed they would never be 
able to resolve. They, as in my own case, were unable to shake off the 
injurious residues of a class identity, a legacy that was indelibly, 
psychically immovable. Again, further research on the incidence of 
aspirants taking up various forms of therapy and how they did, or did not, 
overcome their ontological tensions and insecurities would seem 
worthwhile, albeit beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The thesis has considered other psychical features pertinent to a shifting 
working-class aspirant identity and how these may or may not be resolved 
when becoming assimilated into middle-class social and cultural life. My 
intention in exploring aspirants’ sense of self-worth and self-esteem, has 
been to see how these are linked with, or are part of, feelings and 
emotions such as shame, self-loathing and a lack of self-belief, self-
respect and dignity. I wanted to see whether these ‘negative’ features of 
selfhood may, or may not be minimised or dissolved, in the adjustment of 
the habitus and a change in class identity. From a number of secondary 
sources that I have used, the conflicting evidence for this has not enabled 
me to assert that a direct correlation is evident. This was surprising since 
in my own case, experiencing low self-esteem, for example, seemed to 
intensify when my own class-related inadequacies were exposed. The 
‘imposter syndrome’ and the ‘fish-out-of-water’ scenarios I have included 
have also showed how such ‘inadequacies’ as a sense of unworthiness or 
worthlessness can be triggered and can linger in the aspirant’s psyche. 
The thesis has explored these specific areas of character, personality and 
selfhood in the sense of aspirants’ adjusted identities being based on their 
accumulated life experiences and narratives, and how the deeply held and 
internalised barriers to flourishing can remain buried and largely illusive. 
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The thesis has drawn heavily on the work of Bourdieu in seeking to show 
how aspirants tend to be, metaphorically speaking, psychically and socially 
attuned, like a bird with an irreparably damaged wing. In attempting to 
develop and shine they tend to embrace and re-live patterns of self-doubt 
and harbour past insecurities that negatively impact on their levels of self-
regard, esteem and motivation. Thus, their striving for self-actualisation 
and for a clearer sense of resignation of a ‘familiar self’ is marred insofar 
as they find themselves ill-equipped to access appropriate forms of 
knowledge, (an epistemological issue) and information (a socio-cultural 
issue) in achieving their personal goals or aspirations. For example, an 
examination of Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus shows how such 
ingrained self-perceptions are ‘glue-like’ and fixed until specific life events 
provide opportunities for intense self-reflection from which shifts in self-
actualisation may materialise in the form of a post-hysteresis. Thus, I have 
tried to argue that aspirants can, and obviously do, achieve their life goals, 
but not without carrying these psychical injuries and challenges. 
 
My decision to include a discussion on an existential sociology perspective 
is based on the necessity to show that it is a useful approach for showing 
how the anxieties experienced by working-class aspirants are an inevitable 
manifestation of a class rationality. I wanted to introduce such an 
approach to show the temporal imperative built into the life destinies of 
aspirant mobiles and the urgency that often underpins their endeavours. 
That is, how they are generically empowered to determine their own 
destinies. However, mobile aspirants are still subjected to the social forces 
of class domination, and of class disadvantage. Thus, when considering 
their destinies aspirants would need to be mindful of these structural 
determinants and not to imagine that by being mobile, they will be 
presented with limitless opportunities to acquire social and cultural capital 
in their symbolic forms. The thesis tries to show how and why these will 
be a struggle to acquire and that the limits and opportunities are not only 
within the individual aspirant’s disposition or character to overcome. Thus, 
aspirants will need to be aware of the extent of these structural obstacles 
in their daily lives. They will need to avoid the distorted and dangerously 
misguided voluntarism that can be invoked through the socio-cultural 
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mantra and rhetoric of meritocracy that keeps large sections of the 
working-class striving to achieve ‘success’ and a flourishing life. 
 
To summarise, the thesis makes a novel contribution to existing debates 
on social mobility by focusing on the psychical interiority of mobile 
aspirants from the working-class. The psychological tensions and 
ontological anxieties they experience alongside the structural-determinist 
barriers of class are shown to be key components and inhibitors affecting 
class transition. The thesis argues that aspirants are likely to carry 
injurious residues of their classed origins within their mobility trajectories. 
With the inclusion of personal accounts of mobility, the thesis has shown 
that these often impose social and cultural constraints on a successful 
transition into the middle-class. 
 
Studies of the psychic landscape of class show that a fragmentation of 
selfhood, resulting from inner-class tensions, is ontologically challenging 
to the self through the confusions regarding identity at play when 
escaping, realigning and then accepting a re-formed self as a result of 
class transition. These ontological challenges and insecurities of aspiration 
and upward mobility have been explored throughout the thesis. 
 
As I pointed out in thesis Introduction this study of class mobility does not 
focus directly or heavily on other forms of inequality, exploitation or 
domination. However, implicit in the critiques is the recognition of research 
on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability and their 
relevance to discourses on class. Where necessary, I have indicated where 
class inequalities link with these other bodies of research and have used 
examples accordingly. 
 
In the construction of the thesis it has often proved challenging to find 
suitable words to suit the context I have been addressing. Therefore, the 
vocabulary used in the discussions on the embodied self may seem 
awkward at times. Terms such as ‘beingness’ and ‘becoming’, authenticity 
and inauthenticity, true-self and false-self, are ‘best fit’ attempts at 
registering the ontological and existential sociology approach taken. 
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Further empirical research would help in clarifying how aspiration and 
social mobility are currently practiced within the working-class given the 
fluidity and mutability of class relations and structures. Also, what specific 
issues of relevance emerge from my personal vignettes. In pinpointing 
‘processes of internalisation’ this may also provide a theoretical 
underpinning for future empirical research on the kinds of self-reflexivity 
and ’internal narratives’ that might surface among working-class aspirants 
and reveal the perspectives and motives within. Further empirical research 
on reflexive types (post Archer 2010) specifically related to class mobility 
and transition would seem to be a useful undertaking. There is perhaps, 
also scope for further empirical research to establish a more complete 
picture of aspirants’ feelings and sentiments and ‘states of being’ 
(ontology) when engaging in a reflexive analysis of embodied selves and 
how tensions of aspirational striving might affect the habitus of aspirants. 
Furthermore, it may be that only by detailing specific case examples could 
we confirm Bourdieu’s theoretical position with regard to the ‘splitting’ 
(hysteresis) of the habitus and the existential and emotional consequences 
of this. 
 
Finally, it would be beneficial to engage in an empirical enquiry into the 
ways and extent to which aspirant mobiles actually lose, in an ontological 
sense, the embodiment of their working-class self, in ‘becoming’ middle-
class, in the sense of acquiring a new identity. Can they actually develop 
a new identity and completely shed their working-class ‘ways of being’? 
What are the implications for the self if they cannot? How ‘real’ and ‘true’ 





The factors that triggered my social mobility:  
 
• In most respects I had outgrown mum and dad’s attitudes (not an 
uncommon occurrence) 
• I had experienced a contrast of approaches to life by meeting my 
wife’s parents, who weren’t necessarily better people. They weren’t. 
But they were ‘different’ in social and political outlook 
• I had seen dead ends because of my limited level of competence in 
working in the garage trade  
• I had met a group of people who became friends, many of whom 
were going through to higher education, or were there already, or 
who were working in cleaner and more ‘respectable’ professional 
jobs 
• They, and my wife had opened my eyes to reading books and I was 
reading much more than I’d ever done, and with enthusiasm 
• I’d seen and ‘felt’ the prospects of other options and pathways of 
life 
• I’d developed a modicum of self-belief and positivity, although I was 
conscious of being so far behind some of my friends. They’d had a 
better educational experience up to and post-18 
• I no longer carry a sceptical, ‘anti-intellectual’ disposition (inverted 
snobbery?) as a ‘mask’ or cover to protect me in my much-felt 
comparative ignorance. This was the deeply felt ‘residue’ of a 
‘workerist’ attitude to employment, (the idea that manual work is 
the only ‘real’ work) a kind of misguided, short-sighted, uncultured 
and defensive way of thinking, feeling and being. This, as I say, was 
a result of feeling insignificant and worthless when I compared 
myself to the friends and others, I’d begun to mix with 
• However, the above factors drove me to enrol at a local college. A 
transformative experience owing to inspirational tuition, and things 
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